Carpenter v. Lilley

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: June 6, 2012
• Docket: CUMcv-10-305
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE CUMBERLAND, ss.

MARSHALL CARPENTER, M.D.,

Plaintiff

v. DECISION AND ORDER

DANIEL LILLEY, ESQ., DANIEL G. LILLEY, P.A.,

Defendants

INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of a dispute over the payment of a bill of a

maternal-fetal medicine expert in a medical malpractice case alleging a

catastrophic injury in the birth of a baby. This collection matter was before

the court for trial on April19 and 20, 2012 on Dr. Carpenter's complaint

alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. 1 Dr.

Carpenter claims that Mr. Lilley hired him to serve as an expert in the

medical malpractice case, regardless of the activity, at the rate of $500 per

hour from 2002 - 2007 and at the rate of $600 per hour from 2007 - 2009.

1 Because the court decides this cased based on an express contract, the court does not reach quantum meruit or unjust enrichment.

1 Mr. Lilley counters that he never agreed to pay the hourly rate of $600

and he challenges the amount of hours and the rate charged. Mr. Lilley

argues that Carpenter already received more than $14,000 for his services,

and that Dr. Carpenter is not entitled to any additional fees under any of Dr.

Carpenter's theories because he has already received as much as the next-

highest billing expert and more than four times what Mercy and Dr. Roper's

expert received in the medical malpractice action.

The court heard testimony from Daniel Lilley, Esq., Julian Sweet,

Esq., Christopher Nyhan, Esq., and Marshall Carpenter, M.D., and received

into evidence 13 Carpenter exhibits and 6 Lilley exhibits?

FACTS

The evidence at trial and the findings of this court can be summarized

as follows.

Dr. Carpenter is a medical doctor with a subspecialty in maternal-fetal

medicine. Mr. Lilley is an attorney practicing law in Maine and is the owner

of Daniel G. Lilley, P.A., a professional association, with a principal place

of business in Portland, Maine. Mr. Lilley represented Holly and Ryan

Wilson in the medical malpractice claim arising out of an catastrophic injury

that the Wilsons' daughter sustained at birth. Mark Randall, Esq., an

2 There were a number of exhibits that were marked for identification purposes but that were not admitted into evidence.

2 associate of Mr. Lilley, contacted Dr. Carpenter in 2002 and asked him to

review medical records and provide his expert opinion whether there had

been a breach of the standard of care. In 2002, Dr. Carpenter charged $500

per hour for expert witness work, regardless of the task performed. The

Lilley firm agreed to pay Dr. Carpenter his customary rate and Mr. Randall

sent Dr. Carpenter records to review. Dr. Carpenter reviewed the records,

discussed the case with the Lilley law firm and sent a bill for expert services,

which the Lilley firm paid in late 2002.

Two and one-half years later, in May 2005 the Lilley firm filed on

behalf of the Wilsons, a Notice of Claim. Dr. Carpenter reviewed fetal

monitoring recordings, reexamined medical records sent in 2002, and

discussed the case with Mr. Lilley or his associates. (Over the course of the

litigation, the Lilley firmed employed three associates in this matter,

including Mr. Randall, Mr. Foster, Mr. Flynn, requiring Dr. Carpenter to

become acquainted with each associate and bring the associate up to speed

on the medical issues.) In 2005 Dr. Carpenter billed the Lilley firm 3.25

hours for expert services and the Lilley firm paid the bill.

In 2006, Dr. Carpenter billed the Lilley law firm for additional work

performed on the case, including reexaming the 2002 medical records to

confirm his opinions in light of the fact that Mr. Lilley had confused his

3 opinion with that of another potential expert. Dr. Carpenter also reviewed his

expert designation and discussed the designation and his opinions with

Christian Foster, Esq., another associate at the Lilley law firm. The Lilley

law firm paid Dr. Carpenter for expert services provided in 2006.

On April19, 2007, Dr. Carpenter appeared for his deposition and

submitted a bill on April20, 2007 for 13.5 hours he spent preparing for his

deposition. Dr. Carpenter submitted a bill for additional $750 on June 5,

2007, after having spent 1.5 hours reviewing his deposition transcript. The

Lilley law firm paid $7,500 on August 21, 2007 for all expenses incurred in

2007.

The panel hearing in the Wilson case occurred on January 12, 2008.

The Lilley law firm relied on Dr. Carpenter's deposition testimony as well as

other expert testimony available to the Lilley law firm. The Lilley law firm

did not ask Dr. Carpenter to perform any additional work until the trial

approached in 2009. Between his deposition in April2007 and July 2009,

Dr. Carpenter did not perform any expert services in this matter.

Sometime after his deposition, Dr. Carpenter raised his expert witness

fees for all clients to $600 per hour. According to Dr. Carpenter he advised

the Lilly law firm, through one of the associates, that his expert fee had

increased to $600. According to Mr. Lilley, he did not learn that Dr.

4 Carpenter's fee had increased to $600 per hour until literally the night before

trial while he was meeting with Dr. Carpenter. Mr. Lilley did not acquiesce

to this increase.

On July 28, 2009, August 5, 2009 and again on September 29, 2009

Mr. Lilley or his firm sent letters to Dr. Carpenter advising him that that the

trial had been scheduled. These letters state, "you are our retained expert";

"Your appearance in court is an indispensable part of our trial preparation";

and "We also need to be certain you are up to date on all discovery and that

you have all records you need for your court appearance." Dr. Carpenter

was the standard of care expert in the Wilson' medical malpractice action in

which Mr. Lilley sought more than $11 million dollars. Dr. Carpenter was

indeed a necessary witness in this medical malpractice action.

The trial was to commence on December 7, 2009 with Dr. Carpenter

as the first witness on Monday, December 14, 2009. The Lilley law firm

asked Dr. Carpenter to arrive in Portland by 6:00p.m. on Sunday, December

13, 2009, and asked him to join Mr. Lilley for dinner in order to prepare for

Dr. Carpenter's testimony the next morning. Dr. Carpenter arrived late in

the afternoon on Sunday and had dinner with Mr. Lilley. Mr. Lilley brought

to the dinner some additional exhibits that he gave to Dr. Carpenter to

review. Most of the dinner, which lasted over two hours, revolved around

5 the trial and Dr. Carpenter's testimony. When Dr. Carpenter returned to his

hotel room he spent some time reviewing the new records provided to him

and other records that he had brought to Maine with him and that related to

these new records. The next morning, Mr. Lilley picked him up at

approximately 8:30a.m. and took him back to the Lilley law firm for more

preparation.

Because of an objection about the use of the so-called "Greenbook" in

the examination of Dr. Carpenter, the court conducted a lengthy voir dire in

the morning and Dr. Carpenter did not testify until approximately at 11:30

a.m. Dr. Carpenter left the courtroom at approximately 4:45p.m. and

returned to his home in Warwick, Rhode Island between 8:00 and 9:00p.m.

Dr. Carpenter sent his final bill for 33.5 hours of his time from November 29

through December 14, 2009, for a total of $20,100 at a rate of $600 per hour.

It is this final bill that is the subject of this collection lawsuit.

Dr. Carpenter keeps contemporaneous time records and his bills are

based on those records. Most of his time records were kept on or near the

day the activity was performed, with the exception of the time for December

13 and 14, when the time record was made after he returned home on

December 14, 2009.

6 In this final bill, Dr. Carpenter charged as follows: 1.5 hours for are-

examination of medical records on November 29, 2009; 1.0 hour for

discussion with Mr. Flynn and Mr. Lilley on December 2; 3.5 hours for re-

examination of medical records and Roper deposition transcript on

December 6; 2.0 hours for review of Carpenter deposition transcript and Mr.

Flynn's interrogation plan, and correspondence with Mr. Flynn on December

8; 6.5 hours for a review of panel hearing and Hiatt deposition transcripts on

December 11; 1.0 hour for review of Aieta and Robbins deposition

transcripts on December 13; 7.0 hours for travel and meeting with Mr. Lilley

on December 13; and 11.0 hours for preparation for testimony, time in court

and travel on December 14, 2009.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Carpenter asserts he had a contract to serve as an expert witness

for Mr. Lilley's client and he fully performed his services and is entitled the

$20,100 still due. Dr. Carpenter bears the burden of proof of establishing

that there was a contract or, alternatively, establishing the reasonableness of

his rates and hours submitted.

The court rejects Mr. Lilley's argument that the terms of the

contingent fee agreement between him and the Wilsons limited the

defendants' liability to Dr. Carpenter. Although the contingency fee

7 agreement emphasizes that costs, including expert witness fees and

expenses, are the responsibility of the clients, the agreement provides that

the "amount of the COSTS expended shall be reimbursed to the party who

pays them out. The reimbursement for COSTS is done AFTER the

contingency fee outlined about has been deducted from the GROSS amount

received from or on behalf of the opposing party(ies.)" Mr. Lilley testified

that his firm "generally tries to get the client to contribute to costs, but if it is

a compelling case with catastrophic injuries, like in this case, we finance the

case with the hope that we will be reimbursed by the client some day."

Maine law is well-settled that an expert witness is to be paid in

accordance with the parties' contract or in the absence of a contract, fair and

reasonable fees for the witnesses services as an expert. See Gordon v.

Conley, 107 Me. 286, 78 A. 365 (1910)(without an agreement as to the

compensation the expert witnesses were to receive for their services, they

were entitled to reasonable compensation). "Reasonable compensation"

means an expert witness brought into court by a party is entitled to be paid to

"whatever his services are reasonably worth .... " !d. at 289-90. In Gordon

v. Conley, the Court found that the jury were fully warranted in finding an

implied promise on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff expert

witnesses because an expert performs services at the request of a party,

8 which may include remaining in the courtroom to listen to experts on the

other side, advise counsel and testify in rebuttal, if necessary, and with a loss

of regular occupation for the time that the expert is performing his services

for that party. !d. The Conley court concluded that the jury were fully

warranted in finding an implied promise on the part of the defendant to pay

plaintiff "whatever their services were reasonably worth, and a sufficient

consideration to support it." !d. at 291.

The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 6.01, cmt. (d)(l)

provides:

A lawyer who contracts with a third party for goods or services used by lawyers is subject to liability to the third party when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the third party relies on the lawyer's credit although the third party knows the identity of the lawyer's client, unless at the time of contracting the lawyer has disclaimed such liability.

In this case, there was no agreement in which Mr. Lilley disclaimed any

liability for Dr. Carpenter's services and indeed the Lilley law firm paid all

of his bills until 2009. The court also finds that it is usual and customary

course of dealing between lawyers and experts for lawyers to take

responsibility for paying the expert's fees and this is what Mr. Lilley did in

this case, as he had done in other cases.

The court rejects Mr. Lilley's argument that the fair and reasonable

rate should be determined by comparing fees paid to other experts in this

9 case. This approach simply doesn't work because of a number of factors,

the first of which the parties had an express contract to pay $5 00 per hour for

Dr. Carpenter's expert services. Furthermore, the other experts are not

comparables. The pediatric neurologist and the causation expert, Dr. Hiatt,

was hired through an agency pursuant to a written contract that establishes

$9,000 a day of in court testimony and otherwise a $500 per hour fee and

$200 per hour travel fee. Dr. Shanahan, Central Maine Medical Center's

expert, has an ongoing relationship with the defense law firm. Dr. Shanahan

does not have the expertise and years of service that Dr. Carpenter has. She

is not a maternal-fetal medical specialist but rather is a community

obstetrician-gynecologist at Central Maine Medical Center.

The express contract for Dr. Carpenter's services set the rate of $500

per hour in 2002 and Mr. Lilley or his law firm agreed to pay and did pay for

all services performed and billed from 2002 through 2007 at that rate. The

court finds that the parties intended to make mutual promises and to be

bound by them. Those promises included Dr. Carpenter serving as an expert

witness and the Lilley law firm paying him a $500 per hour fee.

The issues whether the parties agreed to a single hourly rate regardless

of the activity and to an increased rate of $600 however are disputed

between the parties and there are no circumstances surrounding their

10 transactions in 2009 to corroborate that new terms were established in their

agreement. There was no travel before 2009 and no bills paid at the rate of

$600. The first and only bill to charge $600 per hour regardless of the

activity including travel was the December 2009 final bill. The court finds

that although Dr. Carpenter increased all his expert fees to $600 per hour

and this is a reasonable rate in light of his experience, knowledge and

reputation, neither Daniel Lilley nor his law firm agreed to that new rate or

regardless of the activity. Dr. Carpenter bears the burden of establishing that

the parties agreed to an increased rate of $600 and to a flat fee for all

activity. When the evidence is in equipoise as it is here Dr. Carpenter has not

met his burden of establishing that it is more likely than not that the parties

agreed to a rate of $600 per hour regardless of the activity. While $600 per

hour is a reasonable rate, the parties did not agree to $600 an hour so it is not

an express enforceable term of the contract. However, Dr. Carpenter

established by a preponderance of the evidence that the hours he billed in his

final bill were indeed expended pursuant to the parties original contract and

that he should be reimbursed for these services.

The total number of hours reflected in Dr. Carpenter's December 19,

2009 final bill were reasonable, consistent with the understanding of the

parties, the course of their dealings, the complexity of the case, the large

11 gaps in time and consistent with customary charges from other experts with

his expertise and qualifications. It is also reasonable to expect for critical

events, such as depositions and trial, the expert reviews the medical record,

other depositions to ensure they are fresh in his mind and that he know the

medical record cold so he can find in the record anything he needs to support

his testimony.

Dr. Carpenter has established by a preponderance of the evidence that

the defendants, in part, breached their contract with him by not paying him

for his services described in his December 19, 2009 final bill. There was no

showing that Dr. Carpenter's services were unreasonable or unnecessary. A

medical malpractice case requires medical expert testimony to establish the

standard of care that was breached. This case involved the complex area of

catastrophic birth injury, brain injury and cerebral palsy. Dr. Carpenter is a

maternal fetal medical specialist in an academic setting and was a most

highly qualified expert for this case. Dr. Carpenter was the standard of care

expert and without him the case would not have survived a motion to

dismiss or a motion for a judgment as a matter of law.

With regard to Dr. Carpenter's charge for travel time, the court finds

that there was no agreement concerning payment of travel time. The court

concludes that in the absent of an agreement, an expert should be paid a fair

12 and reasonable fee for his travel because the expert is losing income that he

would have earned at his institutions back home or with other clients.

However absent an agreement about how Dr. Carpenter would be paid for

his travel time, the court must establish a fair and reasonable fee. The court

finds that it is fair and reasonable for Dr. Carpenter to be paid $200 per hour

for his travel time. The revised bill, after adjusting for a $200 hourly rate for

travel time of7 hours, is calculated to be $14,650.

DECISION

Based upon the foregoing, and pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is directed to enter this Decision and Order on the Civil Docket by a notation incorporating it by reference and the entry is

A. On Count I of the complaint, Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $14,650, together with interest and costs.

B. Counts II and III of the complaint are hereby dismissed.

Dated: June 6, 2012

~A. Wheeler Justice, Superior Court

13 STATE OF M~~N;COURTS PORTLAND CONSOLID

U_R_Y_S_T--R.-EET 205 NEWB MAINE 04101 PORTLAND,

TO:

LAVOIE ESQ MARK USH ESQ JENNIFER R N & DETROY NORMAN HANSO PO BOX 4600 PORTLAND ME 04112-4600

STATE OF MAINE PORTLAND CONSOLIDATED COURTS

205 NEWBURy STREET TO: PORTLAND, MAINE 04101

DANIEL LILLEY ESQ TINA NADEAU ESQ DANIEL G LILLEY LAW OFFICE Po Box 4803 PORTLAND ME 04112-4803