Carroll v. Board of Education

561 F.2d 1
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedAugust 23, 1977
DocketNos. 76-2525-76-2526, 76-2158
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 561 F.2d 1 (Carroll v. Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carroll v. Board of Education, 561 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1977).

Opinion

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.

These consolidated appeals are another chapter in the litigation involving the desegregation of the schools of Jefferson County, Kentucky.1

The principal question concerns the constitutionality of a State statute which would thwart the desegregation plan adopted by the district court. The district judge declared portions of this statute to be unconstitutional. We affirm.

Also involved on this appeal is a challenge by State officials to the constitutionality of three federal statutes prohibiting the expenditure of federal funds on school busing for purposes of desegregation. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we conclude that there is no case or controversy on the present appeal requiring adjudication of the constitutionality of the three challenged federal statutes.

I.

On July 30, 1975, the district court entered a judgment requiring the implementation of a plan for school desegregation, which subsequently was approved by this court in Cunningham v. Grayson, supra, 541 F.2d 538. On September 15, 1975, plaintiffs in No. 76-2158 filed a declaratory judgment action contending that the allocation of state funds to the Jefferson County Board of Education pursuant to the Kentucky Foundation Program Act, K.R.S. ch. 157A, for transportation purposes should be computed on the basis of transportation of students within the county to the nearest school available to them. The plaintiffs in that case relied upon § 183 of the Kentucky Constitution, which requires the General Assembly by appropriate legislation to provide for an “efficient” system of common schools throughout the state. The argument was made that “no one can seriously contend that cross district busing is an efficient method of operating a school system.” Senior District Judge James F. Gordon rejected this contention in an opinion published at 410 F.Supp. 234 (W.D.Ky.1976), saying:

We need not reach the ultimate definition of what is an “efficient system of common schools throughout the state.” At the very least an efficient system of schools is a system which exists and operates. To exist the Jefferson County schools must be operated and maintained in a constitutional manner, as prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The transportation of over 22,000 students, as provided for in the desegregation order of July 30, 1975, was and is necessary to dismantle an unconstitutional school system and to create a system compatible with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the state’s constitutional duty to provide public education in Kentucky and to fund the public school system that is created, the burden of paying for the additional cost of transporting the students required to be bused under the desegregation order falls on the state, assuming the local school district is unable to meet the financial obligation of providing the required transportation. See K.R.S. 158.110. In short, once the citizens of Kentucky made the voluntary commitment to educate the children of this state in public schools neither the Kentucky General Assembly nor those individuals responsible for discharging the duties imposed on them by the state constitution and the Foundation Program Act can abrogate those duties merely because the monetary obligation becomes unexpectedly large or even onerous.
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[3]*3In conclusion we hold that the Superintendent of Public Instruction, in computing the transportation funds available to Jefferson County, is to include in his computation under the provisions of K.R.S. Chapter 157A, all transportation costs of Jefferson County in the identical manner in which transportation costs are determined under K.R.S. 157A.090 for all other school districts in the state. 410 F.Supp. at 238.

The above-quoted opinion of Judge Gordon was announced on March 19, 1976. On March 29, 1976, the General Assembly enacted into law House Bill No. 168 which became effective immediately. A copy of this statute is made an appendix to this opinion.

The constitutionality of this statute was attacked by the Jefferson County Board of Education. In an opinion announced August 27, 1976, the district court held §§ 1 and 2 and HH 1, 2 and 3 of § 3 of the statute to be unconstitutional. With respect to H111 and 2 of § 3 Judge Gordon said:

Paragraphs 1 and 2 in essence state that local school boards may provide money from their general funds for the transportation of elementary school students to the nearest school able to accommodate the child in his particular grade. The obvious effect of these paragraphs is that it allows or authorizes local school boards to refuse to expend funds for the transportation of elementary school students beyond the nearest school able to provide space for the student in the appropriate grade level.
The defendant contends these first two paragraphs are not unconstitutional because the legislature has not prohibited school boards from expending their funds in transporting elementary school students beyond the nearest available school which can seat that child in his required class but merely gives the school board that discretion if it wishes to avail itself of that authority. This argument is unpersuasive when juxtaposed the legal responsibilities of the Jefferson County Board of Education. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are patently unconstitutional insofar as they give the Jefferson County Board of Education the discretion to refuse to provide transportation for elementary school students beyond the nearest school able to provide a space in the appropriate classroom for the transported student. This discretion has the effect of annulling our desegregation order of July 30, 1975, which requires the Jefferson County Board of Education to dismantle its previously unconstitutional school system by transporting some 22,000 students to assigned schools within the school district. Thus, if the Court determined that insofar as Jefferson County was concerned paragraphs 1 and 2 in Section 3 of H.B. 168 were constitutional, we would in effect be allowing the General Assembly of Kentucky to circumvent our desegregation order. We cannot take such a position. Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 902 (6th Cir. 1970).
In conclusion paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3 of H.B. 168 are unconstitutional insofar as they are made applicable to the Jefferson County Board of Education because they (1) conflict with this Court’s duty to remove all remaining vestiges of state-imposed segregation in the Jefferson County school district, a duty imposed on this Court by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in its order of December 11, 1974. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974); See also Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Gordon, 521 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1975); and (2) conflicts with this Court’s desegregation order issued July 30, 1975, a plan which was and is necessary to dismantle an unconstitutional school system and to create a system compatible with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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561 F.2d 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carroll-v-board-of-education-ca6-1977.