Carroll-Jordan v. Jordan

Opinions

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-868

Filed 15 July 2026

Mecklenburg County, No. 21CVD009784-590

KELLY MADELEINE CARROLL-JORDAN, Plaintiff,

v.

DONALD REID JORDAN, JR., Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from order entered 14 May 2025 by Judge Karen D.

McCallum in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26

March 2026.

Touchstone Family Law, by Brione B. Pattison, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

McKeny Law Firm, by William T. McKeny, for Defendant–Appellant.

MURRY, Judge.

Donald R. Jordan, Jr. (Defendant) appeals from the trial court’s order for

permanent child support, equitable distribution, alimony, and attorneys’ fees. For the

reasons below, this Court affirms the order and remands it to the trial court solely

for further findings of fact explaining the duration and method of payment of its

alimony award.

I. Background

Opinion of the Court

Kelly M. Carroll-Jordan (Plaintiff) and Defendant married in 2004 and had

three children together before separating in 2021. On 18 June 2021, Plaintiff filed a

verified complaint for divorce from bed and board, followed three days later by a

complaint for child custody, child support, postseparation support, alimony, equitable

distribution, and attorneys’ fees. On 1 November 2021, Defendant filed an answer

and counterclaims for child custody, equitable distribution, and attorneys’ fees. On 7

June 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for interim distribution, alleging that Defendant

failed to reimburse her in part for insurance-claim proceeds he received in response

to a claim the parties filed for flooding damages to their marital home. One week

later, Defendant moved to strike Plaintiff’s motion, alleging that he had already

partially reimbursed her for $30,000 and that she could not prove her entitlement to

the additional $25,000 she alleged to be due.1

The matter came on for an alimony and child-support hearing on 12 October

2023. At the hearing, Defendant testified to owning and operating his own plumbing

company, where he paid one employee in cash on an “as-needed” basis for $160 per

day. Although he testified to receiving a monthly paycheck of “about” $5,000 from his

business, Defendant claimed to be unsure of the amount and frequency of shareholder

distributions he would routinely take because “[i]t kind of depends on how the bills

1 The record on appeal does not include any order of the trial court disposing of Plaintiff’s motion for interim distribution or Defendant’s motion to strike.

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get [him].” In response to questioning about specific business expenses and his salary,

Defendant responded, “I just don’t keep up with it. I honestly don’t know, that’s why

I pay these other people to do it.” Defendant testified to paying Plaintiff $5,000 in

monthly support from their separation until June 2023, deducting from that amount

mortgage payments on the marital home and car payments on Plaintiff’s vehicle. He

also testified to reimbursing Plaintiff approximately $30,000 of an insurance claim

payment for “extensive remodeling” to the marital home and to using about $20,000

from the same claim on his own living expenses.

Plaintiff testified to employment outside the home with a high-school

education prior to the parties’ marriage and to “helping [Defendant] run his company”

part-time during the marriage, which included doing “all the bidding for . . . new

construction,” “answer[ing] the telephones,” and financial record-keeping for the

business. She further testified to her unemployment since the parties’ separation,

claiming that her “day has been revolving around taking the kids to school and

picking them up.” She claimed, “There’s nobody that wants to hire me and give me

the hours that I need so I [can] continue to be a mother to my kids.” Plaintiff also

testified that Defendant’s support payments are “not paying the bills and getting us

through,” leaving her to resort to assistance from a crisis ministry organization for

months at a time to pay for the water bill and the children’s school supplies. Both

parties submitted written closing arguments following the hearing.

On 14 May 2025, the trial court issued an order for permanent child support,

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equitable distribution, alimony, and attorneys’ fees. The trial court found the “most

credible evidence of current income” for Defendant to be his 2023 balance sheet and

calculated his income by dividing and averaging the cumulative distributions from

the balance sheet over a ten-year period. The trial court also issued Defendant a child-

support credit of $115,202.85 for past payments, corresponding to his alleged amount

of overpayment in his closing argument, and ordered him to pay Plaintiff outstanding

child-support arrearages of $110,370.15 and ongoing arrearages of $2,349 per month.

Finding Plaintiff’s entitlement to alimony and a shortfall of $3,198 in her monthly

income, the trial court awarded her monthly alimony in that amount for a period of

102 months to be paid directly to her by Defendant. The trial court found Plaintiff’s

capability of “minimum[-]wage employment, which includes office work, on a part-

time basis” and imputed part-time, minimum-wage income to her.

In light of the parties’ waiver of the listing and valuation of their property for

equitable distribution, the trial court found “an unequal division of marital and

divisible property” to be “fair and equitable.” The trial court ordered the distribution

of the former marital home, valued at $331,851, to Plaintiff and “all assets, debts,

and other holdings” held in the name of Defendant’s plumbing company, valued at

approximately $426,000, to Defendant. The trial court also ordered Defendant to pay

Plaintiff a distributive award of $145,000. Finally, the trial court found that Plaintiff

was “an interested party, acting in good[ ] faith with insufficient means to defray the

expense of this action” and awarded her $15,000 in “reasonable” attorneys’ fees,

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ordering Defendant to pay the award in a “lump sum” directly to Plaintiff’s attorney.

Defendant timely appealed.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s order

because it is the “final judgment of a district court in a civil action.” N.C.G.S.

§ 7A-27(b)(2) (2025).

III. Analysis

On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) miscalculating

the amounts of his child-support arrears and credits; (2) failing to make required

findings of fact and miscalculating his income, Plaintiff’s reasonable needs, and

Plaintiff’s earning capacity in determining alimony; (3) failing to make necessary

findings of fact and to consider his business debts in making its equitable-distribution

award; and (4) awarding attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff in a lump sum instead of separate

amounts for each “component” of the case.

We review a trial court’s determinations of alimony, child support, and

equitable distribution for abuse of discretion, see Wise v. Wise, 264 N.C. App. 735, 738

(2019), and overturn its decision “only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it

could not have been the result of a reasoned decision,” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770,

777 (1985). We review de novo a trial court’s determination of a party’s entitlement

to attorneys’ fees under N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6 but “review the amount of the fees for

abuse of discretion” only. Hill v. Hill, 261 N.C. App. 600, 627 (2018). For the reasons

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below, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand it solely for further factfinding on

the reasons for the duration and method of payment of the trial court’s alimony

award.

A. Child Support

On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by miscalculating his

child-support arrears and credits for past payments. He argues that “the trial court

abused its discretion by imputing income” to him “by using distributions over an

approximate ten-year period,” “failed to consider the overpayment for the eldest

child,” and “improperly calculated the credits” for Defendant’s payments to Plaintiff

“during the course of . . . litigation.” We disagree.

When determining a child-support award, the trial court typically determines

the supporting spouse’s ability to pay “by his income at the time the award is made”

but may do so based on his “[c]apacity to earn” instead upon finding that he “is

deliberately depressing his income . . . because of a disregard of his marital obligation

to provide reasonable support.” Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 674 (1976). The trial

court may also “average prior years’ income in cases where” it finds “the evidence of

actual income . . . unreliable or otherwise insufficient.” Wise, 264 N.C. App. at 745.

Here, Defendant mischaracterizes the trial court’s determination of his income

as the product of imputing rather than averaging his income over a period of time.

The trial court found that Defendant “receives inconsistent income across different

sources” and that he “took distributions” from his business “as needed, or

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approximately one to two distributions per month,” along with end-of-year net-profit

distributions. Based on these unchallenged findings, the trial court divided the

cumulative distributions from Defendant’s 2023 balance sheet to find his average

monthly income, finding it to be the “most credible evidence of current income.” Given

the fluctuations in Defendant’s income and his imprecise testimony regarding

distributions, the trial court thoughtfully and reasonably exercised its discretion by

averaging his prior income over a ten-year period to determine his monthly income.

See id. at 747 (affording trial court “discretion in selecting the number of prior years’

income it considers”).

As to the amount of child-support arrears and credits, the trial court issued

Defendant a credit of $115,202.85 for payments made since the parties’ date of

separation, ordered him to pay Plaintiff outstanding arrearages of $110,370.15, and

set the amount of ongoing arrearages at $2,349 per month since September 2024. The

credit amount of $115,202.85 is identical to the amount Defendant claims in his

written closing argument to constitute his support payments “above and beyond the

agreed amount.” Because Defendant cannot now disclaim the credit amount he

previously accepted, we dismiss his claims of improper calculation of credits and of

any purported “overpayment” of child support. Thus, we affirm the portion of the trial

court’s order addressing child-support arrears and credits for past payments.

B. Alimony

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining alimony by failing

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to make required findings of fact under N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A(c)2 regarding the reasons

for the amount, duration, and manner of payment of alimony. He further claims that

the trial court failed to include payments to his employee when calculating his

business income, miscalculated Plaintiff’s reasonable needs, and improperly imputed

minimum wage to Plaintiff on a part-time instead of full-time basis when determining

her earning capacity.

A trial court must “exercise its discretion in determining the amount, duration,

and manner of payment of alimony” and “consider all relevant factors” enumerated

in the relevant statute. N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A(a). In doing so, the trial court must “set

forth the reasons for its award or denial of alimony and, if making an award, the

reasons for its amount, duration, and manner of payment.” Id. § 50-16.3A(c). We have

held that “the findings of fact required to support the amount, duration, and manner

of payment of an alimony award are sufficient” if the trial court makes “findings of

fact . . . on the ultimate facts at issue in the case” that “show the trial court properly

applied the law.” Friend-Novorska v. Novorska, 143 N.C. App. 387, 395 (2001).

In Williamson v. Williamson, 140 N.C. App. 362, 365 (2000), we held that the

trial court lacked sufficient findings of fact under N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A(c) to support

its alimony award when it “failed to provide any reasoning” for the monthly amount

2 Defendant incorrectly cites to “N.C.[G.S.] § 50-16A(c) (2017)” to support his argument. Our review of Defendant’s argument under the correct statute does not negate our admonishment to him for this oversight.

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awarded, the permanent duration of the award, or the method of payment directly

into the clerk’s office. Similarly, the trial court here did not document any reasons for

the duration and method of payment of its alimony award. Finding that Plaintiff had

a “monthly shortfall of $3,198” “[a]fter taking into consideration [her] reasonable

shared . . . and individual monthly expenses,” the trial court awarded her a monthly

alimony amount of $3,198 for a period of 102 months to be paid directly to her. But

the trial court did not specify the reasons for the duration and method of payment of

the alimony award. We apply Williamson to this case and remand the alimony portion

of the trial court’s order for further findings of fact explaining its reasoning for the

duration of the alimony award and its method of payment. See In re Civil Penalty,

324 N.C. 373, 384 (1989).

As to the calculation of Defendant’s business income, the trial court found that

Defendant’s business “has one employee that serves as needed, who receives $160[ ]

in cash per day from a business account.” This finding demonstrates the trial court’s

consideration of payments to Defendant’s employee when calculating his business

income.

Regarding Plaintiff’s reasonable needs, Defendant claims that the trial court

“abused its discretion . . . by failing to consider” Defendant’s $30,000 payment to

Plaintiff “for her reasonable needs” and his $250 monthly payment for her vehicle in

making its alimony award. Defendant’s sole legal authority cited for this argument

is an unpublished opinion of this Court, Webb v. Webb, No. COA09-1203, 2010 N.C.

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App. LEXIS 1968 (Oct. 19, 2010). An unpublished opinion “establishe[s] no precedent

and is not binding authority.” U.S. Auto. Ass’n v. Simpson, 126 N.C. App. 393, 396

(1997); see N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3). Our appellate rules “disfavor[ ]” citation to

unpublished opinions and require a party who nonetheless chooses to cite an

unpublished opinion to “serve[ ] a copy thereof on all other parties in the case and on

the court” and to “indicate the opinion’s unpublished status.” N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3).

Defendant has failed to comply with these requirements. We thus disregard any

reference to this unpublished opinion in our review and remind Defendant and his

counsel of the explicit provisions of our appellate rule prohibiting citation of

unpublished opinions as precedential.

Here, the trial court incorporated into its findings the parties’ stipulations

following mediation, which require in relevant part for Defendant to “pay to Plaintiff

the sum of $30,000[ ] . . . represent[ing] the remaining portion of the insurance check

necessary for [her] to complete the remaining repairs on the former marital

residence.” At trial, Defendant testified to remitting Plaintiff a homeowner’s

insurance claim payment of approximately $30,000 for “extensive remodeling” to the

marital home due to flood damage and to using about $20,000 from the same claim

on his own living expenses. The trial court also found that Defendant “has made

payments toward . . . [Plaintiff’s] car payment” “[s]ince the parties’ date of separation”

and credited him “for the aforementioned payment[ ].” Thus, the evidence and

unchallenged findings reflect the trial court’s consideration of Defendant’s $30,000

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payment to Plaintiff and Defendant’s payments on Plaintiff’s vehicle in determining

the alimony award. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in

determining the amount of alimony.

Additionally, Defendant argues that the trial court’s imputation of minimum-

wage income to Plaintiff on a part-time basis was an “arbitrary” decision unsupported

by the evidence. At trial, Plaintiff testified to having a high-school diploma, working

outside the home prior to the parties’ marriage, and “helping [Defendant] run his

company” part-time during the marriage, doing “all the bidding for . . . new

construction,” “answer[ing] the telephones,” and keeping company financial records.

The trial court found that Plaintiff “has demonstrated that [she] can at least work

minimum[-]wage employment, which includes office work, on a part-time basis” and

imputed income to her “at a part-time, minimum[-]wage rate of $7.25 per hour for

twenty . . . hours per week.” The trial court’s finding of Plaintiff’s earning capacity

demonstrates a reasoned consideration of the evidence before it. Thus, we affirm the

trial court’s alimony award of $3,198 per month to Plaintiff and remand only for

further factfinding explaining the duration and method of payment of alimony as

discussed above.

C. Equitable Distribution

Next, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its equitable-distribution

award by failing to (1) find that equitable distribution would be impractical; (2) list,

classify, and value the parties’ separate and divisible property; and (3) consider his

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company’s business debt in ordering a distributive award to Plaintiff. We disagree on

all counts.

A trial court must “provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property

and divisible property between the parties,” which must consist of “an equal division

by using net value of marital property and . . . divisible property unless the [trial]

court determines that an equal division is not equitable.’’ N.C.G.S. § 50-20(a), (c). This

“presumption . . . that an equal division is equitable . . . may be rebutted by . . .

evidence that the property is a closely held business entity,” in which case the trial

court must “provide for a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the

parties” “in lieu of in-kind distribution.” Id. § 50-20(e).

Here, the trial court found that the parties “waive[d] the listing, classification,

and valuation of the marital and divisible property subject to distribution.” Defendant

challenges this finding on appeal, asserting that “he did not . . . waive” “findings of

fact and conclusions of law” regarding equitable distribution and that he “objected to

the entry of that language” in the order “when sending requests to the trial court for

changes in the order.” Defendant also contends that the trial court “failed to require

equitable distribution affidavits” or include the same “within the court file” in

violation of N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a).

A party who files an equitable-distribution claim must “prepare and serve upon

the opposing party an equitable distribution inventory affidavit” listing and valuing

all marital and separate property, to which the other party must respond with a

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corresponding affidavit. N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a). Here, the record contains no such

affidavit from either party, nor any objection by Defendant to the trial court’s finding

of the parties’ stipulation to waiving the listing and valuation of their property. We

base our review “solely upon the record on appeal.” N.C. R. App. P. 9(a). Absent

contrary evidence, we regard a “stipulation, once made and of record,” as “binding on

the parties” and “treat the facts stipulated to . . . as established.” Lawing v. Lawing,

81 N.C. App. 159, 166 (1986). Accordingly, we regard the trial court’s finding of the

parties’ stipulation as a waiver of the listing and valuation of their marital and

separate property for equitable distribution. See id. at 162 (“presum[ing] that the trial

court acted correctly” “[u]ntil shown otherwise”).

Upon review, we discern no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion in making its equitable-distribution determination or distributive award.

The trial court found “an unequal division of marital and divisible property” between

the parties to be “fair and equitable.” The trial court ordered the distribution of the

former marital home (valued at $331,851) to Plaintiff and “all assets, debts, and other

holdings” held in the name of Defendant’s plumbing company (valued at

approximately $426,000) to Defendant. In light of this difference in value, the trial

court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff a distributive award of $145,000. The trial

court also found Defendant to be a “self-employed commercial plumber” and the “sole

owner” of his business, who “took distributions . . . as needed” and paid “various

personal expenses” through the business. Finally, the trial court found that

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Defendant’s “business debts . . . are encompassed in the business valuation and

expenses, and should not be considered separately from the business.”

These unchallenged findings reflect the trial court’s deliberate and reasoned

consideration of Defendant’s business income and debt in determining an equitable

distribution of the parties’ property. Based on its findings establishing the closely-

held nature of Defendant’s business, the trial court’s distributive award to Plaintiff

appropriately seeks to achieve equity between the parties “in lieu of an in-kind

distribution.” N.C.G.S. § 50-20(e). Thus, we dismiss Defendant’s arguments on this

ground and affirm the portion of the trial court’s order addressing equitable

distribution and the distributive award.

D. Attorneys’ Fees

Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by “awarding attorney[s’]

fees in a lump sum without separating the amount of fees awarded for each

component of the case.” In a child-custody or support case, the trial court “may in its

discretion order payment of reasonable attorney[s’] fees to an interested party acting

in good faith who has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit.” N.C.G.S.

§ 50-13.6. We have interpreted this provision to require findings that “the party

seeking attorney[s’] fees . . . is an interested party acting in good faith” who has

“insufficient means to defray the expenses.” Leary v. Leary, 152 N.C. App. 438, 443

(2002). In a child-support action, “there must be an additional finding that the party

ordered to furnish support has refused to provide support which is adequate under

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the circumstances existing at the time of the institution or proceeding.” Id. (quotation

omitted); see N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6.

Here, the trial court found Plaintiff to be “an interested party[ ] acting in

good[ ] faith with insufficient means to defray the expense of this action.” The trial

court also found that Defendant “has refused to provide child support . . . adequate

under the circumstances existing at the time of the commencement of this action.”

Finding that Plaintiff had incurred $15,000 in attorneys’ fees, that her attorneys’

hourly rate of $400 was “commensurate with other attorneys . . . with the same

skill[-]level and experience, and that the time spent was “fair and reasonable,” the

trial court awarded Plaintiff attorneys’ fees of $15,000. The trial court ordered

Defendant to “pay[ ] a lump sum” for the full amount directly to Plaintiff’s attorney.

Defendant cites our decision in Hill v. Hill as supporting remand “when a

single lump award for multiple claims makes a proper review of reasonableness too

difficult.” There, we vacated an award of attorneys’ fees because the trial court

“awarded fees without specifying the basis” and failed to find whether the defendant

husband had provided adequate support as required by N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6. Id. at 631.

But we expressly clarified that “if there were adequate findings to support [the]

[w]ife’s entitlement to attorney[s’] fees on all three claims, the award would be

proper.” Id. at 627. Nowhere in Hill did we require findings that separated attorneys’

fee amounts by individual claims, nor does Defendant cite to any other legal authority

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in support of this purported requirement.3 The trial court made all required statutory

findings regarding the amount and reasonableness of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, her

insufficient means to cover them, and Defendant’s inadequate provision of support.

See Leary, 152 N.C. App. at 443. Thus, we hold that the trial court properly awarded

attorneys’ fees of $15,000 to Plaintiff.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons above, this Court affirms the trial court’s order and remands

it solely for further findings of fact that document reasons for the duration and

method of payment for its alimony award.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Judges ARROWOOD and GORE concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

3 Defendant does, however, cite to an unpublished opinion of this Court as legal support for his argument without indicating its unpublished status as required by North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 30. See N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3). We chastise Defendant and his counsel for this repeated violation of our appellate rules and disregard his argument to the extent it relies on our unpublished opinion in Rissmann v. Rissmann, 278 N.C. App. 605 (2021).

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