Carroll v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Carroll v. State

554 S.E.2d 560, 252 Ga. App. 39, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2754, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1042

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedAugust 28, 2001

DocketA01A1055

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 554 S.E.2d 560 (Carroll v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Carroll v. State, 554 S.E.2d 560, 252 Ga. App. 39, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2754, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1042 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).

Pincite

Opinion

Miller, Judge.

A jury found Freddie O. Carroll guilty of DUI, weaving over the roadway, and reckless driving. On appeal Carroll argues that the accusations based on these offenses were filed outside the two-year limitation period¹ and that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the statute of limitation.

On May 23, 1996, police issued Carroll uniform traffic citations charging him with three traffic offenses. These citations were filed in Atlanta City Court on May 24,1996. On July 10,1998, the State filed accusations for the same offenses.

1. “A uniform traffic citation serves as an accusation in any court having jurisdiction over the offense, except superior court.”² The July 1998 accusations were based on the same conduct as the original citations (of which there had been no final disposition) and thus were a continuation of the prosecution of those citations.³

The arresting officer testified that on May 23, 1996, he arrested and charged Carroll with DUI.⁴ Although the better practice would have been to admit the uniform traffic citations into evidence, this is sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the crimes were prosecuted within the two-year limitation period.

2. Carroll argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the statute of limitation. Carroll did not, however, submit a timely written request to charge on the statute of limitation⁵ and has therefore waived the right to any such charge.⁶

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. [40]*40Decided August 28, 2001 Reconsideration denied October 15, 2001 Chestney Hawkins Law Firm, Robert W. Chestney, for appellant. Joseph J. Drolet, Solicitor-General, Jennifer L. Moore, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellee.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Miller, Judge.

A jury found Freddie O. Carroll guilty of DUI, weaving over the roadway, and reckless driving. On appeal Carroll argues that the accusations based on these offenses were filed outside the two-year limitation period¹ and that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the statute of limitation.

On May 23, 1996, police issued Carroll uniform traffic citations charging him with three traffic offenses. These citations were filed in Atlanta City Court on May 24,1996. On July 10,1998, the State filed accusations for the same offenses.

1. “A uniform traffic citation serves as an accusation in any court having jurisdiction over the offense, except superior court.”² The July 1998 accusations were based on the same conduct as the original citations (of which there had been no final disposition) and thus were a continuation of the prosecution of those citations.³

The arresting officer testified that on May 23, 1996, he arrested and charged Carroll with DUI.⁴ Although the better practice would have been to admit the uniform traffic citations into evidence, this is sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the crimes were prosecuted within the two-year limitation period.

2. Carroll argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the statute of limitation. Carroll did not, however, submit a timely written request to charge on the statute of limitation⁵ and has therefore waived the right to any such charge.⁶

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. [40]*40Decided August 28, 2001 Reconsideration denied October 15, 2001 Chestney Hawkins Law Firm, Robert W. Chestney, for appellant. Joseph J. Drolet, Solicitor-General, Jennifer L. Moore, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellee.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

554 S.E.2d 560, 252 Ga. App. 39, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2754, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1042, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carroll-v-state-gactapp-2001.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack