Carrasco v. Mendez

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Carrasco v. Mendez

5 A.D.3d 716, 773 N.Y.S.2d 605

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 29, 2004

StatusPublished

This text of 5 A.D.3d 716 (Carrasco v. Mendez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Carrasco v. Mendez, 5 A.D.3d 716, 773 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kitzes, J.), dated January 24, 2003, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). The affirmation of the plaintiffs physician submitted in opposition to the defendant’s motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Santucci, J.P., Smith, Luciano and Adams, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kitzes, J.), dated January 24, 2003, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). The affirmation of the plaintiffs physician submitted in opposition to the defendant’s motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Santucci, J.P., Smith, Luciano and Adams, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

5 A.D.3d 716, 773 N.Y.S.2d 605, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carrasco-v-mendez-nyappdiv-2004.

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