Carpenter v. Ries (In Re Carpenter)

408 B.R. 244, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1776, 2009 WL 2004018
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJuly 13, 2009
DocketBAP 08-6046
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 408 B.R. 244 (Carpenter v. Ries (In Re Carpenter)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carpenter v. Ries (In Re Carpenter), 408 B.R. 244, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1776, 2009 WL 2004018 (bap8 2009).

Opinion

FEDERMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtor Todd Carpenter appeals from the Bankruptcy Court’s Order finding that a prepetition lump sum payment for retroactive social security benefits was property of Carpenter’s estate and, further, that Carpenter could not claim an exemption in those funds pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 1 In so holding, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that, because Carpenter elected to claim federal exemptions under § 522(d), the provisions .of § 407 of the Social Security Act 2 did not apply to protect the funds from Carpen *246 ter’s creditors. Because we conclude that § 407 of the Social Security Act operates to exclude such funds from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate from the outset, we reverse.

The facts, as summarized by the Bankruptcy Court, are simple and uncontested. The Debtor, Todd Carpenter, is disabled and receives social security disability benefits. He initially received a $17,165 lump sum payment for retroactive benefits in the fall of 2007 when his disability status was determined. The funds were deposited into the bank, and maintained in a segregated fashion. Shortly before filing for bankruptcy protection, Carpenter converted the proceeds into a cashier’s check. On April 3, 2008, he filed a petition for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. He elected pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) to claim the federal exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), and claimed the social security proceeds exempt under § 522(d)(10)(A). In response to the Trustee’s objection to such exemption, Carpenter contended, among other things, that social security benefits, including funds previously paid, are excluded from a debt- or’s bankruptcy estate altogether, and thus cannot be reached by the Trustee. Since we agree with Carpenter’s position on that issue, albeit on different grounds than he asserted below, 3 we need not reach his other arguments.

The filing of a bankruptcy case creates a bankruptcy estate. In general, that estate consists of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 4 The Bankruptcy Code then authorizes debtors to exempt certain property from the estate. Unless the debtor’s state of residence has opted out of the federal exemption scheme pursuant to § 522(b)(2), thus requiring such debtors to claim the applicable state’s exemptions, § 522(b)(1) permits debtors to choose exemptions under either (i) applicable state law and federal law other than § 522(d); (n) or § 522(d). 5 A debtor who is given the option to choose must choose one of these options to the exclusion of the other. Minnesota has not opted out, and its law permits its bankruptcy debtors to choose between the exemptions listed in § 522(d), or those provided under state and other federal law. 6 Carpenter chose under § 522(b)(2) to claim the federal bankruptcy exemptions listed in § 522(d). As relevant here, § 522(d)(10)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor choosing the § 522(d) exemptions to claim as exempt “the debtor’s right to receive ... a social security benefit....” 7 As the Bankruptcy Court concluded, the cashier’s check held by Carpenter does not constitute the “right to receive” a social security benefit, but instead represents funds which were previously paid as such a benefit. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court correctly held, Carpenter would not be entitled to exempt them from his estate under § 522(d)(10)(A).

Ordinarily, that would be the end of the matter, and Carpenter would be *247 required to turn over the funds to the Trustee for distribution to creditors. However, § 522(d)(10)(A) notwithstanding, the treatment of social security payments is governed by a separate federal statute, namely § 407 of the Social Security Act, which bears on the question of whether a social security recipient such as Carpenter is required to give up already-paid benefits for the benefit of his creditors in bankruptcy-

Section 407 of the Social Security Act currently provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid, or payable or 'lights existing tinder tins subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
(b) No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section. 8

Treating this statute as an exemption statute, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that Carpenter did not benefit from such exemption because he elected exemptions under § 522(d), to the exclusion of any exemptions provided under state law or federal law other than § 522(d). If § 407 were an exemption statute, the Bankruptcy Coui't would have been correct. Thus, the ultimate question in this appeal is whether § 407 excludes social security proceeds from the recipient’s bankruptcy estate altogether. If so, a court need not reach the question of whether such debtor is entitled to exempt them from that estate under another statute such as § 522(d)(10)(A).

Section 407(a) of the Social Security Act was enacted in 1935. 9 Thereafter, in 1973, the Supreme Court analyzed the statute in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board. 10 In that case, a recipient of social security disability payments had agreed with a local welfare agency that, if he were later awarded social security disability payments for a period of time in which he had received assistance from the local agency, he would reimburse the local agency out of any retroactive social security payment received. The federal government did award the recipient a retroactive lump sum award of social security, representing benefits for the period of time he had received assistance from the local agency. A trustee for the recipient was holding proceeds he had received as retroactive disability payments, and the issue in the case was whether the local agency, a creditor, was entitled to those funds as against the disabled recipient. After pointing out that the protection afforded by § 407 extends to “moneys paid,” the Supreme Court held that “the funds on deposit were readily withdrawable and retained the quality of ‘moneys’ within the purview of § 407.” 11 Therefore, the local agency, as a creditor, was not entitled to reach such moneys.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
408 B.R. 244, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1776, 2009 WL 2004018, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carpenter-v-ries-in-re-carpenter-bap8-2009.