POPOVICH, Judge:
We are asked to review the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting the Petition to Vacate the Award of Arbitrators by the plaintiff/appellee, Buffie Marie Carroll.
We reverse.
Our examination of the record produces the following account: On August 15, 1988, the plaintiff was involved in an accident with an uninsured vehicle while operating an automobile owned by her mother, Sharon Carroll. The mother’s automobile was covered by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, which disputed the plaintiffs claim under the uninsured motorist clause on the ground that the plaintiff did not reside with the named insured/mother at the time of the accident.
This prompted the claimant to pursue recovery under the arbitration provision of the policy.
Prior to the arbitration hearing, counsel stipulated that three policies were issued to Sharon Carroll by State Farm, each having a minimum of $25,000 of uninsured motorist coverage. All were less than the $100,000 of liability coverage available to Sharon Carroll on the vehicle the plaintiff was operating at the time of the accident.
5See Plaintiffs Petition to Vacate Award of Arbitrators at Paragraph 11.
Following a hearing, an award was entered limited in amount to $25,000. Next, a Petition to Vacate Award of Arbitrators was submitted by the plaintiff in which she alleged, in relevant part, that:
12. On October 27, 1990, an arbitration hearing was held.
13. Subsequent thereto, the award of the arbitrators entered a finding holding that they were limited in awarding damages in the amount of $25,000.00, due to the fact that [the plaintiff] was not entitled to stack the other two (2) policies of insurance. Attached hereto and marked Exhibit “E” is a true and correct copy of the Arbitrators’ holding.
14. ... counsel for plaintiff ... (the minor daughter of Sharon Carroll, the owner of the vehicle [the plaintiff] was operating who had joint custody of [the plaintiff] pursuant to a divorce decree) submits that the arbitrators erred as a matter of law, in holding that [the plaintiff] was not entitled to stack uninsured motorist benefits.
In a Memorandum of Law attached to the Petition to Vacate, the plaintiff asserted that the arbitration panel (in a two to one) decision) “held that [she] was not entitled to stack uninsured motorist coverage since a child of divorced parents
could not be considered a class one insured.”
7Further, in the argument section of the Memorandum of Law, the plaintiff averred:
At the [arbitration] hearing of October 27, 1990, the uncontrovered [sic ] testimony submitted to the panel of arbitrators was that plaintiff ... was 17 years old on the date of the accident and born on August 20, 1971. Furthermore, plaintiff ... stated at the arbitration that her parents were divorced on the date of the accident and that she lived with her father, Monday through Friday during the school year but during the summer months, when the accident occurred, she lived primarily at her mother’s house. Furthermore, plaintiff ... testified that on the date of the accident, she had a Pennsylvania driver’s license which indicated her residence at her mother’s house. In addition, [the plaintiffs] mother testified at the arbitration hearing, that on the date of the accident, as a result of divorce proceedings, the Court ordered that Sharon Carroll and her former husband, be awarded joint custody of their minor child plaintiff____
The Petition to Vacate also had attached to it a claim form (Exhibit “B”) which indicated the plaintiffs address as 2001 Society Place, Newtown, Pennsylvania, the same address as her mother’s. Accord Exhibit “D”. Lastly, in Exhibit “G” of the Petition to Vacate, the plaintiff set forth what had transpired, allegedly, before the panel of arbitrators; to-wit:
In the case before the panel, plaintiff lived with her mother at the time of the said accident. Plaintiff stated in her deposition, that she lived with her father Monday through Friday during the school year, but that she lived with her mother during the summer. (See Plaintiffs Deposition at page 11).
Furthermore, plaintiff has a Pennsylvania Driver’s license.
The fact that plaintiff resided with her mother for a substantial period of time, establishes her status as a “resident”.
In response, State Farm filed an Answer in which it denied, with explanation, the allegations of the plaintiff in Paragraphs 13 and 14, supra, of her Petition to Vacate. Attached to State Farm’s Answer was a Memorandum of Law, wherein it was averred:
The issue in the case, among other issues, was whether [the plaintiff] was a resident of the household of her mother. If she [wa]s ... considered a resident of the household of her mother at the time of the accident, she would be entitled under Pennsylvania law to stack the coverages under all three policies. If she was not a resident of the household of her mother, then she would not be permitted to stack the coverages and would be limited to the $25,000 of uninsured motorist benefits covering the vehicle which she was operating.
At the Arbitration Hearing, it was established that the motor vehicle accident occurred in Delanco[,] New Jersey. At that time, [the plaintiff] was living with her father in New Jersey. All of the medical records submitted to State Farm list the address of the claimant, [the plaintiff] as that of her father Michael Carroll in Delran[,] New Jersey. All of her medical treatment was performed by physicians and hospitals in New Jersey near the home of her father in Delran. In fact, at the time of the accident, [the plaintiff] testified that she was working at a pizza parlor in Delranf] New Jersey five or six days a week while living with her father. Based on these facts, the majority of the arbitration panel determined that [the plaintiff] resided with her father and was not a resident in the household of her mother at the time of the accident. Therefore, the panel found that she was not entitled to stack the coverages on the other vehicles in the household of her mother.
Moreover, State Farm argued that the arbitrators found, as a question of fact, that the plaintiff “did not live with her mother at the time of the accident. Therefore, the panel found ... that she was not entitled to stack the coverages----”
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POPOVICH, Judge:
We are asked to review the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting the Petition to Vacate the Award of Arbitrators by the plaintiff/appellee, Buffie Marie Carroll.
We reverse.
Our examination of the record produces the following account: On August 15, 1988, the plaintiff was involved in an accident with an uninsured vehicle while operating an automobile owned by her mother, Sharon Carroll. The mother’s automobile was covered by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, which disputed the plaintiffs claim under the uninsured motorist clause on the ground that the plaintiff did not reside with the named insured/mother at the time of the accident.
This prompted the claimant to pursue recovery under the arbitration provision of the policy.
Prior to the arbitration hearing, counsel stipulated that three policies were issued to Sharon Carroll by State Farm, each having a minimum of $25,000 of uninsured motorist coverage. All were less than the $100,000 of liability coverage available to Sharon Carroll on the vehicle the plaintiff was operating at the time of the accident.
5See Plaintiffs Petition to Vacate Award of Arbitrators at Paragraph 11.
Following a hearing, an award was entered limited in amount to $25,000. Next, a Petition to Vacate Award of Arbitrators was submitted by the plaintiff in which she alleged, in relevant part, that:
12. On October 27, 1990, an arbitration hearing was held.
13. Subsequent thereto, the award of the arbitrators entered a finding holding that they were limited in awarding damages in the amount of $25,000.00, due to the fact that [the plaintiff] was not entitled to stack the other two (2) policies of insurance. Attached hereto and marked Exhibit “E” is a true and correct copy of the Arbitrators’ holding.
14. ... counsel for plaintiff ... (the minor daughter of Sharon Carroll, the owner of the vehicle [the plaintiff] was operating who had joint custody of [the plaintiff] pursuant to a divorce decree) submits that the arbitrators erred as a matter of law, in holding that [the plaintiff] was not entitled to stack uninsured motorist benefits.
In a Memorandum of Law attached to the Petition to Vacate, the plaintiff asserted that the arbitration panel (in a two to one) decision) “held that [she] was not entitled to stack uninsured motorist coverage since a child of divorced parents
could not be considered a class one insured.”
7Further, in the argument section of the Memorandum of Law, the plaintiff averred:
At the [arbitration] hearing of October 27, 1990, the uncontrovered [sic ] testimony submitted to the panel of arbitrators was that plaintiff ... was 17 years old on the date of the accident and born on August 20, 1971. Furthermore, plaintiff ... stated at the arbitration that her parents were divorced on the date of the accident and that she lived with her father, Monday through Friday during the school year but during the summer months, when the accident occurred, she lived primarily at her mother’s house. Furthermore, plaintiff ... testified that on the date of the accident, she had a Pennsylvania driver’s license which indicated her residence at her mother’s house. In addition, [the plaintiffs] mother testified at the arbitration hearing, that on the date of the accident, as a result of divorce proceedings, the Court ordered that Sharon Carroll and her former husband, be awarded joint custody of their minor child plaintiff____
The Petition to Vacate also had attached to it a claim form (Exhibit “B”) which indicated the plaintiffs address as 2001 Society Place, Newtown, Pennsylvania, the same address as her mother’s. Accord Exhibit “D”. Lastly, in Exhibit “G” of the Petition to Vacate, the plaintiff set forth what had transpired, allegedly, before the panel of arbitrators; to-wit:
In the case before the panel, plaintiff lived with her mother at the time of the said accident. Plaintiff stated in her deposition, that she lived with her father Monday through Friday during the school year, but that she lived with her mother during the summer. (See Plaintiffs Deposition at page 11).
Furthermore, plaintiff has a Pennsylvania Driver’s license.
The fact that plaintiff resided with her mother for a substantial period of time, establishes her status as a “resident”.
In response, State Farm filed an Answer in which it denied, with explanation, the allegations of the plaintiff in Paragraphs 13 and 14, supra, of her Petition to Vacate. Attached to State Farm’s Answer was a Memorandum of Law, wherein it was averred:
The issue in the case, among other issues, was whether [the plaintiff] was a resident of the household of her mother. If she [wa]s ... considered a resident of the household of her mother at the time of the accident, she would be entitled under Pennsylvania law to stack the coverages under all three policies. If she was not a resident of the household of her mother, then she would not be permitted to stack the coverages and would be limited to the $25,000 of uninsured motorist benefits covering the vehicle which she was operating.
At the Arbitration Hearing, it was established that the motor vehicle accident occurred in Delanco[,] New Jersey. At that time, [the plaintiff] was living with her father in New Jersey. All of the medical records submitted to State Farm list the address of the claimant, [the plaintiff] as that of her father Michael Carroll in Delran[,] New Jersey. All of her medical treatment was performed by physicians and hospitals in New Jersey near the home of her father in Delran. In fact, at the time of the accident, [the plaintiff] testified that she was working at a pizza parlor in Delranf] New Jersey five or six days a week while living with her father. Based on these facts, the majority of the arbitration panel determined that [the plaintiff] resided with her father and was not a resident in the household of her mother at the time of the accident. Therefore, the panel found that she was not entitled to stack the coverages on the other vehicles in the household of her mother.
Moreover, State Farm argued that the arbitrators found, as a question of fact, that the plaintiff “did not live with her mother at the time of the accident. Therefore, the panel found ... that she was not entitled to stack the coverages----”
Upon a review of the parties’ pleadings, the court vacated the arbitrators’ award and remanded to “permit [the plaintiff] to stack uninsured motorist coverages____”
The arbitrators complied with the March 8th order and awarded the plaintiff $45,000 on July 9, 1991. The July 9th order was reduced to judgment on July 18, 1991, upon praecipe by counsel for the plaintiff. See note 12, infra. Thereafter, State Farm filed a Petition to Vacate the Award of Arbitrators Dated July 9, 1991 and Reinstate the Award of Arbitrators Dated October 27,1990.
The petition was denied by order of court dated October 18, 1991, which decreed that the July 9th award was “confirmed and [the] same shall be entered on the [judgment] docket th[e same] date[.]”
State Farm filed a timely appeal from the final judgment entered with respect to
the order of October 18th confirming the arbitration award.
See
Seay v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co.,
375 Pa.Super. 37, 543 A.2d 1166, 1168 (1988), appeal dismissed, 523 Pa. 105, 565 A.2d 159 (1989).
At first, we will address State Farm’s complaint that the court below erred in reversing the arbitration panel’s initial award by order dated March 8, 1991, and remanding to allow the plaintiff to stack her mother’s policies covering three separate vehicles on grounds that the court exceeded its authority in doing so and proceeded in the absence of any evidence to substantiate its actions.
It is undisputed that the policy issued provided for arbitration pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 501(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7301 et seq., which covers matters concerning the uninsured motorist provisions of the contract. Such being the case, the standard of review in statutory arbitration cases can be found in Section 7302 of the Act:
§ 7302. Scope of subchapter
(a) General rule. — An agreement to arbitrate a controversy on a nonjudicial basis shall be conclusively presumed to be an agreement to arbitrate pursuant to Subchapter B (relating to common law arbitration) unless the agreement to arbitrate is in writing and expressly provides for arbitration pursuant to this subchapter or any other similar statute, in which case the arbitration shall be governed by this subchapter.
(d) Special application.—
(1) Paragraph (2) shall be applicable where:
(iii) Any person has been required by law to submit to or to agree to submit a controversy to arbitration pursuant to this subchapter.
(2) Where this paragraph is applicable a court in reviewing an arbitration award pursuant to this subchapter shall, notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, modify or correct the award where the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Accordingly, contrary to the position taken by State Farm, the court below was utilizing the proper standard of review to assess a challenge to the arbitration award, i.e., the “contrary to law” criterion detailed in. Section 7302(a) & (d). See generally
Geisler v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.,
382 Pa.Super. 622, 556 A.2d 391, 392 (1989).
Unlike State Farm, we find that a determination of the plaintiffs “residence”, so as to trigger the stacking provisions once a claimant is found to be a “class one” insured, was
not a question of fact
precluding the court below from making inquiry of the award. See State Farm’s Brief at 9. Rather, the definition of “resident” and the scope of coverage under multiple vehicle policies were
questions of law.
Cf.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Contrisciane,
504 Pa. 328, 473 A.2d 1005, 1007-1008 (1984) (“... definition of ‘occupying’ and the extent of coverage under multiple vehicle policies [a]re questions of law * * * [W]here a contract exists without a history of bargaining over the terms, the construction of individual terms of that contract [of insurance] is a question of law.” (citations omitted));
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Williams,
481 Pa. 130, 139, 392 A.2d 281 (1978) (Question of stacking coverages is clearly one of law). Therefore, it was proper for the court of common pleas to review the conclusions of the arbitrators.
Utica,
supra.
However, the court below erred in issuing its March 8, 1991, order vacating the arbitrators’ award of $25,000 to the plaintiff in the face of
no
evidence to conclude that she, under the terms of the policy of insurance although a “relative” of the named insured/mother, was a “resident” of the named insured’s household.
The law is quite clear on this point.
Under
Utica,
supra, the Court allowed the decedent’s estate to assail an arbitration award on the ground that the denial of stacking was in error inasmuch as the decedent came within the ambit of “class one” coverage of the policy embracing multiple vehicles, i.e., he was a “relative’Vson of the named insured
and
resided in the same household. As a result, the decedent’s estate was permitted to stack coverages and collect
the full amount under the father’s single policy insuring three vehicles, even though he was designated as a driver on only one of the three vehicles.
The Supreme Court had
facts
before it, which included an Answer to the decedent’s petition to vacate by Utica “admitting” to the decedent’s “insured” status that facilitated and substantiated the ultimate ruling. Such was not the case at bar.
For example, unlike in
Utica,
supra, we have no transcript of the arbitration hearing even though either side had the option to have one made. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7307(b); Pa. R.Civ.P. 1304(c). Nor do we have pleadings in which State Farm
admits
the “residence” of the plaintiff with her mother/named insured. On the contrary, as recounted supra, the record is replete with instances in which the plaintiff and State Farm dispute the others allegations of fact as to both the issue posed to the arbitrators for resolution and the substance of the arbitration hearing. Most glaring of these irreconcilable pleadings is the plaintiffs denial that the arbitrators “ruled” that she was not a resident of her mother’s home. See Plaintiffs Reply to State Farm’s Petition to Vacate at Paragraphs 4 and 5. “To the contrary, the arbitrators expressly ruled that Buffie Marie Carroll was not entitled to stack as she could not be classified as a class one insured
implying
that an unemancipated minor whose parents were given joint custody, could only have one (1) residence and because a majority of the year was spent at her father’s house (weekdays during the school years and weekends during the summer months), she was not entitled to stack.” Plaintiffs Brief at 10 (Emphasis added).
As is evident from the preceding, the account of the plaintiff is presented in her brief, a factor which undermines our ability to place any credence in that which is asserted therein. See
McCormick v. Allegheny General Hospital,
364 Pa.Super. 210, 527 A.2d 1028 (1987). Even if such were not the case, the plaintiff fails in her effort to inform the Court of the
basis
for the arbitrators’ award. In fact, she recommends that we “imply” from the award issued the underlying rationale for the
arbitrators’ actions. This is not consistent with either law or logic. Cf.
Starr v. Zdrok,
419 Pa.Super. 60, 614 A.2d 1209, 1212 (1992) (An appellate court must evaluate the actions of the court below from the facts in the record certified to it for review; matters
de hors
the record have no efficacy on the appellate court’s ruling).
Therefore, because there were no
uncontradicted
pleadings of either the issue ruled upon by the arbitration panel and/or an account of what took place before the panel, the court below was without any record evidence and/or admission which would have permitted it to reverse the arbitrators’ initial award. Thus, the court’s reference in its opinion that: “The Arbitrators found that [the plaintiff] was not a resident of her mother’s household ... because, at the time of the accident, [the plaintiff] was living in the household of her father” is unsubstantiated by
record
evidence. Ergo, it may not stand. Cf.
Starr,
supra;
Whitt v. Phila. Housing Auth.,
325 Pa.Super. 135, 472 A.2d 684, 689 (1984).
And, the plaintiff’s discussion in the pleadings to a custody order resulting in her spending part of her time "with each parent, see Plaintiffs Reply to State Farm’s Petition to Vacate at Paragraph 6, was disputed by State Farm. See Memorandum of Law attached to State Farm’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Petition to Vacate at 2. Moreover, the court below would have been precluded from taking judicial notice of the custody order in the absence of a request to do so or either party admitting without objection to any such order in their pleadings. Cf.
Woolward v. Burton,
345 Pa.Super. 366, 498 A.2d 445, 448 (1985) (“a court is admonished not to take judicial notice of the record of another case, if not pleaded.” (Citations omitted)). Neither scenario occurred before the court below. As such, the court acted
ultra vires, id.,
which necessitates a reversal of the order reaffirming the July 9, 1991, award of the arbitrators in the amount of $45,000 in favor of the plaintiff. See Reproduced Record at 208a. The plaintiff will not be heard to complain since she had the opportunity to create a stenographic record of the arbitration hearing to permit a
proper
inquiry into her allegations of
error. See
City of Scranton v. Shoemaker,
59 Pa.Cmwlth. 141, 428 A.2d 1048 (1981). Her failure to do so is fatal.
Given the state of the record, we hold that the court below acted without foundation in law and fact to reverse the arbitrators’ award and remand to stack plaintiffs coverages under her mother’s policy. The award in favor of the plaintiff for $25,000 should have remained as entered initially by the arbitrators.
Order reversed; case remanded for entry of judgment as herein directed;
jurisdiction is not retained.