OPINION
PER CURIAM.
In this case an incorporated association of condominium owners brought suit to enforce a bylaw of the association which bans residential possession of animals, i.e., pets. The court granted summary judgment in the association’s favor.
We find that the bylaw was not validly adopted and we reverse.
I.
The El Dorado Estates Division Number Two Association, Inc. [Association] was established pursuant to a condominium declaration 1 filed in 1976. The Association is a corporation which, through its Board of Directors, manages the business affairs of the condominium property on behalf of the unit owners. Under the declaration, the Association also has responsibility for the enforcement of its bylaws and of the rules and regulations of occupancy.
At the time the condominium declaration was filed, pets were permitted. Article IX of the declaration states in part:
Section 6. Animals. The Association may by rules and regulations prohibit or limit the raising, breeding or keeping of animals in any unit or on the common areas or any part thereof.
Article VIII of the bylaws of the Association permitted pet ownership, subject to certain restrictions.2
At the Association’s annual meeting on June 28, 1979, twenty of twenty-three unit owners were present in person or by proxy. A proposed amendment to Article VIII, Section 1, clause (f) of the bylaws was adopted. The amendment prohibited pet ownership, except for existing pets.3
In September, 1982, the Association filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction enforcing the amended bylaw against three unit own[1160]*1160ers, James A. Carroll, James Adkins, and Guy Whitney (collectively referred to as “Carroll”). Carroll’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that injunctive relief was not available was denied.
Carroll was the only one of the three who had been a unit owner at the time of the 1979 annual meeting. All three owners conceded that they now own pets in violation of the amended bylaw. They defended the action on the basis that the amendment was invalid, for the following reasons: (1) timely and adequate notice of the purpose of the annual meeting was not given; (2) the proxy solicitation was materially misleading; and (3) the pet ban restricted their ownership rights as set forth in the declaration.
On cross motions for summary judgment the superior court rejected these contentions and granted summary judgment in the Association’s favor. The unit owners appeal.
II.
A. Injunctive Relief.
Carroll contends that injunctive relief was not available because the plaintiff did not plead or prove that it would be irreparably harmed. It has not shown that the pets are in any way a nuisance, or that they reduce the property values, or that there have been any complaints about them. Carroll argues that the Association has shown nothing more than that its bylaw has been violated, without any demonstration of any harm or injury.
The Association does not assert that it will be irreparably injured if an injunction, or specific performance, is denied. It simply asserts, without citing any authority, that it is entitled to have its bylaws enforced by a court order, and that Carroll did not adequately raise this issue below.
The record establishes that Carroll's motion to dismiss adequately raised this issue. It is clear that the Association has not shown that all equitable grounds normally required for injunctive relief are present; rather, it has shown only the bare fact that its bylaw is being violated. That in itself is sufficient, however, since injunc-tive relief is specifically authorized by the Horizontal Property Regimes Act as a remedy for the failure to “comply strictly with the bylaws” of a condominium association. AS 34.07.360. Where a statute specifically authorizes injunctive relief, the plaintiff need not show either irreparable injury or lack of an adequate remedy at law. See Vogler v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 635 P.2d 462, 464 (Alaska 1981); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 133, at 251 (1978); 42 Am. Jur.2d Injunctions § 38, at 776 (1969). Furthermore, as a practical matter injunc-tive relief is the only way to adequately enforce a bylaw of this nature.
B. Sufficiency of Notice.
Carroll argues that because the notice of the meeting did not indicate that a pet ban would be considered, it was insufficient. The Association bylaws require that the notice contain a statement of the purpose of the meeting. A mere statement that amendments to the bylaws will be considered, without any specificity as to which bylaws or the general nature of the proposed amendments, is inadequate to fulfill this requirement. Carroll cites several cases in support of this argument. See Des Moines Life & Annuity Co. v. Midland Insurance Co., 6 F.2d 228, 229 (D.C. Minn.1925); Blum v. Latter, 163 So.2d 189, 193-94 (La.App.1964); Klein v. Scranton Life Insurance Co., 139 Pa.Super. 369, 11 A.2d 770, 775 (1940); Mueller v. Merz, 23 Wis.2d 588, 127 N.W.2d 774, 776 (1964).
The Association contends that its notice was adequate, since it informed the unit owners that “Proposed Amendments to Bylaws” were on the agenda. The corporate cases cited by Carroll are distinguishable, it contends. Even if the notice was inadequate, Carroll’s attendance by proxy waives any objection, the Association argues.4
[1161]*1161The Alaska statutes and the Model Business Corporation Act, unlike the Association’s bylaws, do not specifically require that the notice of a corporation’s annual meeting specify the purpose of the meeting. Model Business Corp. Act § 29 (1971); AS 10.05.141; AS 10.20.066.5 However, there are significant differences between memberships in a condominium association and status as a shareholder in the typical corporation. Members of a condominium association have a heightened interest in the affairs of the association inasmuch as it regulates the conditions of their residence. Shareholders typically have only a financial interest in corporate affairs, and, in addition, their ownership interests are often more readily transferable than realty. A higher standard of notice for condominium associations may therefore be appropriate.
The Uniform Condominium Act promulgated by the Commission on Uniform State Laws in 1977 requires that “[t]he notice of any meeting [of the association] must state the time and place of the meeting and the items on the agenda, including the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws.” Uniform Condominium Act § 3-108, 7 U.L.A. 177 (1978). In 1980, a revised Uniform Condominium Act was promulgated, which broadens the notice requirement to include, in addition to changes in the declaration or bylaws, “any budget changes, and any proposal to remove a director or officer.” 7 U.L.A.Supp. at 187 (1983).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM.
In this case an incorporated association of condominium owners brought suit to enforce a bylaw of the association which bans residential possession of animals, i.e., pets. The court granted summary judgment in the association’s favor.
We find that the bylaw was not validly adopted and we reverse.
I.
The El Dorado Estates Division Number Two Association, Inc. [Association] was established pursuant to a condominium declaration 1 filed in 1976. The Association is a corporation which, through its Board of Directors, manages the business affairs of the condominium property on behalf of the unit owners. Under the declaration, the Association also has responsibility for the enforcement of its bylaws and of the rules and regulations of occupancy.
At the time the condominium declaration was filed, pets were permitted. Article IX of the declaration states in part:
Section 6. Animals. The Association may by rules and regulations prohibit or limit the raising, breeding or keeping of animals in any unit or on the common areas or any part thereof.
Article VIII of the bylaws of the Association permitted pet ownership, subject to certain restrictions.2
At the Association’s annual meeting on June 28, 1979, twenty of twenty-three unit owners were present in person or by proxy. A proposed amendment to Article VIII, Section 1, clause (f) of the bylaws was adopted. The amendment prohibited pet ownership, except for existing pets.3
In September, 1982, the Association filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction enforcing the amended bylaw against three unit own[1160]*1160ers, James A. Carroll, James Adkins, and Guy Whitney (collectively referred to as “Carroll”). Carroll’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that injunctive relief was not available was denied.
Carroll was the only one of the three who had been a unit owner at the time of the 1979 annual meeting. All three owners conceded that they now own pets in violation of the amended bylaw. They defended the action on the basis that the amendment was invalid, for the following reasons: (1) timely and adequate notice of the purpose of the annual meeting was not given; (2) the proxy solicitation was materially misleading; and (3) the pet ban restricted their ownership rights as set forth in the declaration.
On cross motions for summary judgment the superior court rejected these contentions and granted summary judgment in the Association’s favor. The unit owners appeal.
II.
A. Injunctive Relief.
Carroll contends that injunctive relief was not available because the plaintiff did not plead or prove that it would be irreparably harmed. It has not shown that the pets are in any way a nuisance, or that they reduce the property values, or that there have been any complaints about them. Carroll argues that the Association has shown nothing more than that its bylaw has been violated, without any demonstration of any harm or injury.
The Association does not assert that it will be irreparably injured if an injunction, or specific performance, is denied. It simply asserts, without citing any authority, that it is entitled to have its bylaws enforced by a court order, and that Carroll did not adequately raise this issue below.
The record establishes that Carroll's motion to dismiss adequately raised this issue. It is clear that the Association has not shown that all equitable grounds normally required for injunctive relief are present; rather, it has shown only the bare fact that its bylaw is being violated. That in itself is sufficient, however, since injunc-tive relief is specifically authorized by the Horizontal Property Regimes Act as a remedy for the failure to “comply strictly with the bylaws” of a condominium association. AS 34.07.360. Where a statute specifically authorizes injunctive relief, the plaintiff need not show either irreparable injury or lack of an adequate remedy at law. See Vogler v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 635 P.2d 462, 464 (Alaska 1981); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 133, at 251 (1978); 42 Am. Jur.2d Injunctions § 38, at 776 (1969). Furthermore, as a practical matter injunc-tive relief is the only way to adequately enforce a bylaw of this nature.
B. Sufficiency of Notice.
Carroll argues that because the notice of the meeting did not indicate that a pet ban would be considered, it was insufficient. The Association bylaws require that the notice contain a statement of the purpose of the meeting. A mere statement that amendments to the bylaws will be considered, without any specificity as to which bylaws or the general nature of the proposed amendments, is inadequate to fulfill this requirement. Carroll cites several cases in support of this argument. See Des Moines Life & Annuity Co. v. Midland Insurance Co., 6 F.2d 228, 229 (D.C. Minn.1925); Blum v. Latter, 163 So.2d 189, 193-94 (La.App.1964); Klein v. Scranton Life Insurance Co., 139 Pa.Super. 369, 11 A.2d 770, 775 (1940); Mueller v. Merz, 23 Wis.2d 588, 127 N.W.2d 774, 776 (1964).
The Association contends that its notice was adequate, since it informed the unit owners that “Proposed Amendments to Bylaws” were on the agenda. The corporate cases cited by Carroll are distinguishable, it contends. Even if the notice was inadequate, Carroll’s attendance by proxy waives any objection, the Association argues.4
[1161]*1161The Alaska statutes and the Model Business Corporation Act, unlike the Association’s bylaws, do not specifically require that the notice of a corporation’s annual meeting specify the purpose of the meeting. Model Business Corp. Act § 29 (1971); AS 10.05.141; AS 10.20.066.5 However, there are significant differences between memberships in a condominium association and status as a shareholder in the typical corporation. Members of a condominium association have a heightened interest in the affairs of the association inasmuch as it regulates the conditions of their residence. Shareholders typically have only a financial interest in corporate affairs, and, in addition, their ownership interests are often more readily transferable than realty. A higher standard of notice for condominium associations may therefore be appropriate.
The Uniform Condominium Act promulgated by the Commission on Uniform State Laws in 1977 requires that “[t]he notice of any meeting [of the association] must state the time and place of the meeting and the items on the agenda, including the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws.” Uniform Condominium Act § 3-108, 7 U.L.A. 177 (1978). In 1980, a revised Uniform Condominium Act was promulgated, which broadens the notice requirement to include, in addition to changes in the declaration or bylaws, “any budget changes, and any proposal to remove a director or officer.” 7 U.L.A.Supp. at 187 (1983). These provisions indicate the importance of advance notification of changes in the bylaws. They add specific content to the general concept of purpose expressed in the association’s bylaws. We think it is appropriate to follow the lead of the uniform act and hold that the term purpose includes notice of the general nature of proposed amendments to bylaws.6
The importance of prior notice of amendments to the bylaws is also indicated by the fact that the Association’s Board of Directors in this case directed the Association’s secretary to provide a copy of the proposed amendments with the notice, and [1162]*1162it was only by oversight that the notification failed to include a copy.
For these reasons we conclude that the bylaws’ requirement that the notice of the annual meeting must include a statement of the purpose of the meeting means that members must be informed of the general nature of proposed amendments to the bylaws. The notice of annual meeting failed to inform the members of the general nature of proposed amendments, and hence did not constitute notice as to that matter.
III.
We hold that the notice of the annual meeting was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of the Association’s bylaws. Attendance by proxy was not a waiver of the defective notice.
Article II, Section 7 of the bylaws states in part:
The presence of any Unit Owner in person or by proxy at any meeting shall be deemed a waiver of any required notice as to such Unit Owner unless such Unit Owner shall at the opening thereof object to the holding of such meeting for noncompliance with the provisions of this section.
Arguably, the waiver provision applies to any defect in notification, including a failure of notice. Without determining the full scope of the waiver provision, we decline to read it so broadly as to encompass notice of the general nature of proposed amendments.7
The judgment is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings.