Carpenter v. Saul

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedOctober 6, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-00198
StatusUnknown

This text of Carpenter v. Saul (Carpenter v. Saul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carpenter v. Saul, (W.D.N.C. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION 1:20-cv-00198-WCM

VICKIE RENEE CARPENTER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION v. ) AND ORDER ) COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL ) SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ) ) Defendant. ) _______________________________ )

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment (Docs. 12, 13).1 I. Procedural Background In August of 2017, Plaintiff Vickie Renee Carpenter (“Plaintiff”) filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Transcript of the Administrative Record (“AR”) at 160-166; 174-183. Plaintiff alleges disability beginning January 23, 2017. AR 187; AR 60. On September 19, 2019, following an administrative hearing at which Plaintiff appeared and testified, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued

1 The parties have consented to the disposition of this matter by a United States Magistrate Judge. Doc. 11. an unfavorable decision. AR at 14-27. That decision is the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of this action.

II. The ALJ’s Decision The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of “angina pectoris without ischemic heart disease and Charcot Marie tooth disease.” AR at 19. After determining that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically

equal one of the listed impairments, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”): to perform light work . . . except the claimant can occasionally climb ladders; frequently climb stairs; frequently stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; and frequently perform fine and gross manipulations in the bilateral upper extremities. The claimant should avoid concentrated exposure to cold, humidity, pulmonary irritants, and hazards.

AR at 22. Applying this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the ability to perform certain jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy such that Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period. AR -26-27. III. Plaintiff’s Allegations of Error Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to weigh the opinions of Dr. Jacob Mills (AR 513-514), Dr. Michael Vavra (AR 509-511), and F.N.P. Jill Raymer (“NP Raymer”) (AR 503-507) properly. IV. Standard of Review A claimant has the burden of proving that he or she suffers from a

disability, which is defined as a medically determinable physical or mental impairment lasting at least 12 months that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505; 416.905. The regulations require the Commissioner to evaluate each claim for benefits using

a five-step sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920. The burden rests on the claimant through the first four steps to prove disability. Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 2016). If the claimant is successful at these steps, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove at step five

that the claimant can perform other work. Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 635 (4th Cir. 2015); Monroe, 826 F.3d at 180. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner denying disability benefits is limited to whether substantial

evidence exists in the record as a whole to support the Commissioner’s findings, and whether the Commissioner’s final decision applies the proper legal standards. Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). When a federal district court reviews the Commissioner’s decision, it does not “re-weigh

conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the issue before the Court is not whether Plaintiff is disabled but, rather, whether the Commissioner’s decision that she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence in the record and based on the

correct application of the law. Id. V. Discussion For applications filed on or after March 27, 2017, such as Plaintiff’s, the Administration has “fundamentally changed how adjudicators assess opinion

evidence.” Bright v. Saul, 1:19CV504, 2020 WL 4483008, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 4, 2020) (citing 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §404.1520c(a) (effective March 27, 2017)). Specifically, “longstanding requirements calling for adjudicators to weigh medical opinions and give

special deference to treating source opinions have changed” and an ALJ is now required to “consider and articulate in the administrative decision how persuasive he or she finds each medical opinion…” Id. “In evaluating persuasiveness, the ALJ must articulate two factors:

supportability and consistency. Supportability is an internal check that references objective medical evidence and supporting explanations that come from the source itself. Consistency is an external check that references evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources.” Id. (internal citations

omitted). Here, the ALJ applied this standard properly, and, as discussed below, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s treatment of the opinions of Dr. Mills,

Dr. Vavra, and NP Raymer.2 A. Dr. Mills Dr. Mills opined that Plaintiff had marked restrictions in her activities of daily living, marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and

deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace. AR 513. The ALJ found Dr. Mills’ opinion unpersuasive because it was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s treatment record. AR 20. Specifically, the ALJ noted “very little mental health treatment other than medication

management.” AR 20 (citing AR 377-378 (Dr. Jan Pattanayak January 13, 2017 treatment note reflecting Plaintiff on sertraline for anxiety/depression and “dealing with it reasonably well” and that Plaintiff “does seem happy with

2 As a threshold matter, while a conclusory, stand-alone “check box” form is not favored, a form may constitute some evidence of a claimant’s functional limitations if it is appropriately supported by other evidence in the record. See Lawson v. Colvin, 21 F.Supp.3d 606, 614 (W.D. Va. 2014) (where physician’s opinion, set forth in a “fill- in-the-blank” form, was supported by physician’s own examination notes and years’ worth of notes by other physicians in his practice, as well as the results of a separate nerve conduction study, opinion should have been given controlling weight); Williams v. Colvin, No. 1:14cv18-MOC-DLH, 2015 WL 1000321, at *7 (W.D.N.C. March 6, 2015) (“A conclusory checkbox form like the application filled out by Dr. Rosenburg is entitled to little, if any, weight”); Thomas v. Berryhill, No. 4:16cv15-D, 2017 WL 1047253, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 15, 2017) (check box or fill in the blank forms are weak evidence unless supported by medical records). life”), AR 493 (Dr. Vavra March 7, 2019 treatment note reflecting normal mental status exam)).

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Related

Bonnilyn Mascio v. Carolyn Colvin
780 F.3d 632 (Fourth Circuit, 2015)
George Monroe v. Carolyn Colvin
826 F.3d 176 (Fourth Circuit, 2016)
Lawson v. Colvin
21 F. Supp. 3d 606 (W.D. Virginia, 2014)

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Carpenter v. Saul, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carpenter-v-saul-ncwd-2021.