Carr v. Department of Insurance

Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Franklin County, Civil Division

Carr v. Department of Insurance

187 N.E.2d 649, 90 Ohio Law. Abs. 46, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 324, 1962 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 225

CourtCourt of Common Pleas of Ohio, Franklin County, Civil Division

DecidedSeptember 8, 1962

DocketNo. 214362

StatusPublished

This text of 187 N.E.2d 649 (Carr v. Department of Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Franklin County, Civil Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Carr v. Department of Insurance, 187 N.E.2d 649, 90 Ohio Law. Abs. 46, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 324, 1962 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 225 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1962).

Pincite

Opinion

Sater, J.

This case is before us on appellee’s motion to dismiss Carr’s appeal for failure to comply with Section 119.12, Revised Code. The motion is sustained.

The first sentence of Section 119.12, Revised Code, controls this case and this appeal; no other portion of that statute, [47]*47or of any other statute, is pertinent. The relevant portion of that sentence is:

“Any party adversely affected by an order of an agency (State) . . . revoking or suspending a license, may appeal from the order of the agency to the court of common pleas of the county in which the place of business of the licensee is located or the county in which the licensee is a resident.” . . .

Appellant gags over the verb “may.” That word as used in this law does no more than preserve the right of appeal and establish convenient venue if the disaffected party shall choose to use that right of appeal. If the word “shall” had been used, that same party would be compelled to appeal whether he wanted to or not. An absurdity. Nor may we say that “may” has one meaning in this statute and another (the opposite) in, for example, Sections 2101.42, 2505.23 and 2505.24, Revised Code.

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Sater, J.

This case is before us on appellee’s motion to dismiss Carr’s appeal for failure to comply with Section 119.12, Revised Code. The motion is sustained.

The first sentence of Section 119.12, Revised Code, controls this case and this appeal; no other portion of that statute, [47]*47or of any other statute, is pertinent. The relevant portion of that sentence is:

“Any party adversely affected by an order of an agency (State) . . . revoking or suspending a license, may appeal from the order of the agency to the court of common pleas of the county in which the place of business of the licensee is located or the county in which the licensee is a resident.” . . .

Appellant gags over the verb “may.” That word as used in this law does no more than preserve the right of appeal and establish convenient venue if the disaffected party shall choose to use that right of appeal. If the word “shall” had been used, that same party would be compelled to appeal whether he wanted to or not. An absurdity. Nor may we say that “may” has one meaning in this statute and another (the opposite) in, for example, Sections 2101.42, 2505.23 and 2505.24, Revised Code.

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Bluebook (online)

187 N.E.2d 649, 90 Ohio Law. Abs. 46, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 324, 1962 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 225, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carr-v-department-of-insurance-ohctcomplfrankl-1962.