8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 CARTER RESERVOIR MUSTANGS, INC., No. 2:25-cv-3252 WBS DMC 13 et al.,
14 Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 15 v. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 16 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, et al., 17 Defendants. 18
19 ----oo0oo---- 20 This case involves claims brought pursuant to several 21 federal statutes challenging Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) 22 decisions regarding the relocation of wild horses. (See First 23 Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 12).) Plaintiffs now move for 24 preliminary injunctive relief on the ten claims they raise in the 25 FAC. (Docket No. 22.) Specifically, they seek to temporarily 26 halt a scheduled removal of so-called excess wild horses in 27 Northeastern California. (Id. at 10.) 28 1 I. Background 2 Plaintiffs primarily challenge BLM’s 2025 Gather Plan 3 and its scheduled execution. The 2025 Gather Plan authorizes the 4 “gather and removal” of wild horses in three locations, called 5 Herd Management Areas (“HMAs”): the Carter Reservoir HMA, the 6 Buckhorn HMA, and the Coppersmith HMA.1 (FAC at 24.) BLM 7 arrived at this plan by relying upon “Appropriate Management 8 Levels” (“AMLs”) for wild horses. (Id.) An AML is the 9 population of wild horses that a given area of land can sustain. 10 (Id.) The relied-upon AMLs have their own histories: They were 11 “set, modified, or reaffirmed” through the “1981 Cowhead/Massacre 12 Land Use Plan MFP,2 1985/1989 Carter Reservoir HMA Herd 13 Management Area Plan, 2003 Carter Reservoir AML 14 Establishment/Capture Plan, . . . 2008 Surprise Resource 15 Management Plan,” the 1984 Coppersmith Herd Management Area Plan, 16 and the 1984 Buckhorn Herd Management Area Plan, many of which 17 plaintiffs also challenge. (Id. at 24—25, 31—32.) 18 a. The Carter Reservoir HMA 19 The Cowhead/Massacre Land Use Plan, which BLM adopted 20 in 1981, addressed 769,000 acres of public land and established 21 the Carter Reservoir HMA. (Id. at 25—26.) In establishing the 22 Carter Reservoir HMA as part of this plan, BLM stated that 23
24 1 The FAC contains a veritable herd of acronyms scattered throughout its body. The court – which is not a subject-matter 25 expert in agency action regarding the management of wild horses - - finds these acronyms challenging to wrangle. 26
27 2 An “MFP” is defined in the instant motion as a Management Framework Plan. (Docket No. 22 at 11.) 28 1 “40,000 acres would be provided for a total population of 20 to 2 30 horses,” with 300 Animal Unit Months (“AUMs”) of forage. (Id. 3 at 26.) An AUM is defined by BLM as “the amount of forage 4 necessary to sustain one adult horse . . . for one month.” (Id. 5 at 12.) Plaintiffs allege that the AML of 20 to 30 horses was 6 “not based on evidence, analysis or appropriate studies” and 7 “improperly limited” to the “geographic area” of 40,000 acres. 8 (Id.) They further allege that, in selecting the boundaries for 9 the Carter Reservoir HMA, BLM failed to “take into account water 10 resources needed to sustain a viable horse population.” (Id. at 11 27.) 12 In 1985, BLM adopted a HMAP for the Carter Reservoir 13 HMA, specifically. (Id.) Pursuant to this plan, BLM reduced the 14 acreage of the Carter Reservoir HMA from 40,000 to 23,200 15 “without any analysis, rationale, or discussion.” (Id.) BLM did 16 not, however, alter its 1981 AML of 20 to 30 horses in its 1985 17 HMAP. (Id.) Nor did it explain why. (See id. at 27—28.) 18 BLM revised some provisions of the Carter Reservoir 19 HMAP in 1989 but did not modify the Carter Reservoir HMA’s 20 boundaries or AML. (Id. at 28.) In 2003, BLM adopted the 21 “Carter Reservoir AML Establishment/Capture Plan,” which 22 increased the AML for the Carter Reservoir HMA from 20 to 30 wild 23 horses to 25 to 35 wild horses. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that, 24 in arriving at this increased AML in 2003, BLM failed to 25 “consider habitat suitability,” namely, the lack of available 26 vegetation and water for the wild horses during the winter 27 months. (See id. at 28—29.) 28 1 Five years later, BLM adopted the 2008 Surprise 2 Resource Management Plan. (Id. at 30.) This plan did not alter 3 the 2003 AML for wild horses in the Carter Reservoir HMA, nor did 4 it analyze whether the Carter Reservoir was a suitable habitat 5 for wild horses, and, if not, whether the HMA should have been 6 enlarged or altered. (See id.) 7 b. The Coppersmith and Buckhorn HMAs 8 In 1979, BLM adopted the Tuledad/Home Camp Management 9 Framework Plan, which established an AML of 80 to 100 horses for 10 the Tuledad HMA. (Id. at 30.) BLM established this AML by, 11 among other things, considering available land and forage. (See 12 id.) 13 Four years later, the Tuledad HMA was divided into the 14 Coppersmith HMA and Buckhorn HMA. (Id.) After meeting with 15 interested individuals, BLM and those individuals informally 16 agreed that an AML of 50 to 75 horses would be appropriate for 17 the Coppersmith HMA and the Buckhorn HMA, each. (See id.) 18 In 1984, BLM adopted a HMAP for the Coppersmith HMA 19 that affirmed, but did not re-evaluate, the AML of 50 to 75 20 horses informally agreed to the previous year. (See id. at 31) 21 BLM did the same in creating a HMAP for the Buckhorn HMA. (See 22 id.) 23 c. The 2025 Gather Plan 24 Last year, BLM adopted the Carter Reservoir, Buckhorn, 25 and Coppersmith Wild Horse Gather and Population Control Plan, 26 known as the 2025 Gather Plan. (Id.) The 2025 Gather Plan 27 28 1 provides for the “gather and removal of” hundreds of “excess wild 2 horses” in the previously-described HMAs. (See id. at 24.) 3 According to plaintiffs, this plan did not involve the 4 adjustment or re-calculation of the above-described AMLs. (See 5 id. at 32.) Rather, the 2025 Gather Plan contained a 6 “determination that an overpopulation [of wild horses] exists in 7 the Carter Reservoir, Buckhorn, and Coppersmith HMAs,” the 8 corresponding AMLs for which plaintiffs allege were “not based on 9 appropriate evidence, studies, and analysis; and/or were based on 10 acreage different from that addressed in earlier land use plans 11 and decisions.” (Id.) Plaintiffs then detail the further, 12 allegedly deficient actions BLM took (or did not take) in 13 adopting the 2025 Gather Plan. (See id. at 32—33.) 14 d. Executing the 2025 Gather Plan 15 On March 13, 2026, BLM solidifed its plans to 16 operationalize the 2025 Gather Plan. (See Docket No. 22 at 25.) 17 Specifically, BLM aims to gather and remove 470 wild horses from 18 the Carter Reservoir HMA, 273 wild horses from the Buckhorn HMA, 19 and 113 wild horses from the Coppersmith HMA. (Id.) These 20 gathers, which the court will refer to as the September 2026 21 Gathers, are currently scheduled to be executed between September 22 1, 2026, and September 30, 2026. (Id.) 23 Plaintiffs seek to preliminarily enjoin the September 24 2026 Gathers on the grounds that they violate the Wild Free- 25 Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WHA), 16 U.S.C. § 1332, et seq.; 26 the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLMPA), 43 U.S.C. § 27 1701 et seq.; the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 28 1 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; and the Administrative Procedure Act 2 (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (Docket No. 22 at 2.) Defendants 3 oppose plaintiffs’ motion. (Docket No. 32.) 4 II. The Plaintiffs 5 Plaintiffs consist of (1) a nonprofit, Carter Reservoir 6 Mustangs, Inc. (“CRMI”), (2) CRMI’s president and founder Darice 7 Massey, (3) another nonprofit, Wild Horse Education (“WHE”), (4) 8 WHE’s president and founder Laura Leigh, and (5) Billo Michael 9 Comola. (See FAC at 2—6.)3 10 Carter Reservoir Mustangs, Inc., founded in 2015, 11 serves to “educate[] and inform[] the public about the wild 12 horses and burros in the Carter Reservoir Herd Management Area,” 13 through various media. (Id. at 2—3.) Its “mission is to provide 14 effective means for conserving the irreplaceable Carter Reservoir 15 Spanish-Iberian Mustangs for generations to come,” which it 16 executes by, among other things, conducting research regarding 17 these animals, developing a conservation center to house and care 18 for them, and educating the public regarding their importance. 19 (Id. at 3.) Members and volunteers of CRMI routinely visit the 20 Carter Reservoir HMA to “view, study, and document the Carter 21 Mustangs,” and intend to continue doing so for the “foreseeable 22 future on no less than an annual basis.” (Id.) 23 Massey adopted her first Carter Mustang in May 2004 and 24 has since “owned, trained, or worked with at least an additional 25 eight” such Mustangs. (Id.) Since 2012, she has visited the 26 27 3 The court refers to Massey, Leigh, and Comola as the “individual plaintiffs,” and CRMI and WHE as the “organizational 28 1 Carter Reservoir HMA “approximately four to six times per year” 2 to observe the wild Carter Mustangs; she plans to continue her 3 visits at the same frequency for the foreseeable future. (Id.) 4 Indeed, because of her frequent visits, she “knows the wild 5 Mustangs in the . . . Reservoir . . . intimately by name” and has 6 “developed a strong bond with” them. (Id. at 4.) She has 7 communicated the importance of protecting these horses to BLM 8 individually and through her organization, CRMI. (See id.) 9 Wild Horse Education, as its name suggests, is 10 “dedicated to research, journalism, and public education 11 concerning the activities and operations of federal and state 12 management of the free roaming horse and wild burro populations.” 13 (Id.) Like CRMI, its mission is to “protect and preserve wild 14 horses and burros” through “public education,” engagement with 15 BLM, and other means. (Id.) Since WHE’s inception in 2011, 16 WHE’s “members and supporters” have visited the locations at 17 which BLM plans to relocate wild horses to “view, photograph, and 18 document the wild horses” there. (Id. at 5.) These individuals 19 have accordingly “developed strong emotional connections with the 20 wild horses” they have observed. (Id.) 21 Leigh has been visiting the wild horses at issue for 22 approximately fifteen years and plans to continue visiting them 23 for the foreseeable future. (Id.) Like Massey, she has also 24 communicated the importance of protecting the wild Carter 25 Mustangs to BLM both individually and through her organization, 26 WHE. (Id.) 27 28 1 Comola “routinely visits the Carter wild horses” in the 2 Carter Reservoir HMA and has “done so for many years.” (Id.) He 3 “gains great satisfaction from seeing the horses and other 4 animals living peacefully in their natural environment.” (Id.) 5 He also purchased a property near the Mustangs, which he began 6 renting to individuals who sought to view those Mustangs in 2023. 7 (Id.) He alleges that, if BLM is permitted to relocate the 8 Mustangs, his “ability to rent” his property “will . . . be 9 negatively impacted.” (Id. at 6.) He has expressed his 10 opposition to the 2025 Gather Plan to BLM directly. (Id.) 11 III. Preliminary Injunction 12 A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and 13 drastic remedy” that should not be granted “unless the movant, by 14 a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. 15 Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (emphasis in 16 original). Thus, plaintiffs, as the party “seeking a 17 preliminary injunction,” must “establish that [they are] likely 18 to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer 19 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 20 balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction 21 is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 22 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The last two factors “merge when 23 the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 24 418, 435 (2009). 25 “[A]s a threshold matter, [p]laintiff[s] must have 26 standing to sue.” Rosenblum v. Does 1-10, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 27 1132 (D. Or. 2020). The court addresses this “threshold 28 1 jurisdictional [issue]” first. See Pirozzi v. Apple, Inc., 966 2 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 3 IV. Article III Standing 4 “To establish constitutional standing, plaintiffs must 5 demonstrate three elements”: (1) an injury-in-fact that is 6 “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”; (2) a 7 causal connection, meaning the injury must be “fairly traceable” 8 to the “conduct complained of,” and (3) redressability, meaning 9 that a “favorable decision” would be “likely to redress the 10 injury-in-fact.” Barnum Timber Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 633 F.3d 894, 11 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). Plaintiffs must 12 “demonstrate standing for each claim [they] seek[] to press.” 13 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). 14 a. Counts Nine and Ten 15 In Counts Nine and Ten of the FAC, plaintiffs allege 16 that the 2025 Gather Plan, which BLM seeks to operationalize via 17 the currently planned September 2026 Gathers, is unlawful under 18 the WHA, NEPA, and APA. (See FAC at 43—45.) Plaintiffs have 19 standing to do so. 20 It is well-established that “the desire to use or 21 observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is 22 undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.” Lujan 23 v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992); see also In 24 Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 25 1262 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (England, J.) (finding that “diminished 26 ability to interact with, view and enjoy wild horses and burros” 27 constituted Article III injury). Each of the individual 28 1 plaintiffs plainly alleges a desire to observe and document the 2 Carter Mustangs that would be trampled upon by the execution of 3 the 2025 Gather Plan. (See FAC at 3—4 (Massey), 5 (Leigh and 4 Comola), 6 (Massey, Leigh, and Comola).) Unlike the plaintiffs 5 in Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, the individual plaintiffs here 6 concretely assert that they plan to observe the Carter Mustangs 7 in the future. See 504 U.S. at 563—64. 8 For years, Massey has been visiting, and will continue 9 to visit, the Carter Reservoir HMA approximately four to six 10 times per year to observe and document the Carter Mustangs. (See 11 FAC at 3.) Leigh, likewise, has been visiting the Carter 12 Reservoir HMA for years to observe and document the Carter 13 Mustangs, with her last visit in 2025; she states that she plans 14 to continue her regular visits for the foreseeable future. 15 (Docket No. 16-3 at 2.) And Comola, who lives in Surprise 16 Valley, also routinely visits the nearby Carter Reservoir HMA to 17 observe the Carter Mustangs and has done so for many years; he, 18 too, plans to continue his regular visits for the foreseeable 19 future. (Docket No. 16-2 at 2.) 20 Moreover, Comola states that he owns a property in 21 “proximity to” the Carter Mustangs, and that “[p]ast and current 22 tenants” have rented this property to “view” those Mustangs. 23 (Docket No. 12 at 5—6.) He claims that, if a large number of 24 these Mustangs were to be relocated, his “ability to rent this . 25 . . property” would be “negatively impacted.” (Id.) Comola’s 26 alleged, economic injury -- a potential loss of rental income -- 27 28 1 is a “quintessential injury-in-fact.” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 2 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 As for CRMI and WHE, they have associational standing 4 based on their members’ individual standing. “[A]n association 5 has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its 6 members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 7 (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the 8 organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor 9 the relief requested requires the participation of individual 10 members in the lawsuit.” United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 11 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) (citation 12 omitted). As discussed above, the organizational plaintiffs’ 13 members, here Massey and Leigh, have standing to sue in their own 14 right. See id. Next, the “interests” the organizational 15 plaintiffs “seek[] to protect” -- the observable presence and 16 well-being of Carter Mustangs -- overlap almost entirely with 17 their stated “purpose[s].” See id. Finally, plaintiffs seek 18 purely injunctive relief in the form of enjoining the 19 implementation of and vacating the 2025 Gather Plan (FAC at 45— 20 46, see Docket No. 22), the grant of which would not require the 21 participation of CRMI and WHE’s individual members in this 22 lawsuit. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975). 23 Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are also “fairly 24 traceable” to defendants’ “conduct,” namely, the adoption of the 25 2025 Gather Plan and its planned execution via the September 2026 26 Gathers. See Barnum Timber Co., 633 F. 3d at 897. Indeed, it is 27 apparent that a diminished ability to observe and document the 28 1 Carter Mustangs would result from a plan that expressly provides 2 for the relocation of those same Mustangs. And plaintiffs have 3 satisfied the “redressability” element of standing because a 4 “favorable decision” of this court temporarily enjoining the 5 implementation of the 2025 Gather Plan (and the relocation of 6 Carter Mustangs therein provided for via the September 2026 7 Gathers) would obviate their aesthetic injuries. See id. 8 b. The Remaining Claims (Counts One through Eight) 9 In Counts One through Eight, plaintiffs challenge the 10 1981 Cowhead/Massacre Land Use Plan, the 1985/1989 Carter 11 Reservoir HMA HMAP, the 2003 Carter Reservoir AML 12 Establishment/Capture Plan, and the 2008 Surprise Resource 13 Management Plan (the “intermediate plans”). (See generally FAC.) 14 Their theory for now seeking to vacate and set aside these 15 decades-old agency actions, separately and independently from any 16 challenge to the 2025 Gather Plan, proceeds as follows: BLM, as 17 part of these plans, unlawfully adopted AMLs that it subsequently 18 modified or affirmed, without proper re-evaluation, in the 2025 19 Gather Plan. (See id.; see also Docket Nos. 16 at 34; 33 at 14— 20 16.) As such, plaintiffs claim, “setting aside” the intermediate 21 plans will “redress” their aesthetic injuries by “obligat[ing] 22 BLM to set an AML range” that comports with governing statutory 23 requirements. (See Docket Nos. 16 at 34, 33 at 16.) 24 To the extent that the intermediate plans relate to the 25 2025 Gather Plan, plaintiffs may attack the intermediate plans as 26 components of their claims challenging the 2025 Gather Plan. But 27 vacating the intermediate plans on a standalone basis, divorced 28 1 from their relation to the 2025 Gather Plan and its scheduled 2 implementation, would not redress plaintiffs’ instant, aesthetic 3 injury. See Barnum Timber Co., 633 F. 3d at 897. Accordingly, 4 the court proceeds to address the Winter factors as they apply to 5 plaintiffs’ claims which mount challenges to the 2025 Gather Plan 6 and its planned execution. 7 V. Preliminary Injunction Factors 8 a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 9 Likelihood of success on the merits is “the most 10 important factor in determining whether a preliminary injunction 11 is warranted.” Garcia v. County of Alameda, 150 F. 4th 1224, 12 1230 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks 13 omitted). 14 When assessing the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, 15 “[b]ecause neither NEPA nor the [WHA] contain an internal 16 standard of judicial review, the [APA] governs this court's 17 review of the BLM's actions.” In Def. of Animals, Dreamcatcher 18 Wild Horse & Burro Sanctuary v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 751 F.3d 19 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014). The APA requires courts to “hold 20 unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, 21 capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 22 accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 23 To comply with the arbitrary and capricious standard, 24 BLM “must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 25 explanation for its action including a rational connection 26 between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle 27 Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 28 1 Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). “An ‘agency's action 2 must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency 3 itself.’” Butte Cnty., Cal. v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 196 (D.C. 4 Cir. 2010) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50). 5 i. WHA and APA 6 In their ninth claim, plaintiffs argue that the 2025 7 Gather Plan violates the WHA and APA because, among other things, 8 defendants based their “overpopulation determination on incorrect 9 assumption [sic] and arbitrarily relying on AMLs that the agency 10 knew were set only for administrative reasons and not on 11 appropriate evidence, studies, and analysis.” (Docket No. 22 at 12 38.) 13 “Because of Congress’ concern that wild horses were 14 vanishing from the West, it passed the WHA to protect wild horses 15 from ‘capture, branding, harassment, or death’ and ordered that 16 the horses were to be considered ‘an integral part of the natural 17 system of the public lands.’” Kathrens v. Zinke, 323 F. Supp. 3d 18 1142, 1149 (D. Mont. 2018) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1331). 19 Accordingly, the WHA directs BLM to manage wild horses “in a 20 manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving 21 natural ecological balance on public lands.” 16 U.S.C. §§ 22 1332(a), 1333(a). 23 The WHA “does not define ‘appropriate management 24 level,’ instead authorizing BLM to ‘determine’ both the AMLs and 25 how they should be achieved.” Colorado Wild Horse v. Jewell, 130 26 F. Supp. 205, 213 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)). 27 But the WHA does instruct BLM to “‘maintain a current inventory’ 28 1 of wild horses in order to determine” those AMLs. Id. at 211 2 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)). The WHA’s inventory 3 requirement exists because “inventory is designed to help BLM 4 decide ‘whether and where an overpopulation exists’ and whether 5 to achieve AMLs by removing ‘excess animals’ or by taking some 6 other action.” Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)). 7 Plaintiffs chiefly contend that defendants’ 8 overpopulation determination was based on incorrect assumptions 9 because BLM relied upon an unsupported “20% annual growth rate” 10 to estimate the “current population” of wild horses in the HMAs 11 at issue. See 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1) (directing BLM to “maintain 12 a current inventory” of wild horses); Docket No. 22 at 41. 13 However, based on data provided within BLM’s own 2025 Gather 14 Plan’s Environmental Assessment (EA), the growth rates of horses 15 in the HMAs at issue have, over the past fifteen years, departed 16 significantly from BLM’s assumed 20% growth rate and in many 17 years have in fact been negative. (See Docket Nos. 26-3 (2025 18 Gather Plan EA) at 6—9, 22 at 41—42.) 19 Defendants do not address this discrepancy in assumed 20 and actual growth rates in their opposition or the exhibits 21 attached thereto. Defendants point to a 2013 study referred to 22 in the 2025 Gather Plan EA (the “EA”) in purported support of 23 their position; this study “concluded that wild horse populations 24 grow at 15-20% a year.” (EA at 171.) While the study may have 25 reached that conclusion, the 270-page EA fails to address (1) the 26 actual population growth in the subject areas, and (2) given the 27 discrepancy between the growth rate cited in the study and the 28 1 actual growth rates, why reliance on the 2013 study is 2 appropriate here. 3 Courts are prohibited from “automatically defer[ring] 4 to an agency's conclusions, even when those conclusions are 5 scientific,” so as to avoid “render[ing] judicial review 6 generally meaningless.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. 7 Locke, 776 F.3d 971, 994 (9th Cir. 2014). This court’s role in 8 “ensur[ing] that agency decisions are founded on a reasoned 9 evaluation of the relevant factors,” id. at 995, is especially 10 relevant here, where BLM’s assumed growth rate “runs counter to 11 the evidence before” it, State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, namely, the 12 actual population growth rates of the Carter Reservoir Mustangs 13 in the HMAs at issue. Cf. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. E.P.A., 286 14 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (courts may “reject an agency’s 15 choice of a scientific model . . . when the model bears no 16 rational relationship to the characteristics of the data to which 17 it is applied”). 18 Because BLM has failed to consider the actual growth 19 rates of the horse populations at issue, the court must conclude 20 that BLM has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of 21 the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of 22 Chippewa Indians v. Haaland, 659 F. Supp. 3d 33, 48 (D.D.C. 23 2023), aff'd, No. 23-5076, 2024 WL 3219481 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 24 2024) (“An agency acts arbitrarily under § 706(2)(A) of the APA 25 when it refuses to consider evidence bearing on the issue before 26 it or ignores evidence contradicting its position.” (citation 27 modified)). That being the case, the court concludes that based 28 1 on the present record plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the 2 merits of their WHA claim. See 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1).4 3 b. Irreparable Harm 4 “Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be 5 adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at 6 least of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If such injury is 7 sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually 8 favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.” 9 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 545 10 (1987); see also Battelle Energy All., LLC v. Southfork Sec., 11 Inc., 980 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1220 (D. Idaho 2013) (“Harm is 12 irreparable when, as name suggests, the harm cannot be undone by 13 an award of compensatory damages.”). While the Supreme Court’s 14 language in Amoco “does not mean that any potential environmental 15 injury warrants an injunction,” “actual and irreparable injury” 16 is sufficient to satisfy Winter’s requirement of irreparable 17 harm. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 18 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 Plaintiffs offer two grounds for finding irreparable 20 harm: (1) their aesthetic interests will be significantly 21 impaired if BLM is permitted to proceed with the September 2026 22 Gathers; and (2) the September 2026 Gathers “will result in a 23 significant loss to the wild horse population numerically” and 24 “threaten[] the herds’ very existence due to genetic 25
26 4 As plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their 27 WHA claim, the court need not consider whether they are also likely to succeed on the merits of their NEPA claim. See Los 28 1 bottlenecking and associated impact to the [horses’] genetic 2 diversity.” (Id.) 3 As discussed above, plaintiffs “enjoy observing, 4 photographing and generally commiserating with the [horses]” at 5 the various HMAs. Fund For Animals v. Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d 8, 6 14 (D.D.C. 1998). Thus, it is not unreasonable for them to claim 7 that dramatically “reduc[ing]” the number of horses in those 8 areas “would have an appreciable and irreparable harm on [their] 9 interests.” Fund For Animals v. Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209, 221 10 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussing Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 14—15). 11 While defendants argue that Clark and Norton are 12 distinguishable because the operations contemplated in those 13 cases involved the killing of animals (Docket No. 32 at 63—64), 14 the findings of irreparable harm reached in those cases did not 15 turn exclusively on that fact.5 See Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 14 16 (“even contemplating” treatment of bison in controlled hunt 17 sufficient to establish irreparable harm); Norton, 281 F. Supp. 18 2d at 221 (“even the contemplation” of mistreatment of bison in 19 planned removal operation sufficient to establish irreparable 20 harm (emphasis in original)). The court declines to announce a 21 requirement that irreparable harm to a plaintiff’s aesthetic 22 interest in animals’ presence can exist only when the killing of 23 24 5 Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that at least some 25 horses will end up being killed or seriously injured as a result of the September 2026 Gathers. (See 2025 Gather Plan EA at 55—56 26 (risks of gather include, but are not limited to, fatalities, 27 “bruises, scrapes, or cuts,” “spinal injuries or fractured limbs,” and “miscarriages” in up to “5% of . . . captured 28 1 those animals is expressly contemplated. Cf. Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2 2d at 14; Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 221. 3 Plaintiffs’ injuries are “not compensable in money 4 damages because, while the injury threatened to . . . plaintiffs' 5 aesthetic interests would be palpable and concrete, they are not 6 ownership interests in property susceptible to monetary 7 valuation.” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Espy, 814 F. Supp. 142, 8 151 (D.D.C. 1993). Accordingly, plaintiffs have established 9 irreparable harm. See Battelle Energy All., LLC, 980 F. Supp. 2d 10 at 1220. 11 c. Balance of Equities and the Public Interest 12 “The public interest favors injunctions against 13 unlawful agency practices, and agencies have no countervailing 14 interest in perpetuating those practices.” League of United 15 Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of the President (“LULAC”), 780 16 F. Supp. 3d 135, 211 (D.D.C. 2025); see also Cath. Legal Immigr. 17 Network, Inc. v. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., 513 F. Supp. 3d 18 154, 176 (D.D.C. 2021) (same). That is the case here, where, as 19 explained above, the proposed September 2026 Gathers likely 20 violate the WHA and APA. 21 Defendants argue that preliminarily enjoining the 22 September 2026 Gathers could result in, among other things, the 23 horses residing in the HMAs at issue being exposed to drought 24 conditions, and land and resource quality within the HMAs 25 declining due to “extensive trampling and trailing damage done by 26 the overpopulation of wild horses.” (Docket No. 32 at 67—68.) 27 On the other hand, the public has an interest in “the meticulous 28 eee EE III EEE RII IIE IDE IIE EINE IE ODE IEE SD Oe compliance with the law by public officials,” Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2 at 15 (quotations omitted), that cannot be overcome by BLM’s post-hoc rationalizations, see LULAC, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 211. The sooner BLM comes into “compliance,” Clark, 27 F. Supp. at 15, ° with the WHA and other applicable statutes, the sooner it will be ° able to execute its planned gather. Accordingly, the court concludes that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in favor of granting ° plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief. 10 VI. Conclusion 11 Because plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their WHA and APA claim, that they will likely suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest favor granting injunctive relief, the court will grant plaintiffs’ motion for re preliminary injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (Docket No. 22) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Pending further proceedings in this case, 20 defendants are hereby ENJOINED from implementing the 2025 Gather Plan to remove horses in the Carter Reservoir, Buckhorn, and Coppersmith Herd Management Areas. 23 Dated: July 7, 2026 - atte A, WILLIAM B. SHUBB 29 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28 20