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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 PETER JAMES CARR, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00266-LK 9 Petitioner, SECOND ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 10 v. 11 KAREN ARNOLD, 12 Respondent. 13
14 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Peter Carr’s four motions for relief from 15 judgment in this case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Dkt. Nos. 25, 26, 29, 30. 16 For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies all four motions. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 On May 19, 2025, this Court adopted the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of United 19 States Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida, dismissing Mr. Carr’s federal habeas petition for lack 20 of jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 17. Specifically, the Court held that Mr. Carr’s application was untimely 21 and was a successive petition which had not been authorized by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 3–5. 22 Between May 28 and July 1, Mr. Carr filed five motions for relief from judgment. Dkt. 23 Nos. 18–22. On July 7, this Court issued an order denying all five of those motions. Dkt. No. 24. 24 It provided the substantive grounds for the denials, id. at 3–5, and further noted that Mr. Carr’s 1 serial filing of such motions was inappropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, id. at 5. 2 The Court cautioned Mr. Carr that he should desist from filing frivolous motions for relief from 3 judgment, noting that it could impose sanctions or “carefully tailored restrictions” on his filing
4 privileges should he continue to lodge frivolous and procedurally improper 60(b) motions. Id. 5 (citing Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2014)). 6 Undeterred, Mr. Carr has continued to file additional Rule 60(b) motions. He filed one on 7 July 11, 2025, Dkt. No. 25, a second on July 15, 2025, Dkt. No. 26, a third motion on July 23, 8 2025, Dkt. No. 29, and a fourth on August 6, 2025, Dkt. No. 30. On July 15, 2025, Mr. Carr 9 appealed this Court’s decision adopting Judge Tsuchida’s R&R to the United States Court of 10 Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. No. 27. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 A. Jurisdiction
13 The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Carr’s motions. Although a district court 14 generally does not have jurisdiction over a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 60 if it is filed after a judgment has been appealed, Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 16 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam), “[i]f a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or 17 enters a judgment” but before it disposes of a pending motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of 18 Civil Procedure 60 or other applicable motion, the notice of appeal only “becomes effective to 19 appeal a judgment or order, in whole or in part, when the order disposing of the last such remaining 20 motion is entered.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i); see also Nutrition Distrib. LLC v. IronMag Labs, 21 LLC, 978 F.3d 1068, 1074 n.2 (9th Cir. 2020). 22 Here, Mr. Carr filed his July 11 motion four days prior to filing his as his notice of appeal,
23 and as such the Court has jurisdiction over that motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). And because 24 Mr. Carr filed his July 15, July 23, and August 6 motions before the Court ruled on his July 11 1 motion, the Court has jurisdiction over those motions as well. Id.; Nutrition Distrib. LLC, 978 F.3d 2 at 1074 n.2; see also Midkiff v. Bennett, No. 3:24-CV-05550-LK, 2024 WL 5008874, at *2 (W.D. 3 Wash. Dec. 6, 2024).
4 B. Mr. Carr’s Motions Lack Merit 5 The first three of Mr. Carr’s pending motions contend that this Court violated the 6 Magistrate’s Act and Habeas Rule 8(b) by (1) “failing to conduct de novo review of Petitioner’s 7 Affidavit In Support of 28 U.S.C. section 2241,” Dkt. No. 25 at 1; (2) “failing to conduct de novo 8 review of MOTION REQUESTING JUDICIAL NOTICE,” Dkt. No. 26 at 1; and (3) “failing to 9 conduct de novo review of MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING,” Dkt. No. 29 at 1. The 10 fourth pending motion requests that the Court apply the “analysis set forth in Ornelas v. United 11 States,” 517 U.S. 690 (1996), given the “historical fact” that Mr. Carr allegedly “filed a Motion 12 Requesting Evidentiary Hearing, pursuant to Evidence Rule 201(e), which received no
13 consideration.” Dkt. No. 30 at 1. All four of Mr. Carr’s motions seek to “void the [Court’s] 14 judgment” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Dkt. No. 25 at 1; Dkt. No. 26 at 1; Dkt. 15 No. 29 at 1; Dkt. No. 30 at 1. Each of these motions also requests, in the alternative, 16 “[a]ppealability . . . to avoid a dilatory remand for the limited purpose of granting or denying a 17 certificate of appealability,” Dkt. No. 25 at 2; Dkt. No. 26 at 2; Dkt. No. 29 at 2; Dkt. No. 30 at 2, 18 which this Court construes as a request for a certificate of appealability. 19 As the Court noted in its prior order, Rule 60(b)(4) provides relief from a final judgment if 20 it is void as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 24 at 3. “The list of such judgments is ‘exceedingly short,’ 21 and ‘Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a 22 certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice
23 or the opportunity to be heard.’” Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 24 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010)), aff’d, 579 U.S. 40 (2016). 1 Like his first five motions for relief from judgment, Dkt. Nos. 18–22, Mr. Carr’s sixth, 2 seventh, eighth, and ninth motions for relief also do not address the substance or reasoning of the 3 report and recommendation or the standard for granting relief from judgment. As other judges in
4 this District have observed, Mr. Carr’s incessant motions for relief from judgment “appear to be 5 ‘fill-in-the-blank’ style filings” that do not engage with the legal standard and are otherwise 6 “devoid of merit.” Carr v. Bennett, No. 2:24-CV-01499-DGE-GJL, 2025 WL 437882, at *1 (W.D. 7 Wash. Jan. 2, 2025). Here, Mr. Carr again fails to show that the judgment is void because this 8 Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, lacked jurisdiction over the parties, or acted in a matter 9 inconsistent with due process that deprived a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard. 10 Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270–71. Accordingly, Mr. Carr is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). For 11 the same reasons the Court has provided in prior orders, Mr. Carr is not entitled to a certificate of 12 appealability. Dkt. No. 17 at 5; Dkt. No. 24 at 5.
13 Accordingly, Mr. Carr’s motions, Dkt. Nos. 25, 26, 29, 30, are DENIED. As Mr.
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 PETER JAMES CARR, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00266-LK 9 Petitioner, SECOND ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 10 v. 11 KAREN ARNOLD, 12 Respondent. 13
14 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Peter Carr’s four motions for relief from 15 judgment in this case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Dkt. Nos. 25, 26, 29, 30. 16 For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies all four motions. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 On May 19, 2025, this Court adopted the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of United 19 States Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida, dismissing Mr. Carr’s federal habeas petition for lack 20 of jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 17. Specifically, the Court held that Mr. Carr’s application was untimely 21 and was a successive petition which had not been authorized by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 3–5. 22 Between May 28 and July 1, Mr. Carr filed five motions for relief from judgment. Dkt. 23 Nos. 18–22. On July 7, this Court issued an order denying all five of those motions. Dkt. No. 24. 24 It provided the substantive grounds for the denials, id. at 3–5, and further noted that Mr. Carr’s 1 serial filing of such motions was inappropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, id. at 5. 2 The Court cautioned Mr. Carr that he should desist from filing frivolous motions for relief from 3 judgment, noting that it could impose sanctions or “carefully tailored restrictions” on his filing
4 privileges should he continue to lodge frivolous and procedurally improper 60(b) motions. Id. 5 (citing Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2014)). 6 Undeterred, Mr. Carr has continued to file additional Rule 60(b) motions. He filed one on 7 July 11, 2025, Dkt. No. 25, a second on July 15, 2025, Dkt. No. 26, a third motion on July 23, 8 2025, Dkt. No. 29, and a fourth on August 6, 2025, Dkt. No. 30. On July 15, 2025, Mr. Carr 9 appealed this Court’s decision adopting Judge Tsuchida’s R&R to the United States Court of 10 Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. No. 27. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 A. Jurisdiction
13 The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Carr’s motions. Although a district court 14 generally does not have jurisdiction over a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 60 if it is filed after a judgment has been appealed, Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 16 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam), “[i]f a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or 17 enters a judgment” but before it disposes of a pending motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of 18 Civil Procedure 60 or other applicable motion, the notice of appeal only “becomes effective to 19 appeal a judgment or order, in whole or in part, when the order disposing of the last such remaining 20 motion is entered.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i); see also Nutrition Distrib. LLC v. IronMag Labs, 21 LLC, 978 F.3d 1068, 1074 n.2 (9th Cir. 2020). 22 Here, Mr. Carr filed his July 11 motion four days prior to filing his as his notice of appeal,
23 and as such the Court has jurisdiction over that motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). And because 24 Mr. Carr filed his July 15, July 23, and August 6 motions before the Court ruled on his July 11 1 motion, the Court has jurisdiction over those motions as well. Id.; Nutrition Distrib. LLC, 978 F.3d 2 at 1074 n.2; see also Midkiff v. Bennett, No. 3:24-CV-05550-LK, 2024 WL 5008874, at *2 (W.D. 3 Wash. Dec. 6, 2024).
4 B. Mr. Carr’s Motions Lack Merit 5 The first three of Mr. Carr’s pending motions contend that this Court violated the 6 Magistrate’s Act and Habeas Rule 8(b) by (1) “failing to conduct de novo review of Petitioner’s 7 Affidavit In Support of 28 U.S.C. section 2241,” Dkt. No. 25 at 1; (2) “failing to conduct de novo 8 review of MOTION REQUESTING JUDICIAL NOTICE,” Dkt. No. 26 at 1; and (3) “failing to 9 conduct de novo review of MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING,” Dkt. No. 29 at 1. The 10 fourth pending motion requests that the Court apply the “analysis set forth in Ornelas v. United 11 States,” 517 U.S. 690 (1996), given the “historical fact” that Mr. Carr allegedly “filed a Motion 12 Requesting Evidentiary Hearing, pursuant to Evidence Rule 201(e), which received no
13 consideration.” Dkt. No. 30 at 1. All four of Mr. Carr’s motions seek to “void the [Court’s] 14 judgment” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Dkt. No. 25 at 1; Dkt. No. 26 at 1; Dkt. 15 No. 29 at 1; Dkt. No. 30 at 1. Each of these motions also requests, in the alternative, 16 “[a]ppealability . . . to avoid a dilatory remand for the limited purpose of granting or denying a 17 certificate of appealability,” Dkt. No. 25 at 2; Dkt. No. 26 at 2; Dkt. No. 29 at 2; Dkt. No. 30 at 2, 18 which this Court construes as a request for a certificate of appealability. 19 As the Court noted in its prior order, Rule 60(b)(4) provides relief from a final judgment if 20 it is void as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 24 at 3. “The list of such judgments is ‘exceedingly short,’ 21 and ‘Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a 22 certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice
23 or the opportunity to be heard.’” Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 24 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010)), aff’d, 579 U.S. 40 (2016). 1 Like his first five motions for relief from judgment, Dkt. Nos. 18–22, Mr. Carr’s sixth, 2 seventh, eighth, and ninth motions for relief also do not address the substance or reasoning of the 3 report and recommendation or the standard for granting relief from judgment. As other judges in
4 this District have observed, Mr. Carr’s incessant motions for relief from judgment “appear to be 5 ‘fill-in-the-blank’ style filings” that do not engage with the legal standard and are otherwise 6 “devoid of merit.” Carr v. Bennett, No. 2:24-CV-01499-DGE-GJL, 2025 WL 437882, at *1 (W.D. 7 Wash. Jan. 2, 2025). Here, Mr. Carr again fails to show that the judgment is void because this 8 Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, lacked jurisdiction over the parties, or acted in a matter 9 inconsistent with due process that deprived a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard. 10 Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270–71. Accordingly, Mr. Carr is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). For 11 the same reasons the Court has provided in prior orders, Mr. Carr is not entitled to a certificate of 12 appealability. Dkt. No. 17 at 5; Dkt. No. 24 at 5.
13 Accordingly, Mr. Carr’s motions, Dkt. Nos. 25, 26, 29, 30, are DENIED. As Mr. Carr has 14 filed several meritless motions in this case, it is further ORDERED that, except for a notice of 15 appeal, any further motions Mr. Carr files in this case will be docketed by the Clerk of the Court, 16 but no action will be taken on them. See Carr, 2025 WL 437882, at *2; Carr v. Bennett, No. C24- 17 1377JLR, 2024 WL 4765155, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2024) (directing the Clerk “not to 18 calendar any additional motions for relief from judgment filed in this closed case” after Mr. Carr 19 filed four meritless 60(b) motions). 20 Dated this 2nd day of September, 2025. 21 A 22 Lauren King United States District Judge 23 24