Carson v. Myers

951 P.2d 700, 326 Or. 248, 1998 Ore. LEXIS 2
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 8, 1998
DocketSC S44509 (Control); SC S44510; SC S44511
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 951 P.2d 700 (Carson v. Myers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carson v. Myers, 951 P.2d 700, 326 Or. 248, 1998 Ore. LEXIS 2 (Or. 1998).

Opinion

*251 GILLETTE, J.

These three ballot title review proceedings are consolidated for purposes of argument and opinion. The petitioners in each proceeding have challenged the legal sufficiency of one or more parts of a ballot title certified by the Attorney General for Ballot Measure 40 (the proposed measure). 1 For the reasons that follow, we modify the Attorney General’s ballot title in certain respects and, as modified, certify it.

Measure 40, self-styled as the “Initiative Reform Act,” is a wide-ranging revision of the initiative and referendum process as it presently is practiced in Oregon. Its scope cannot be captured easily in a brief summary. We therefore limit our discussion of its contents to those portions that must be mentioned in order to respond to the particular arguments that we are addressing.

The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for Measure 40:

“AMENDS CONSTITUTION: REVISES INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS, PROVIDES FOR YEARLY INITIATIVE ELECTIONS
“RESULT OF YES’ VOTE: Vote Yes’ for yearly initiative elections, revised signature requirements, limit restrictions on paid signature gatherers.
“RESULT OF ‘NO’ VOTE: Vote ‘No’ to retain present constitutional and statutory controls on initiative and referendum.
“SUMMARY: Amends Constitution, changes number of required signatures; permits two year minimum to gather signatures. Restricts legislature’s referral or enactment of changes in initiative process, restricts enactment of laws controlling petition circulation, who may circulate, payment of circulators. Chief petitioner selects 40% of committee to draft statewide ballot titles; if challenged,
*252 Supreme Court must choose between petitioner’s, committee’s or challenger’s ballot title. Elections held each year in November. For some elections, removes voter turnout requirement on local measures. Prohibits publicly funded challenges to initiative approved laws.”

This court’s review of the Attorney General’s ballot title is limited to a determination whether, in the face of the challenges raised by the parties, the ballot title is in “substantial compliance” with the requirements of ORS 250.035. ORS 250.085(5). Because they have taken markedly different approaches to the ballot title, we address the arguments advanced by each petitioner separately.

Petitioner Carson challenges only the legal adequacy of the Summary in the Attorney General’s ballot title. The Summary must set out a concise and impartial statement of the proposed measure and its major effects. ORS 250.035(2)(d). Petitioner Carson asserts that the Attorney General’s Summary fails to meet that standard, because

“it excludes any mention that Article IV, Section l(2)(d) [of the Oregon Constitution] would be amended to dilute the requirement that a proposed initiative law or constitutional amendment be limited to a single-subject in certain amendments to the Constitution or proposed laws.”

Petitioner’s argument refers to a paragraph of Measure 40 that would add to Article IV, section l(2)(d), of the Oregon Constitution, wording that declares that, for the purposes of “single subject” analysis, a measure that

“embracéis] one subject only and matters properly connected therewith * * * shall not be deemed to violate this paragraph, and shall not be deemed to be a revision of the Constitution[ 2 ] because it amends or affects more than one section or article of the Constitution. For purposes of this section, a proposed initiative or amendment which primarily revises all or part of the system whereby government taxes or assesses fees or charges shall be deemed to embrace only one subject.”

*253 It is not clear to us whether or not the addition of the foregoing wording would, in fact, “dilute” the “single subject” provision. Because it is not clear, it is not appropriate for us to speculate among arguable meanings of a measure. See, e.g., Mannix v. Kulongoski, 323 Or 485, 495-96, 918 P2d 839 (1996) (Attorney General did not err in declining to speculate about scope of existing law).

Petitioner Carson is correct, however, in suggesting that something must be said in the Summary to alert the reader that wording is being added to the constitution, even if the ultimate effect of that addition cannot be foretold precisely. The Attorney General’s Summary is legally deficient in not doing so. As we explain elsewhere in this opinion, other changes to the Summary at least make it possible to add the words “other provisions” to that portion of the ballot title. We direct that that be done.

We turn next to the challenges made by petitioners Gray, Sager, and Dale. They challenge all three parts of the Attorney General’s ballot title. With respect to the Caption, they state:

“This is a complex and multi-faceted proposal. * * * [I]t is impossible to draft a Caption which identifies all of the major subjects touched on by the proposal. However, the goal should be a Caption which is as comprehensive as possible.
“The [Attorney General’s] certified Caption identifies two points: revisions to the initiative and referendum processes, and the establishment of annual initiative elections. The petitioners suggest an alternative which keeps these two points and adds a third: the change in signature requirements.”

ORS 250.035(2)(a) requires that the Attorney General’s ballot title contain *254 (Emphasis added.) We agree with petitioners that the Caption in its present form is inadequate, when examined in light of the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a), because it catalogues an effect of the proposed measure, rather than stating its “subject.” Petitioners’ assertion that the proposed measure is “complex and multi-faceted” is well taken. However, petitioners’ solution is to describe more effects in the Caption. That is the wrong approach. The Caption is not meant to serve as a comprehensive statement of the measure’s effects.

*253 “[a] caption of not more than 10 words that reasonably identifies the subject matter of the state measure.

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Related

Carson v. Kroger
270 P.3d 243 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2012)
Morgan v. Myers
149 P.3d 1160 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2008)
Wolf v. Myers
173 P.3d 812 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2007)
Kain v. Myers
79 P.3d 864 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2003)
Mabon/Pulvers v. Myers
39 P.3d 171 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2002)
Mabon v. Myers
33 P.3d 988 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2001)
Dirks v. Myers
993 P.2d 808 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2000)
Dale v. Myers
980 P.2d 157 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
951 P.2d 700, 326 Or. 248, 1998 Ore. LEXIS 2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carson-v-myers-or-1998.