Carrillo De Matias v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 10, 2024
• Docket: 23-3186
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 10 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JACINTA CARRILLO DE No. 23-3186 MATIAS; DENIS OMAR MATIAS- Agency Nos. CARRILLO; JONATHAN ALEXANDER A220-489-680A220-489-681A220- MATIAS-CARRILLO; LEIDY MATIAS- 489-682A220-589-683 CARRILLO, MEMORANDUM* Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 8, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Jacinta Carrillo De Matias and her three children seek review of a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration

Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, the BIA cites Matter of Burbano, 20 I. &

N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), and adopts and affirms the IJ’s order in its entirety,

“we review the IJ’s decision directly.” Cornejo-Villagrana v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d

479, 482 (9th Cir. 2017). Reviewing the agency’s factual findings for substantial

evidence and its legal conclusions de novo, Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th

626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022), we deny the petition for review.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Petitioner is

not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. Assuming Petitioner is part of a

particular social group and has a protected identity, “[t]he lack of a nexus to a

protected ground is dispositive of [Petitioner’s] . . . claims.” Riera-Riera v. Lynch,

841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016).2 The BIA adopted the IJ’s finding that Luis

1 Petitioner and her children each filed an individual asylum application, and Petitioner identified her children as derivative beneficiaries on her application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). 2 Where, as here, the petitioner fails to establish any nexus between the claimed persecution and a protected ground, there is no distinction between the “one central reason” requirement for an asylum claim and “a reason” requirement for a withholding of removal claim. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2010); Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2021).

2 23-3186 did not harm Petitioner on account of any statutorily protected characteristic.

Record evidence concerning the history of the relationship between Luis and

Petitioner, Luis’s statements to Petitioner, and Luis’s behavior toward Petitioner

and others supports this determination. On appeal, Petitioner does not identify any

evidence indicating the contrary. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion

that Luis was motivated to harm Petitioner because he was angry that she was

pregnant and questioned the paternity of their son, and that he was motivated to

threaten Petitioner because she left him and married another man. These

motivations and the actions they instigated were disturbing and cruel, but they do

not demonstrate that Petitioner was “individually targeted on account of a

protected ground.” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2021).

Therefore, the IJ did not err in finding that Petitioner did not demonstrate a nexus

between her past harm and a protected ground.

2. Failure to establish a nexus for past harm does not preclude a

petitioner from establishing a nexus with respect to likely future harm. See, e.g.,

Regalado-Escobar v. Holder, 717 F.3d 724, 729–30 (9th Cir. 2013). On appeal

Petitioner contends that the IJ “ignored” record evidence in its future harm

determination. This is not so. The IJ drew on its past harm analysis to find that

Petitioner’s fear of future harm, similarly, does not bear a nexus to a protected

ground. Substantial evidence supports this conclusion. See Flores Molina, 37

3 23-3186 F.4th at 632. Furthermore, Petitioner failed to exhaust her disfavored group

analysis argument. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416–18, 421

(2023); Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023).

Accordingly, we deny the petition.3

PETITION DENIED.

3 Petitioner forfeited her claim for protection under CAT by not challenging the agency’s independently dispositive past-torture, individualized risk of future torture, and requisite government action assessments. See Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2011) (establishing the elements of CAT relief); Hui Ran Mu v. Barr, 936 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that a petitioner forfeits “issues not raised in the opening brief”).

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