Carrigan CU Application

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedAugust 2, 2013
Docket115-8-12 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of Carrigan CU Application (Carrigan CU Application) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carrigan CU Application, (Vt. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT - ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION

{ In re: Carrigan Conditional Use Application { Docket No. 115-8-12 Vtec (deck enclosure) { (Appeal from 8/6/12 Addison DRB decision) { *********************************************************************************************** In re: Carrigan Certificate of Occupancy { Docket No. 33-3-13 Vtec (determination as to non-violation { (Appeal from 2/25/13 Addison DRB decision) re: multiple detached decks, etc.) { *********************************************************************************************** In re: Carrigan Conditional Use Application { Docket No. 55-5-13 Vtec (determination as to certificate of { (Appeal from 4/25/13 Addison DRB decision) occupancy for detached decks) { {

Judgment Order

Linda J. and John P. Carrigan (“Applicants”) purchased their seasonal camp property on the shores of Lake Champlain in the Town of Addison (“Town”) thirty or more years ago. Their property is located off of a private road known as Fisher Point Road and is known as 16 Fisher Point South. At the time of Applicants’ purchase, the property contained a run-down seasonal camp, without internal plumbing or running water. Over the years, Applicants have made improvements to their seasonal camp. The latest improvements consist of certain decks that are the subject of the three appeals noted in the above caption. Barbara Supeno and Barbara J. Ernst (“Appellants”), who jointly own and reside as full-time residents at the adjoining property located at 330 Fisher Point Road, filed the three pending appeals. When Applicants and Appellants were unable to resolve these respective disputes, despite their mutual best efforts, the Court consolidated these three appeals and set them for a de novo trial. Applicants are represented in these appeals by James W. Runcie, Esq. Appellants are represented by Willem Jewett, Esq. Donald R. Powers, Esq. and Adam L. Powers, Esq. represent the Town. The Court conducted a site visit of the parties’ respective properties and then began the trial on June 14, 2013. The trial was completed during a second day, held on July 29, 2013. Once the parties had completed their presentation of all evidence and legal arguments, the Court took a recess to conduct its deliberations and then returned to the bench to deliver its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the record of the last day of trial. The Court issues this

1 Judgment Order to provide a summary of its Findings and Conclusions and to fulfill its responsibility for issuing a separate judgment order pursuant to V.R.C.P. 58. To the extent that a reader wishes to review the Court’s Findings and Conclusions in detail, they should review the record from the July 29, 2013 proceedings. The Court first noted on the record that the improvements at issue in these consolidated appeals may best be referenced by an exhibit that the partied stipulated to for admission, which was admitted at trial as Exhibit S-19. A copy of Exhibit S-19 is attached to this Judgment Order for the reader’s reference. In Docket No. 115-8-12 Vtec, Appellants appeal a conditional use permit that the Town of Addison Development Review Board (“DRB”) granted to Applicants to enclose an already- permitted roof and deck. This area (identified as deck “B” on Exhibit S-19) is now part of Applicants’ 20 foot by 40 foot seasonal camp. Docket No. 33-3-13 concerns a Certificate of Occupancy that the Town Zoning Administrator (“ZA”) issued to Applicants for a detached deck (identified as deck “D” on Exhibit S-19). Appellants appealed the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy to the DRB, which denied the appeal; Appellants now appeal that denial to this Court. Docket No. 55-5-13 Vtec concerns another Certificate of Occupancy that the ZA issued to Applicants enabling them to connect deck “C” to deck “D” and use these two combined decks as a “detached” deck within the 100 foot shoreland setback, as authorized by § 2.3(F)(7)(a) of the Town of Addison Zoning Regulations (“Regulations”). Appellants appealed the issuance of that Certificate of Occupancy to the DRB, which denied the appeal; Appellants now appeal that denial to this Court. Appellants were compelled to file three separate appeals, given that the DRB issued separate determinations on Applicants’ three separately-filed applications. However, these consolidated appeals presented common factual and legal issues for the Court to resolve. The Court noted that at the core of each appeal were the following factual and legal determinations: 1. The 2003 permit that granted Applicants authority to construct the roof over deck B added ten feet in length to Applicants’ seasonal camp, as shown in the hand-drawn site map attached to Applicants’ 2003 permit application, which the ZA used to memorialize his approval. Copies of the application and approval documents were admitted at trial as Exhibit 2 (see hand-drawn site plan sketch on p. 4). By this approval, the footprint of Applicants’ seasonal camp was memorialized as and became 20’ by 40’.

2 2. Pursuant to Regulations § 2.3(F)(7)(a), Applicants were permitted to construct one detached deck of no more than 500 square feet within the 100-foot shoreline setback. The Regulations do not define what “detached” means. The Court concludes that the common definition of “detached” (i.e., not attached) controls, that the Regulations do not provide for a minimum space between the detached deck and other structures, and that Applicants’ decks C and D, as now constructed, are sufficiently detached from the camp. Further, while decks C and D are within the 100-foot setback, they are no more than 500 square feet and therefore fulfill the provisions of Regulations § 2.3(F)(7)(a). In rendering our determination of whether Applicants’ decks are sufficiently “detached,” we found Acting ZA Kauffman’s testimony most credible, especially based upon his experience with the Regulations in general and this specific provision in particular. 3. Applicants’ property has included a landing and stairs on the property’s shoreline that have provided historical access to Lake Champlain. The original landing and stairs became unstable, so Applicants replaced it in the late 1980’s with a concrete landing and stairs, which provided a safer access for Applicants and their guests to enter the waters of Lake Champlain. Applicants and certain town officials have also referred to this concrete landing and stairs as a “bulkhead” or “retaining wall.” Both terms have credibility, given the physical nature of the concrete landing. Appellants urged the Court to regard this landing as a “detached deck, gazebo, or similar structure” as those terms are used in Regulations § 2.3(F)(7)(a), but the Court does not believe that the shoreline concrete landing and stairs fit the intended meaning of the Regulation provision. Appellants argued that by classifying the concrete landing as a detached deck or other such structure, Applicants would be foreclosed from receiving conditional use approval for the detached deck located near their seasonal camp. The Court declines to adopt Appellants’ reasoning, since we conclude that Applicants’ concrete landing at the shoreline does not fit the meaning of Regulations § 2.3(F)(7)(a). 4. Appellants further argued that Applicants’ detached deck and other improvements are in conflict with the purpose provisions for the Shoreland Residential Zoning District (“SR District”) (Regulations § 2.3(A)) and the applicable purpose provisions in the Town of Addison Town Plan (Exhibit M-1). While these purpose provisions provide helpful guidance to the Court by explaining the intended purpose of the SR District, these provision cannot be relied upon to deny Applicants’ pending applications, since they do not contain regulatory language that provide adequate notice to Applicants or other property owners of the uses or development that is specifically prohibited.

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Bluebook (online)
Carrigan CU Application, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carrigan-cu-application-vtsuperct-2013.