Carpenter v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: November 20, 2024
• Docket: N23C-06-081 FJJ
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

GLENN CARPENTER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) C.A. No. N23C-06-081 FJJ ) v. ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ) LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE ) COMPANY, and LM GENERAL ) INSURANCE COMPANY, ) ) Defendants. )

Submitted: November 13, 2024 Decided: November 20, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

On Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

DENIED

Karin Sarkisian, Esquire, Kennedys CMK, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff.

Daulton Gregory, Esquire, Marin & Gregory, LLC, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defendant

Jones, J. This case involves a claim by Plaintiff to recover under two separate insurance

policies for underinsured motorist benefits issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance

Company. The first policy covered a car that Plaintiff was operating at the time of

the incident that gives rise to the claim. The second policy covered a motorcycle

that was not involved in the accident. Defendants have asserted that Plaintiff cannot

stack the two policies given the language of 18 Del. C. §3902 and have denied the

claims under the motorcycle policy. In addition to the usual UIM claims, Plaintiff

has asserted additional extra contractual claims including an Unfair Claims Practices

Act claim. The extra contractual claims revolve around allegations that the carrier

has acknowledged that the value of the Plaintiff’s claims exceed the amount of

coverage under the automobile policy, but Defendant has failed to pay the policy

limits under the automobile policy without Plaintiff signing a release releasing all

claims under both the automobile and motorcycle policy.

Plaintiff previously filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that he was

entitled to the $100,000 under the automobile policy because Liberty Mutual agreed

to tender that policy, and Plaintiff accepted the tender of that policy. The factual

basis for the offer was an April 28, 2022 letter to Plaintiff’s counsel from Liberty

Mutual’s adjuster and an email response from Plaintiff’s counsel to that adjuster.

2 The appropriate portion of the April 28, 2022 letter provided:

On April 18, 2022, you presented a demand for Mr. Carpenter under the Underinsured Motorist bodily injury coverage for the accident of October 31, 2021. The demand was for $200,000.00, which is the total of the coverage stacked between the policies. As explained above, I am not able to meet this demand as the policy issued to Mr. Carpenter does not support it.

However, I am in position to offer the available $100,000.00 under Mr. Carpenter’s automobile policy claim 047435635-05 in exchange for a full and final release.

In a verbal decision, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. The Court found that Liberty Mutual’s offer of $100,000 was conditioned

on Plaintiff releasing all claims that it had against Liberty Mutual. Since Plaintiff

clearly wanted to retain the right to bring an action under the second policy, there

was no meeting of the minds. As such, no contract was formed between the parties

as to a binding agreement.

Trial in this matter is scheduled for December 9, 2024. The Court has

bifurcated the issues to be tried. The December 9th trial is limited to the traditional

issues involved in a UIM case: (1) the liability of the underinsured motorist and (2)

the amount of Plaintiff’s damages. Plaintiff’s extra contractual claims and his

entitlement to benefits under the second policy, whether by way of Liberty Mutual’s

actions or the language of its policy, will be tried after trial establishes the amount

of Plaintiff’s damages.

3 Plaintiff has filed the instant renewed Motion for Summary Judgment

maintaining that the recent Supreme Court decision in Ginsberg v. Harleysville

Worcester Insurance Company compels this Court to conclude that Defendants are

obligated to pay the $100,000 policy limit under the policy of the car that the Plaintiff

was in at the time of this accident. Ginsberg dealt with the stacking of UIM policies

from the same carrier and concluded that §3902 did not bar stacking if the applicable

policies permitted it. 1 Finding that the polices at issue were ambiguous and that

under one interpretation of the policy coverage could be stacked, the Court permitted

the polices to be stacked. 2

Another issue in Ginsberg was whether releases signed by the two different

people barred them from pursuing the second policy.

Plaintiff maintains that Ginsberg requires this Court to find that he is entitled

to stack the two policies and that the Ginsberg decision requires this Court to enter

summary judgment as the first $100,000.

I turn to the release issue. Ginsberg was a wrongful death and survivor claim

resulting from the death of Davis. Ginsberg was Davis’ husband and Zoladkiewicz

was the father of Davis’ child. Both Ginsburg and Davis signed different releases.

These releases constituted an agreement between the parties as to settlement. There

1 Ginsberg v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co., 2024 WL 4599219 at *4 (Del. 2024). 2 Id. at *5.

4 was no factual question that there was a meeting of the minds regarding a settlement.

The question in Ginsberg was not whether there was a valid offer and acceptance

but whether the scope of the agreement included the second policy. As to one release

signed by Ginsberg, there was no limiting language. The Court held he was barred

from pursuing an individual claim because he signed the release but could pursue a

claim as the executor of his estate because the release did not cover the estate’s

claims. As to the Zoladkiewicz’s release, there was language limiting the release to

a specific policy, so the Court ruled that a claim against the second policy had not

been released. The teaching of Ginsberg is that where there is a meeting of the minds

regarding the settlement the Court will enforce what the actual agreement was

between the parties based on the agreements made.3

In the instant case, there was no meeting of the minds as to a settlement.

Liberty Mutual agreed to settle the case “in exchange for a full and final release.”

Plaintiff wanted to continue to pursue the second policy as a condition of settlement.

There was simply no agreement regarding the settlement. Therefore, Plaintiff is not

entitled to summary judgment because there was no agreed upon settlement.4

This Court has made it clear that it will not address the question of stacking

of the polices until after the upcoming trial which will determine the value of

3 Id. at *5-6. 4 Whether Liberty Mutual actions amount to an unfair claims practice and entitles Plaintiff to contractual damages is an issue for another day.

5 Plaintiff’s damage. Nothing has been presented by Plaintiff that suggests to the

Court that it should depart from the path that has been established in this case. A

decision on the stacking of the polices is deferred until the second phase of this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr. Francis J. Jones Jr., Judge

cc: Original to the Prothonotary Karine Sarkisian, Esquire Daulton V. Gregory, Esquire