Carr v. Carr
Opinion
Appellant, the former wife, appeals from a non-final order granting appellee’s (former husband’s) motion to abate venue. We reverse.
Appellant filed a petition in Leon County, Florida, her place of residence, to establish a Georgia divorce decree as a Florida judg[890] ment, and to modify or increase the amount of child support, alleging a change in circumstances since the original foreign decree and stipulation were entered into in 1975. Finding that the husband was a resident of Gulf County, Florida, and relying upon Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, and an earlier opinion of this court involving the same parties in Carr v. Carr, 464 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.1985) (Carr I), the trial court concluded that venue should be transferred from Leon to Gulf County. The lower court erroneously relied upon the wrong venue statute.
In Carr I, the husband brought an action to establish the foreign divorce decree and to modify certain provisions in that decree relating to child visitation. This court there observed that the general venue statute, Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, applies to an action to establish a foreign divorce judgment, and the special venue provision, Section 61.14, Florida Statutes, to a modification of a support agreement. Id., at 222. Upon determining that no modification of support was at issue in Carr I, this court held that section 47.011 applied, and that proper venue lay in the county of defendant’s (appellant herein) residence in Leon County. We conclude that the lower court’s reliance upon our earlier Carr opinion as justification for its decision to transfer venue to Gulf County was erroneous, in that the petition to modify the foreign judgment at bar is quite different from the petition at issue in Carr I, and thus, section 61.14,
Stewart v. Carr, 218 So.2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), provides additional support for the conclusion reached. Stewart held that the special venue provision, section 61.14, applies to an action to establish a foreign decree and to modify that decree as it relates to support. We adopt the holding in Stewart and apply section 61.14 to the facts at bar.2 Under section 61.14, as it pertains to modification of child support obligations, venue is proper where either of the two parties resides. Applying section 61.14 to the case at bar, we hold that venue is proper in Leon County, appellant’s place of residence and filing.
REVERSED.
Footnotes
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489 So. 2d 889 (Carr v. Carr) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.