Carr v. . Parsons

174 S.E. 289, 206 N.C. 448, 1934 N.C. LEXIS 206

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: May 2, 1934
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

The extension clause in question partakes of the nature of an option and is available to the grantee only upon notice and payment when due of “the yearly tax assessed against that part of the land on which the timber has not been removed.” The right, therefore, which arises from the exercise of this option, inures to the benefit of the present owners or those primarily liable for the yearly tax. Hood v. McGill, ante, 83.

Speaking to the subject in Bennett v. Lumber Co., 191 N. C., 425, 131 S. E., 741, it was said:

“The decisions on the subject are to the effect that these extension provisions, of the kind here presented, are in the nature of options, or unilateral executory contracts subject to be converted into bilateral executed contracts only upon compliance with the terms stated therein, and that the estates or interests resulting therefrom arise at the time the conditions are complied with and the options exercised. Hence, nothing else appearing, the prices to be paid for said extension rights belong to those who own the property at the time the options are exercised, and from whose estates the interests then arising necessarily pass. Hill v. Reynolds, 186 N. C., 293.”

The case of Bateman v. Humber Co., 154 N. C., 248, 70 S. E., 474, is so nearly like the present one in principle that we are content to rest our decision on the Bateman case and the principles announced therein, without further elaboration. The authorities cited by appellant are distinguishable.

Affirmed.