Carrano v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Carrano v. City of New York

34 A.D.2d 980, 312 N.Y.S.2d 420, 1970 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4475

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 15, 1970

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 34 A.D.2d 980 (Carrano v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Carrano v. City of New York, 34 A.D.2d 980, 312 N.Y.S.2d 420, 1970 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4475 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970).

Pincite

Opinion

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated September 14, 1965, as, in granting its motion to vacate its default in serving its answer to the complaint, imposed the condition that defendant waive the defense of the Statute of Limitations. Order reversed insofar as appealed from, without costs, and motion granted unconditionally. It appears that the defendant city’s 28-day delay in serving an answer was due to inadvertence caused by the heavy press of work and that the Statute of Limitations for the commencement of a tort action against the city (General Municipal Law, § 50-i) constitutes a meritorious defense to the action. It does not appear that plaintiff suffered the impairment of a right or any other prejudice in law by reason of the delay. In the circumstances, the city’s motion to vacate its default should have been granted unconditionally (Bermudez v. City of New York, 22 A D 2d 865; Hirsch v. Flick, 17 A D 2d 961; Karp v. Antelman, 285 App. Div. 955; Sears v. Hetfield, 216 App. Div. 767). Christ, P. J., Hopkins, Munder, Martuscello and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur.

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In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated September 14, 1965, as, in granting its motion to vacate its default in serving its answer to the complaint, imposed the condition that defendant waive the defense of the Statute of Limitations. Order reversed insofar as appealed from, without costs, and motion granted unconditionally. It appears that the defendant city’s 28-day delay in serving an answer was due to inadvertence caused by the heavy press of work and that the Statute of Limitations for the commencement of a tort action against the city (General Municipal Law, § 50-i) constitutes a meritorious defense to the action. It does not appear that plaintiff suffered the impairment of a right or any other prejudice in law by reason of the delay. In the circumstances, the city’s motion to vacate its default should have been granted unconditionally (Bermudez v. City of New York, 22 A D 2d 865; Hirsch v. Flick, 17 A D 2d 961; Karp v. Antelman, 285 App. Div. 955; Sears v. Hetfield, 216 App. Div. 767). Christ, P. J., Hopkins, Munder, Martuscello and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

34 A.D.2d 980, 312 N.Y.S.2d 420, 1970 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4475, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carrano-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1970.

Opinion

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