Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge TRAXLER wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge WILLIAMS joined. Judge NIEMEYER wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:
Carrie A. McMellon, Lori Dawn White, Kathy D. Templeton, and Cheri Call (collectively, the “plaintiffs”) filed an action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A.App. §§ 741-52 (West Supp.2002), seeking recovery for injuries they suffered when they rode jet skis over the gates of the Robert C. Byrd Locks and Dam, a facility owned by the United States government and operated by the Army Corps of Engineers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the government had no duty to provide any warnings about the dam. The plaintiffs appeal, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
In August 1999, the plaintiffs were staying at a campground on the Ohio River near the Ohio-West Virginia border. Late one afternoon, they took two jet skis for a ride, with two of the plaintiffs riding on each of the jet skis. The plaintiffs rode upstream for a short period and then turned around and headed downstream. The plaintiffs approached what they all believed to be a bridge; when it was too late, the plaintiffs realized they were going over the gates of a dam. They dropped approximately twenty-five feet, hitting the water below and suffering significant injuries. The plaintiffs stated in their depositions that they did not see any warning signs as they approached the dam and that they could not tell until they were perhaps five feet away from the dam that there was a change in the water levels.
At the time of the accident, there were several warning signs on the upstream side of the dam. The plaintiffs’ evidence, however, indicated that the signs were difficult to see from the river. The plaintiffs submitted affidavits from several people who regularly camp and boat in the area around the dam. The affiants stated that a warning sign on the right descending bank cannot be seen from the river because it is obscured by trees and other vegetation and that a sign located in the river on a concrete piling is not readable from a distance and is not readable from the center or right side of the river.
Until 1995, there had been buoys in place marking the entrance of the restricted area around the dam. The buoys were removed when extensive repairs were made to the dam and locks, but they were not replaced after the construction work was completed. In the summer of 2000, after the plaintiffs’ accident, the Corps of Engineers placed two new warning buoys on the upstream side of the dam.
The plaintiffs’ theory of the case was that the government had a duty to warn those on the river of the presence of the dam and that the signs in place were inadequate to carry out that duty. The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the government’s actions with regard to the dam fell within an implied “discretionary function” exception to the Suits in Admiralty Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. In the alternative, the government moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to warn about the dam, that the warnings it did provide were adequate, [291]*291and that the plaintiffs’ negligence was the sole cause of the accident.
The district court rejected the government’s discretionary function argument and denied the government’s motion to dismiss. However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the government had no duty to warn of the dam. The plaintiffs appeal.
II.
The discretionary function issue involves jurisdictional questions of the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we address that issue first.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2680 (West 1994 & Supp.2002), waives sovereign immunity for most tort claims asserted against the government. The FTCA includes a “discretionary function” exception, which specifically provides that the Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a). The plaintiffs’ claims against the government, however, do not fall within the FTCA, but instead are brought pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act (the “SIAA”), through which the government has consented to being sued in admiralty1 and under which the government is exposed to liability to the same extent as a private person. See 46 U.S.C.A.App. § 742 (“In cases where if ... a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the United States.... ”); Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 1975) (explaining that under the SIAA, “the United States is to be held accountable in admiralty whenever a private person, in similar circumstances, would be”). Unlike the FTCA, the SIAA does not include a discretionary function exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. The government nonetheless contends that such an exception must be read into the SIAA.
Every other circuit to consider the question has agreed with the government. See Mid-South Holding Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir.2000); Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 418-19 (6th Cir.1998); Tew v. United States, 86 F.3d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir.1996); Baldassaro v. United States, 64 F.3d 206, 208 (5th Cir.1995); Cassens v. St. Louis River Cruise Lines, Inc., 44 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir.1995); Earles v. United States, 935 F.2d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir.1991); Sear-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 891-93 (3d Cir.1990); Robinson v. United States (In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos [292]*292Litig.), 891 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1989); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976). These courts have typically concluded that principles of separation of powers require that the discretionary function be read into the SIAA:
Were we not to find a discretionary function exception to the SAA, we would subject all administrative and legislative decisions concerning the public interest in maritime matters to independent judicial review in the not unlikely event that the implementation of those policy judgments were to cause private injuries. Because such an 'outcome is intolerable under our constitutional system of separation of powers, we hold that a discretionary function exception is implied in the SAA.
Tew, 86 F.3d at 1005 (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
This court, however, has refused to read a discretionary function exception into the SIAA:
[The SIAA] contains no discretionary function exception, and the Tort Claims Act contains a specific exception of claims for which the Suits in Admiralty Act provides a remedy. Thus it is clear that this action could not have been brought under the Tort Claims Act, and it is properly maintainable under the Suits in Admiralty Act, which is an effective waiver of sovereign immunity.
There is no basis upon which we can import the many exceptions in the Tort Claims Act into the Suits in Admiralty Act, where the United States is to be held accountable in admiralty whenever a private person, in similar circumstances, would be.
Lane, 529 F.2d at 179 (footnotes omitted). The district court, therefore, properly rejected the government’s discretionary function argument.
The government, however, points us to Faust v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 721 F.2d 934 (4th Cir.1983), which appears to have applied a limited form of a discretionary function exception to eases arising under the SIAA. Because Lane rejected, without qualification, the argument that the SIAA includes an implied discretionary function exception, we must follow Lane. See Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 312 n. 4 (4th Cir.2001) (“[A] panel of this court cannot overrule, explicitly or implicitly, the precedent set by a prior panel of this court. Only the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc can do that.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952, 122 S.Ct. 349, 151 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001). Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271 (4th Cir.1991), to which the government also points, implicated the operation of our nation’s air defenses, a context quite different from that presented here. As the Tiffany court emphasized, the significance of the military setting required the result quite independently of the discretionary function exception. See id. at 277 (explaining that “the discretionary function exception alone does not capture all the important aspects of this case”).
The dissent contends that by following Lane rather than Faust and Tiffany, we are effectively overruling Faust and Tiffany, thus violating the rule that one panel cannot overrule the decision of another panel. We disagree. As Judge Luttig has noted, the
necessary corollary of this rule is that in those instances in which a later opinion impermissibly attempts to modify an earlier opinion, the earlier opinion remains the controlling law in the circuit with respect to matters as to which the two opinions unquestionably conflict. Were it otherwise, willing panels, unconstrained by any sense of obligation to the principles of stare decisis, our own internal rules, or notions of collegiality, [293]*293could run roughshod over prior precedent, effectively repealing a rule whose importance to both the rule of law and to the orderly operation of a court is beyond dispute.
Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 343 (4th Cir.1996) (Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).2 Other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 322 F.3d 823, 828 n. 1 (5th Cir.2003) (“Where two previous holdings or lines of precedent conflict, the earlier opinion controls and is the binding precedent in the circuit.” (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted)); Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir.2001) (“Once a panel resolves an issue in a precedential opinion, the matter is deemed resolved, unless overruled by the court itself sitting en banc, or by the Supreme Court.... [A] later three-judge panel considering a case that is controlled by the rule announced in an earlier panel’s opinion has no choice but to apply the earlier-adopted rule; it may not any more disregard the earlier panel’s opinion than it may disregard a ruling of the Supreme Court.”).
III.
Because this case falls within our admiralty jurisdiction, it is governed by admiralty law. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986) (“With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”); Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir.1999) (“All cases involving a tort committed on navigable water, whether brought under federal admiralty jurisdiction, in state court under the saving-to-suitors clause, or in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, are governed by admiralty law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The plaintiffs’ claim is a straightforward negligence claim, the requirements of which under the general maritime law parallel those of land-based claims. Thus, the plaintiffs must establish that the government owed them a duty of care; that the government breached that duty; and that the government’s breach of duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. See Pearce v. United States, 261 F.3d 643, 647 (6th Cir.2001); 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 5-2 (3d ed.2001). The only element presently at issue in this case is that of duty.3
The plaintiffs contend that the common law imposes a duty to warn upon the government and that a regulation also imposes upon the government such a duty. The plaintiffs also contend that even if the government did not otherwise have a duty to warn, since the government in fact undertook to warn about the dam, it was re[294]*294quired to use reasonable care when providing those warnings.
A. Duty upon Undertaking
The plaintiffs argue that even if the government did not otherwise have a duty to warn about the dangers associated with the dam, a duty exists under the “Good Samaritan Doctrine.” That is, the plaintiffs contend that once the government undertook to place some warnings, it became obligated to use due care in the exercise of that undertaking. See Good, 149 F.3d at 420 (“Ohio Edison argues that maritime tort liability exists by virtue of the Good Samaritan Doctrine, which makes one person liable to another for breach of a duty voluntarily assumed by affirmative conduct, even when that assumption of duty is gratuitous.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We agree with the district court, however, that the plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence of the kind of reliance necessary to support this theory.
The seminal “Good Samaritan” case in the admiralty context is Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955). In Indian Towing, the Coast Guard undertook to operate a lighthouse that it was statutorily authorized, but not required, to operate. The existence of the lighthouse was noted on various navigational charts. The Coast Guard negligently maintained the lighthouse, the light was extinguished, and a ship ran aground. The Supreme Court concluded that the Coast Guard’s negligence in maintaining the lighthouse did not fall within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.4 When reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care to discover this fact and to repair the light or give warning that it was not functioning.
Id. at 69, 76 S.Ct. 122 (emphasis added).
Focusing on the “engendered rebanee” language, this circuit has concluded that Kability under Indian Towing for an undertaken duty arises if the plaintiff rebed to his detriment on the governmental undertaking: “The principle laid down in Indian Towing requires no more than that the government not injure sailors or boaters by inducing reliance on misleading navigational aids. It imposes no general duty upon the government to ensure navi[295]*295gable waters are safe or to provide warning devices.” Faust v. South Carolina State Highway Dep’t, 721 F.2d 934, 939 (4th Cir.1983) (emphasis added). Citing Faust, the district court here concluded that the plaintiffs had not relied upon or been misled by the government’s warning signs, and that the government therefore had no duty under the Good Samaritan doctrine.
The plaintiffs do not argue that there is evidence suggesting that they relied upon warnings issued by the government that turned out to be wrong. Instead, they simply contend that Indian Towing does not require reliance on the action undertaken by the government. We disagree. This court, as evidenced by the decision in Faust, and other courts have consistently held that liability under Indian Towing is typically dependent on the plaintiffs rebanee on the action undertaken by the government.5 See, e.g., Limar Shipping, Ltd. v. United States, 324 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir.2003) (“[T]he general principle gleaned from Indian Towing is that the government must not mislead, and must not induce reliance upon a belief that it is providing something which, in fact, it is not providing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); B & F Trawlers, Inc. v. United States, 841 F.2d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 1988); (“In Indian Towing ... an innocent party who was the intended beneficiary of the government action relied on the government to his detriment.”); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 623 (7th Cir.1982) (“The government argues, that even if the sign evidenced negligence, it did not engender justifiable rebanee by the Cabases to their detriment and, thus, there can be no liability under the rule of Indian Towing. It is true that some type of reliance is necessary to establish that government negligence was a cause of the injury, but we conclude that there was rebanee in the instant case .... ” (citation omitted)). The only evidence in the record establishes that the plaintiffs did not see any of the signs warning of the existence of the dam. Thus, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs relied to their detriment on or were mislead by any warnings issued by the government. We therefore agree with the district court that no duty on the part of the government arose under Indian Towing or the Good Samaritan doctrine. The question, then, is whether a duty arises under some other source.
B. Regulatory Duty
As with land-based torts, a maritime duty of care can arise from a statute or regulation. See Southern Nat. Gas Co. v. Pontchartrain Materials, Inc., 711 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (5th Cir.1983); Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 5-2 (“In admiralty the duty of care may be derived from ... duly enacted laws, regulations, and rules....”). The plaintiffs contend that 33 C.F.R. § 207.300(s) (2002) imposes upon the government a mandatory duty to
[296]*296296 338 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
post warning signs. For its part, the government contends that the regulation imposes a duty on boaters, but not itself.
[4] The regulation states:
(s) Restricted areas at locks and dams. All waters immediately above and below each dam, as posted by the respective District Engineers, are hereby designated as restricted areas. No vessel or other floating craft shall enter any such restricted area at any time. The limits of the restricted areas at each dam will be determined by the responsible District Engineer and marked by signs and/or flashing red lights installed in conspicuous and appropriate places.
Id. (emphasis added). The plaintiffs contend that the underscored portion of the regulation imposes upon the government a duty to conspicuously and appropriately mark the limits of the restricted area around the dam. We agree.
There are two ways that section 207.300(s) may be read. First, the regulation could be understood to declare as “restricted” some area above and below each dam on the Ohio River, but to leave to the Corps of Engineers’ discretion the determination of the size of each restricted area. Second, it is possible to read the regulation as giving the Corps of Engineers discretion as to whether any area around a dam should be restricted. Since the Corps of Engineers did in fact restrict an area around the Robert C. Byrd Locks and Dam, it is unnecessary here to decide which of the possible interpretations of the regulation is the correct one. And under either reading of the regulation, we conclude that there is a mandatory duty on the part of the government to conspicuously mark the boundaries of any area surrounding each dam it decides to restrict. See Callas, 682 F.2d at 623 (“[T]he warning sign did not mark the limits of the restricted area as required by the Army
regulations.”). While the regulation also imposes a duty on boaters to stay out of the restricted areas, we simply cannot agree that the boater’s duty is the only one created by the regulation, as some courts have held. See Pearce, 261 F.3d at 648 (concluding that regulation 207.300(s) “creates a duty for boaters, not for the Corps”); accord Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 407-08 (6th Cir.1982)
A violation of the regulation by the government, however, can support the plaintiffs’ negligence claim only if the plaintiffs are within the class of persons protected by the regulation and if the harm suffered is the type of harm the regulation was intended to prevent. See Southern Nat. Gas Co., 711 F.2d at 1256; Loehr v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 691 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir.1982); see also Schoenb-aum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 5-2 (“Negligence may be shown by evidence of violation of a statute or regulation. The statute or regulation must be determined to be applicable, however; the plaintiff must be included in the class of persons protected and the harm suffered must be the kind that the statute or rule was designed to prevent.”). We conclude that the plaintiffs satisfy these requirements.
[5] Regulation 207.300(s) requires the government to conspicuously mark the restricted areas around the dam; nothing in the regulation specifically requires the government to post signs warning of danger. That is, the government could perhaps satisfy its obligation under regulation 207.300(s) by conspicuously posting signs reading “RESTRICTED AREA, DO NOT ENTER,” rather than signs reading “DANGER, DAM AHEAD, DO NOT ENTER.” Because the regulation does not specifically require the government to give express safety warnings, it could be argued that the regulation is directed at the
[297]*297protection of government-owned dams and locks rather than the safety of those plying the waters of the Ohio River. While the protection of government property may well be the primary purpose of regulation 207.300, we think it clear that another purpose of section 207.300(s) is to protect the safety of those nearing the dam and its hazards.
Preliminarily, we note that there are other subsections of regulation 207.300 that are more specifically aimed at protecting the government’s property from damage. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. §§ 207.300(b), (n), (o), (q). Moreover, any person who damages a government lock or dam is held strictly liable for those damages. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 408; United States v. American Comm. Barge Line Co., 988 F.2d 860, 861-62 (8th Cir.1993). If section 207.300(s) were directed solely to the protection of government property, it would add little to the government’s arsenal. Thus, it is logical to conclude that section 207.300(s) is directed at something in addition to the protection of the government’s property.
As will be discussed in more detail below, the operation of a dam across a navigable waterway is dangerous, and restricting entry into the waters near the dam is perhaps the best way to ensure the safety of the boating public. Boaters who approach a conspicuously marked area they are prohibited from entering will pause and survey their surroundings, giving them an opportunity to recognize the dangers of the dam. In fact, the Corps of Engineers has in the past acknowledged that restricting access to the waters around certain dams is critical to protecting the safety of those on the rivers. See Navigation Regulations; McClellan-Kerr Arkansas Navigation System, 49 Fed.Reg. 10680 (March 22, 1984) (adding various regulations, including one largely identical to section 207.300(s), and noting that the added regulations “pertain to safety items which are essential to protect the locks and dams and the users ” (emphasis added)).
Therefore, while section 207.300(s) may be intended to protect the government’s property, we conclude that it is, at least in part, also a safety regulation intended to protect those navigating a waterway from being injured by the perils that a dam built across a navigable waterway creates. Because the plaintiffs fall within the group of persons the regulation was intended to protect and the harm that befell them was one that the regulation was intended to prevent, the government could be held liable if it breached its duties under section 207.300(s) and that breach proximately caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.6 The district court, therefore, erred by rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention that regulation 207.300(s) imposed a duty on the government.
C. Duty under the General Maritime Law
In admiralty cases, unless there is “a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, applies.” East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864, 106 S.Ct. 2295. “Drawn from state and federal sources, the general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.” Id. (footnote omitted).
[298]*298Broadly speaking, the general maritime law imposes a duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care under the circumstances, a duty which includes the duty to warn of foreseeable dangers. See Bubla v. Bradshaw, 795 F.2d 349, 353 (4th Cir.1986) (“The duty of ordinary care includes, of course, a duty to warn of harm that is reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances.”); Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir.1980) (“In analyzing a maritime tort case, we rely on general principles of negligence law. The plaintiff is owed a duty of ordinary care. A defendant’s failure to warn the plaintiff does not breach that duty, however, unless the resultant harm is reasonably foreseeable. Liability for a failure to warn thus arises from foreseeability, or the knowledge that particular conduct will create danger.” (citation omitted)); see also Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 5-2 (“A duty of care exists when injury is foreseeable.... ”).
In our view, the duty the plaintiffs envision — a duty to warn about the dangers of a dam the government constructs across navigable waters — fits easily within this general duty rubric. To state the obvious: a dam across a navigable waterway is a dangerous thing, in much the same way that a barricade put up by the government across an interstate highway would be a dangerous thing. In fact, a dam across navigable waters is arguably more dangerous than a barricade across an interstate highway, because dams can be less visible and because water currents can make it difficult to stop a boat or steer it away from danger. In light of the nature and operation of a dam built across a navigable waterway, it is clearly foreseeable that those who approach too closely may be injured.7 Accordingly, we believe that under the general maritime law, exercise of reasonable care in the circumstances requires the owner and operator of a dam at the very least to give adequate warnings about the existence of the dam.
Other courts have reached the same conclusion, determining in cases involving government-operated dams that the government has at a minimum some obligation to warn of such danger. See Kohl v. United States, 712 F.2d 286, 290 (7th Cir.1983) (concluding that government had duty to warn of dam); Dye v. United States, 210 F.2d 123, 128 (6th Cir.1954) (“Although the dam was constructed under lawful authority, a duty rested upon the operator of the dam to give adequate warning of a dangerous condition, when existing, and the failure to do so would impose liability upon the operator.”); Doty v. United States, 531 F.Supp. 1024, 1034 (N.D.Ill.1982) (“As owner and operator of Lock and Dam 13 the Corps (and therefore the United States) had a duty to warn users of the Mississippi River that it is dangerous to approach too near to the dam.”); see also Pearce v. United States, 261 F.3d 643, 650 (6th Cir.2001) (“The district court determined that there was no negligence on the part of the Corps because, while it had a duty to warn boaters of the dangers around the dam, it satisfied that duty.... The district court’s factual findings were sound and, based on those findings, its conclusion that the Corps was not negligent because it satisfied its duty to warn of danger was [299]*299not in error.” (emphasis added)); Graves v. United States, 872 F.2d 138, 136 (6th Cir.1989) (“[T]he district court determined that there was no negligence on the part of the Corps because it had met its duty to warn of any hazards associated with the closing of the locks.... We believe the district court’s finding of [the boater’s presumed knowledge of information shown of navigational charts] coupled with the remaining warning sign reasonably satisfies any duty to warn.” (emphasis added)).8
Such a duty is similar to the duties imposed by the general maritime law on private defendants responsible for obstructions in navigable waterways. See Smith v. Burnett, 173 U.S. 430, 433, 19 S.Ct. 442, 43 L.Ed. 756 (1899) (noting that wharfin-gers must exercise reasonable diligence in determining the safety of their berths, a duty which requires them to remove any dangerous obstruction in a berth “or to give due notice of its existence to vessels about to use the berths”); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 760 F.Supp. 97, 98-99 (W.D.La.1990) (“A prudent pipeline owner or operator should warn of the crossing of a pipeline.... Moreover, if [the defendant] maintains a pipeline above the mud line, it has a further duty to warn of this potential obstruction to navigation.”); Cumberland County Utilities Auth. v. The M/T Delbar, 604 F.Supp. 383, 389 (D.N.J.1985) (“The plaintiff, as owner of a structure which extends into a navigable waterway, has a duty to adequately mark such structure. Failure to do so ■with an appropriate warning is negligence.”), aff'd, 930 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.1991) (table); see also Creppel v. Shell Oil Co., 738 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir.1984) (“Our research ... has revealed no precedent in which a prívate party’s liability for damages resulting from collision of a boat with an obstruction in navigable waters was predicated on any basis other than the defendant’s ownership, custody, or placement of the obstruction in the navigable waters.”).
And while it is not dispositive on the question of the existence of a duty under the general maritime law, we also believe the same duty would arise under common law principles. As noted above, land-based common law principles are often incorporated into the general maritime law. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864, 106 S.Ct. 2295 (explaining that “the general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules”).
[300]*300In tort actions, courts frequently look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts as a source of general common law principles that should be incorporated into the general maritime law. See Wells, 186 F.3d at 525 (noting that because “there is no well-developed body of general maritime law of defamation ..., the general maritime law may be supplemented by either state law or more general common law principles,” and determining that “the common law as compiled in the Restatement (Second) of Torts should control our evaluation of Wells’s claim of shipboard defamation”); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 841 (9th Cir.2002); Marastro Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Canadian Maritime Carriers, Ltd., 959 F.2d 49, 53 (5th Cir.1992). We agree with the plaintiffs that, under the principles set forth in the Restatement, the government would have a duty to warn about the existence of the dam.9
Section 343 of the Restatement provides that:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a)knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965); see also Stone v. York Haven Power Co., 561 Pa. 189, 749 A.2d 452, 457 (2000) (“[A]ppellants have a duty to maintain the dam in a safe condition and are subject to suit for any harm caused by their negligent failure to do so or to warn of dangers posed by that improvement.”). This section sets forth essentially the same duty that we have described above. Under section 343, the government, as owner of the dam, has a duty to warn about its existence because members of the public, absent some warnings, may not discover that a dam is there until it is too late.
As the language of this section makes clear, section 343 reflects the common-law duty owed to invitees; the Restatement sets forth different standards to be applied when licensees or trespassers are involved. The government notes that the plaintiffs entered into the restricted area where boats are prohibited, and the government contends that to the extent any common law duties are relevant to this case, the plaintiffs would be considered trespassers to whom it owed no duty.
In Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959), a case involving [301]*301a claim against a shipowner by a plaintiff who had been onboard to pay a social call on a member of the crew, the Supreme Court concluded that making such distinctions based on the status of the plaintiff “would be foreign to [admiralty law’s] traditions of simplicity and practicality.” Id. at 631, 79 S.Ct. 406. The Court therefore concluded that, regardless of whether the plaintiff would be treated as an invitee or licensee under land-based negligence principles, “the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 632, 79 S.Ct. 406. This court has read the Kermarec court’s rejection of the common-law invitee, licensee, and trespasser labels as a rejection of the labels in all admiralty claims, not just claims against shipowners. See Bubla, 796 F.2d at 353 n. 2 (“Kermarec, though considering specifically the duty of a shipowner, broadly abolished such distinctions for those properly within admiralty....”). Thus, we find unavailing the government’s efforts to characterize the plaintiffs as trespassers so as to reduce the duty of care owed to the plaintiffs by the government.
Without regard to the status that might be accorded the plaintiffs under land-based common law principles, we believe that, of the various statements of a landowner’s duty set forth in the Restatement, the standard set forth in section 343 is the most consistent with the general maritime law’s demand for the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances. Cf. Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 407 (6th Cir.1982) (concluding that section 343A provides “useful guidance” on the question of whether the government had a duty to warn about the dangers associated with a dam); Harris v. Reederei, 657 F.2d 53, 54-55 (4th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (finding section 343A to be relevant when determining scope of shipowner’s duty to employees of a stevedore). We therefore conclude that land-based common-law principles as reflected in the Restatement support our conclusion that the government has a duty to warn about a dam it operates.
The government insists, however, that the dam was open and obvious and that it therefore had no duty to warn. We have no quarrel with the broad proposition that there normally is no duty under the general maritime law to warn of an open and obvious danger. See, e.g., Gemp, 684 F.2d at 406-08; Farrell v. United States, 167 F.2d 781, 783 (2d Cir.1948); Little v. United States, 290 F.Supp. 581, 584 (E.D.La.1968). But we cannot assume that every dam is open and obvious. For example, some dams and similar structures are constructed to be below the water line, with little if any structure extending above the water, see, e.g., Theriot v. United States, 245 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 1998) (underwater sill); Pagnotti v. Lancaster Township, 751 A.2d 1226, 1227-28 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) (low-head dam), and a dam located in a bend of a river may not be visible until it is too late. Thus, whether a dam is sufficiently open and obvious so as to relieve the government of any obligation to warn will normally be a question of fact dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case. This point is illustrated by Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404 (6th Cir.1982), a case upon which the government relies.
In Gemp, two men were fishing in a “stilling bay” (the area into which water flowing over a dam through an open gate is collected) of a navigational dam across the Ohio River. Because of the nature of the dam’s construction, the water in the stilling bay was typically turbulent, with “spray, foam, white water, and a vortex [302]*302near the face of the dam.” Id. at 406. The men, both of whom had previously fished in the area below the dam, secured their boat to one of the piers separating the stilling bays. The boat became unsecured, struck the pier, and sank; one of the men drowned, the other was injured. After a bench trial, the district court concluded as a matter of fact that the “hazards created by the open gate were obvious to any person who ventured near the ... [d]am.” Id. at 406-07 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the hazards were obvious, the district court concluded that the government had no duty to warn. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that factual determination on appeal, concluding that the finding was “amply supported by the record.” Id. at 407.
Thus, all the court did in Gemp was conclude, as a factual matter in that particular case, that the hazards of the dam were open and obvious, so that the government in that case had no duty to warn. But no such factual finding has been made in this case, nor can it be said that the only inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the dam was open and obvious. For example, while the plaintiffs saw the structure of the dam before the accident, none of them recognized it for what it was— they all believed that they were about to pass under a bridge. The reasonableness of this belief is a factual issue that, along with others, must be addressed below in the first instance. Accordingly, the question of whether there was an open and obvious danger so as to reheve the government of its duty to warn is simply not before this court at this time.
The government also contends that the duty urged by the plaintiffs is inconsistent with the rule that it is not an insurer of the safety of navigable waters and that it cannot be charged with the responsibility of warning about all obstructions in navigable waters. We again have no quarrel with the government’s articulation of this general rule. See Faust, 721 F.2d at 939 (‘We are aware of no authority ... which holds that the United States may be held liable on a common law tort theory of failure to maintain safe conditions on navigable waters which it ‘owns.’ ”); see also Eklof Marine Corp. v. United States, 762 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir.1985) (“It has long been established that the Coast Guard has no statutory mandate to ensure the safety of all navigable waterways in the United States and thus it has no duty to mark all obstructions.”).
Contrary to the government’s contention, however, the duty at issue in this case is completely consistent with the general rule that the government is not an insurer of the safety of the navigable waters. The duty in this case springs not from the government’s capacity as the “owner” of all navigable waterways, but from its capacity as the owner and operator of an artificial obstruction across one particular navigable waterway. Concluding that the government has a'duty under the general maritime law to warn about a dam that it built, owns, and operates is a far cry from concluding that the general maritime law requires the government to warn about all obstructions in all navigable waterways.
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.1994). In that case, the court concluded that the government had a duty to warn recreational boaters about a mooring buoy placed by the government within the waters of a naval base that was open to public use. The court rejected the government’s argument, based on this court’s decision in Faust, that it had no duty to warn:
For the United States to be hable in Faust would have required finding a general duty on the part of the United [303]*303States to ensure the safety of navigable waters. In contrast, our decision imposes no general duty to ensure the safety of navigable waters. We merely conclude that the Navy must take reasonable precautions to warn of dangers it creates by placing obstructions within the navigable waters of its Weapons Station. Indeed, the government admits that it owed the same duty imposed upon private parties whose property abuts or includes navigable waters — a duty to exercise reasonable care. We agree with the district court that this duty includes, a duty to warn those lawfully plying the Weapons Station waters of the hazard placed there by the Navy.
Id. at 912 (citations omitted).
We therefore conclude that the general maritime law’s requirement of the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances imposes on the government a requirement to warn about a dam that it operates across navigable waters.10 While there may be individual cases involving an open and obvious dam about which the government has no duty to warn, the open and obvious nature of the dam will generally be a factual question. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in its conclusion that the government had no duty to warn of the Robert C. Byrd Locks and Dam.
D. Other Issues
Because we have concluded that the government’s ownership and operation of a dam across navigable waters can give rise to a duty to warn, we must briefly address the government’s alternative arguments as to why the district court’s decision should be affirmed.
(i)
As noted above, the SIAA provides that “the United States is to be held accountable in admiralty whenever a private person, in similar circumstances, would be.” Lane, 529 F.2d at 179. The government contends that a private person in this situation would be absolved of liability by virtue of the “recreational use” statute in effect in West Virginia (and most other states), and that it too should be protected by the recreational use statute.11 We disagree.
As noted above, maritime law is federal law. While admiralty courts may apply state law in some circumstances, state law will not be applied if its application would “frustrate national interests in having uniformity in admiralty law.” Coastal Fuels Marketing, Inc. v. Florida Express Shipping Co., 207 F.3d 1247, 1251 [304]*304(11th Cir.2000); see Wells, 186 F.3d at 525 (“State law is said to conflict with general maritime law when it negatively impacts upon admiralty’s foremost goal — uniformity.”); Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir.1981) (“A state law, even though it does not contravene an established principle of admiralty law will, nevertheless, not be applied where its adoption would impair the uniformity and simplicity which is a basic principle of the federal admiralty law, or where its application would defeat an otherwise meritorious maritime cause of action.” (citations omitted)).
Although there are many similarities between the various state recreational use statutes, there are significant differences as well. For example, the West Virginia statute provides that liability may be imposed only for deliberate, willful, or malicious actions, see W. Va.Code Ann. §§ 19-25-2, 19-25-4 (Michie 2001), while the South Carolina statute allows liability to be imposed for gross negligence, see S.C.Code Ann. § 27-3-60(a) (1991). In Georgia, the statute does not apply if the plaintiff is injured in an off-limits area within an otherwise open recreational area, see Georgia Power Co. v. McGruder, 229 Ga. 811, 194 S.E.2d 440, 441 (1972), while the statute would apply in those circumstances in Indiana, see McCormick v. Indiana, 673 N.E.2d 829, 834-35 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). Thus, application of the recreational use statute of the state where a maritime accident happened to occur would lead to disparate results based only on the fortuity of geography and would frustrate the goal of developing a uniform body of maritime law. Accordingly, we conclude that state recreational use statutes cannot be applied in admiralty actions.12
(ii)
The government also contends that plaintiffs’ actions were the sole cause of the accident because they failed to consult navigational charts that would have shown the existence of the dam and because they violated various navigational “Rules of the Road”13 — for example, failing to keep a proper lookout. But again, the district court decided only the question of duty; it did not consider the questions of proxi[305]*305mate cause and comparative negligence, which are clearly factual questions that cannot be resolved by this court in the first instance. See Lane, 529 F.2d at 180 (“In some circumstances, particularly when large vessels are involved, the failure to have and to use current charts may be so obviously negligent as to require a finding to that effect. Circumstances are important, however, and consideration must be given to such things as the size of the vessel, its draft, the navigator’s experience, his general familiarity with the waters, and his handling of the vessel.” (footnote omitted)); see also Theriot, 245 F.3d at 400-01 (concluding that recreational boater’s failure to refer to navigational charts was simply a factor to be considered when determining whether the boater used reasonable care under the circumstances). Moreover, any negligence on the part of the plaintiffs would not bar their claims, but would only reduce the amount of any recovery. See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed. 265 (1939) (explaining that under “the established admiralty doctrine of comparative negligence ..., contributory negligence, however gross, is not a bar to recovery but only mitigates damages”). Accordingly, the government’s arguments as to any negligence on the part of the plaintiffs raise only factual issues that must be resolved through further proceedings after remand.
(hi)
Finally, the government suggests that even if it had a duty to warn, it satisfied that duty by accurately noting on navigational charts the existence of the dam and the extent of the restricted areas surrounding it — charts the plaintiffs admittedly did not consult. See Gemp, 684 F.2d at 408 (explaining that “pleasure craft operators are charged as a matter of law with knowledge of information shown on such charts”); accord Graves v. United States, 872 F.2d 133, 136 (6th Cir.1989). We disagree.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, this circuit has refused to impute to boaters knowledge of information contained in navigational charts. See Lane, 529 F.2d at 180. The sufficiency of the warnings actually provided by the government, including the information about the dam shown on various charts, is therefore a factual question that must be resolved on remand. Moreover, as we have already discussed, 33 C.F.R. § 207.300(s) imposed on the government a duty to conspicuously mark the limits of the restricted area around the dam; this duty to provide a physical marking cannot be satisfied through notations on various navigational charts. See id. (The “duty as the Coast Guard has to mark wrecks hazardous to navigation is not discharged by the publication by the Department of Commerce of a chart.”).
IV.
To summarize, we conclude that 33 C.F.R. § 207.300(s) imposed on the government a mandatory duty to conspicuously mark the restricted area around the Robert C. Byrd Locks and Dam. We also conclude that the requirement under the general maritime law for the exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances generally obligates the government, as the owner and operator of a dam across navigable waters, to warn about the dam.14 While the duty may not arise in a case [306]*306where the dam is open and obvious, whether the dam is sufficiently open and obvious will normally be a factual question. The district court therefore erred by concluding as a matter of law that the government owed no duty to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.