Carson v. NYC Department of Correction

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 11, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-10052
StatusUnknown

This text of Carson v. NYC Department of Correction (Carson v. NYC Department of Correction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carson v. NYC Department of Correction, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CARTEZ D. CARSON, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-10052 (LLS) N.Y.C. D.O.C.; DEPARTMENT OF ORDER TO AMEND CORRECTION; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is civilly committed on Rikers Island, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he never received a ballot to vote in the November 2024 presidential election. He names as Defendants the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) and two John Doe defendants. By order dated January 8, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 As set forth in this order, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days leave to amend this complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills,

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make

a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.2 On July 20, 2024, while detained on Rikers Island, Defendants never fulfilled Plaintiff’s request for a ballot to vote in the November 2024 presidential election. Plaintiff alleges that by “November 22, 2024[,] . . . after numerous attemp[t]s I asked my social service worker about the ballot and he said they would make sure the registration ballot gets delivered but still I wasn’t able to place my ballot.” (ECF 1, at 5.)

2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. Plaintiff contends that “there seems to be some discrimination towards me because Im a gay man in the LGBTQ community.” (Id.) Plaintiff signed the complaint on November 22, 2024. He seeks money damages. DISCUSSION A. New York City Department of Correction As an initial matter, the Court dismisses the claims against the DOC because an agency

of the City of New York does not have the capacity to be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Edwards v. Arocho, 125 F.4th 336, 354 (2d Cir. 2024) (“A plaintiff cannot bring a claim against a municipal agency that does not have the capacity to be sued under its municipal charter.” (emphasis in original)). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. Municipal Policy At this stage, the Court declines to construe the complaint as asserting a claim against the

City of New York because, as discussed below, Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered a constitutional violation. Generally, when a plaintiff sues a municipality under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). To show a violation, the plaintiff must allege facts describing a municipal policy, custom, or practice that caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). Should Plaintiff file an amended complaint, he may name the City of New York and state facts suggesting that a New York City policy, custom, or practice caused him to suffer a constitutional injury. C. Voting Claim The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to vote as a “fundamental political

right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections.”). Although Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits states to deny this right to people who have been convicted of felonies, see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974), the Equal Protection Clause guarantees a pretrial detainee’s right to vote, see O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1974). Where a pretrial detainee seeks access to the ballot box, the claim for relief is “not the right to vote . . . but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.” McDonald v. Bd.

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Related

Yick Wo v. Hopkins
118 U.S. 356 (Supreme Court, 1886)
Reynolds v. Sims
377 U.S. 533 (Supreme Court, 1964)
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago
394 U.S. 802 (Supreme Court, 1969)
O'Brien v. Skinner
414 U.S. 524 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Richardson v. Ramirez
418 U.S. 24 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Palazzo v. Corio
232 F.3d 38 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Jones v. Town of East Haven
691 F.3d 72 (First Circuit, 2012)

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Carson v. NYC Department of Correction, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carson-v-nyc-department-of-correction-nysd-2025.