Carr v. Lytle

District Court, D. Idaho·Decided May 9, 2022·No. 1:20-cv-00313·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JODY CARR, Case No. 1:20-cv-00313-DCN Plaintiff, SEALED vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER C/O LYTLE and SGT. ANDERSON,

Defendants.

Pending before the Court are various motions filed by the parties, including a motion for partial summary dismissal of one of Plaintiff’s two claims on grounds that it is barred by a prior settlement agreement between the parties. Dkt. 25. Having considered the record and the arguments of the parties, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s first claim is subject to dismissal and the second will proceed to summary judgment on a due process theory. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Jody Carr is a prisoner in custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC). Plaintiff settled a first set of seven federal and state court actions against various state actors on April 26, 2019, in a judicial settlement conference. The Court takes judicial notice of the “global settlement agreement” (GSA) between Plaintiff, and the State, both represented by counsel, terminating the following: United States District Court District of Idaho Case Nos. 1:13-cv-00380-REB, 1:14-cv-00125-BLW, 1:15-cv-00133-CWD, 1:16- cv-00182-DCN, 1:17-cv-00167-DCN, and 1:18-00247-DCN, as well as Ada County Fourth Judicial District Court Case No. CV01-19-5023. See Dkt. 15, sealed GSA in Case No. 1:18-cv-000247-DCN. Hereinafter, each case will be referred to by its last few digits. The GSA resolved all Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Idaho Department of

Correction, the State of Idaho, their “employees,” and “all other persons or entities acting for, by or through them.” Id., p. 1. In the GSA Plaintiff gave up “any and all rights, actions, causes of action, claims, concerns, grievances, demands, damages of any nature, and attorney fees and costs which the undersigned now has or which may hereafter accrue on account of, or in any way grow out of, any known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen

injuries, damages, economic loss, loss of income, earnings or profit, medical expenses and any other injuries, damages and expenses of any kind or character, or which may arise as a result of or relate to the incidents which form the subject matter of any and all allegations raised in any and all disputes between Releasor and any or all of the Releasees named in any or all of the actions identified herein, including, without limitation the allegations

raised or the subject matter of any and all Complaints or Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus which have been filed as of the date of signature herein.” Id., pp. 1-2. In the GSA, Plaintiff also released all “past, present and future claims arising in any way out of the dismissed lawsuits and Habeas Corpus Petition referenced herein,” and the parties agreed that “no future actions(s) may be maintained which are based upon or

include in any fashion the alleged wrongful acts from the dismissed actions, nor may those alleged wrongful acts be used as the basis for background evidence in any future lawsuits or actions.” Id., p. 2. Plaintiff received a sum of money for release of all his claims. Id., pp. 2-3. DISCUSSION The instant case is part of a second set of Plaintiff’s cases arising from Case No. 1:20-cv-00146-DCN, Carr v. Cupp (Case 146), which contained a multitude of unrelated

claims against a multitude of defendants, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20. The Court severed Plaintiff’s claims into a number of separate actions and required Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint in each if he desired to pursue his claims; the Court provided Plaintiff with the appropriate standards of law, including those governing segregation and due process claims. See Case 146, Dkt. 13; see Dkt. 2 in this action.

In this severed action, Plaintiff has submitted a Second Amended Complaint with exhibits. Dkt. 3. In accordance with the Initial Review Order, Plaintiff was permitted to bring only the following claims in this action: 1. Defendants Lytle and Anderson violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by transferring him to a close custody unit, D-1 on April 8, 2019, without adequate due process;

2. Defendants Lytle and Anderson transferred Plaintiff to “The Hole” (disciplinary segregation) on June 12, 2019, without adequate due process.

Id., p. 4. Rather than follow the Court’s Order to bring these claims only in this action, Plaintiff also attempted to pursue these same or similar claims in an amended pleading in Case 146. The Court now reviews the claims Petitioner was authorized to raise in his amended pleading. 1. Claim 1: April 8, 2019 – All Legal Theories Plaintiff alleges in the amended pleadings that, on April 8, 2019, IDOC employees Lytle and Anderson transferred him to close custody with no override, in retaliation for

making PREA complaints. Dkt. 3. Lytle is directly named in suits settled by the GSA. Anderson is an employee of IDOC. The PREA complaints are based on alleged sexual assaults that occurred before the GSA. The date of Lytle and Anderson’s alleged acts occurred before the GSA. These claims are barred by the GSA and accordingly fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. Claim 2: June 11, 2019 - Conspiracy Plaintiff asserts that, on June 11, 2019, inmate Wolfe stole four affidavits of other inmates that Plaintiff kept in his legal files. The affidavits were intended to support a class action lawsuit centered on the dangerousness of double-celling inmates in close and

protective custody. Plaintiff asserts that Wolfe gave the affidavits to prison officials, who conspired with Wolfe to stop the lawsuit from being filed. In a screening order in Case 146, the Court has addressed this claim as one that fails to state a claim.

3. Claim 3: June 11, 2019 – Due Process Plaintiff also alleges that, on June 11, 2019, Defendants failed to afford him adequate due process when he was placed in segregation pending investigation for 36 days. The segregation allegedly resulted from IDOC officials’ need to investigate Wolfe’s statement to prison officials that Plaintiff was trying to entice inmate LaGrotta to assault Plaintiff so Plaintiff could sue IDOC officials again. Plaintiff may proceed to the next stage of litigation—summary judgment—on the claim that had a liberty interest in not being placed in segregation pending investigation for 36 days, and that he was not afforded proper due process when he was placed there.1 This

claim is not the subject of the pending Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal. Though the body of the amended complaint mentions dates beyond June 12, 2019, the prayer for relief makes it clear that the only claims asserted in this action arise from April 8, 2019, and June 11/12, 2019. Plaintiff is pursuing claims arising after the 36-day period in other pending lawsuits, and, thus, he cannot also do so here.

4. Public Disclosure of Confidential Settlement Agreement Because the GSA contains a confidentiality clause (see Dkt. 15, pp 4-5, in Case 247), the parties and the Court have filed the GSA and documents quoting from it under

seal. Defendants point out that recently Plaintiff filed the GSA in its entirety as an exhibit at Docket 30, pp. 12-19, without requesting that it be filed under seal. The effect is that Plaintiff has published to all the world the terms upon which the State is willing to settle with a prisoner, including the amount that the State was willing to pay. Because Plaintiff has breached the confidentiality clause, Defendants who are parties to the GSA are entitled

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