CAROLYN SMITH-BARRETT VS. MICHAEL SNYDER (FM-10-0329-06, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division·Decided February 5, 2020·No. A-3279-18T3·Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3279-18T3

CAROLYN SMITH-BARRETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL SNYDER,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued January 15, 2020 – Decided February 5, 2020 Before Judges Koblitz, Whipple and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hunterdon County, Docket No. FM-10-0329-06.

Diana N. Fredericks argued the cause for appellant (Gebhardt & Kiefer, PC, attorneys; Diana N.

Fredericks, on the briefs).

Franklin G. Whittlesey argued the cause for respondent (Scholl & Whittlesey, LLC, attorneys; Franklin G.

Whittlesey, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Carolyn Smith-Barrett appeals from the March 19, 2019 order denying her application to terminate her alimony to her former husband, defendant Michael Snyder, based on his cohabitation. We agree that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of cohabitation to require further discovery at that time and affirm.

I. Factual background.

The parties were married on August 31, 1986 and have two emancipated children. A final judgment of divorce with a Property Settlement Agreement (Agreement) was entered on November 13, 2007.

Based upon defendant's lack of income, the Agreement provided that plaintiff would pay defendant alimony of thirty percent of plaintiff's gross annual base salary, with the applicable salary capped at $230,000 annually. Defendant's current alimony award was $2280 biweekly based on plaintiff's current salary of $197,600. The Agreement also required plaintiff to pay additional alimony of twenty percent of her total gross annual bonus, with the additional alimony capped at $15,000 per annum.

Three provisions in the Agreement are relevant to plaintiff's appeal of the denial of her motion to terminate alimony. Paragraph 9 states:

[Plaintiff's] obligation to pay alimony to [defendant]

shall terminate upon the earliest occurrence of any one

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or more of the following events: . . . (3) remarriage of [defendant]; or (4) cohabitation of [defendant] with an unrelated female. Termination based upon one of the foregoing events shall be effective on the date of the event or occurrence. [Defendant] shall have an affirmative obligation to advise [plaintiff] of his remarriage or cohabitation within seven (7) days of the event.

Paragraph 55 provides that "[i]n the event of any dispute arising out of this Agreement or the performance thereof, [defendant] and [plaintiff] agree that all attempts should be made between them to settle the dispute by [a]greement before using the courts for any determination." Paragraph 56 states that "[s]hould either [defendant] or [plaintiff] fail to abide by the terms of this Agreement, the defaulting party will indemnify the other for all other reasonable expenses and costs, including attorneys fees incurred in successfully enforcing this Agreement."

On June 25, 2018, plaintiff hired a private investigator to determine whether defendant was cohabiting with K.R.1 After receiving a report from the investigator detailing instances where K.R.'s vehicle was found parked at defendant's home, as well as collecting Facebook posts showing that defendant and K.R. were romantically involved, plaintiff's attorney sent two letters to

1 We refer to K.R. by her initials to protect her privacy.

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defendant informing him she was seeking to terminate her alimony obligation based on evidence of cohabitation. Although defendant's attorney responded by calling plaintiff's attorney, defendant did not reply in writing.

In a written decision, the court denied both plaintiff's motion to terminate alimony and her counsel fee request. The court rejected plaintiff's assertion that defendant was cohabiting with K.R., finding plaintiff only provided evidence that defendant was in a romantic relationship with K.R. Citing to Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202 (1999), the court stated that "[c]ohabitation involves an intimate relationship in which the couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage." Social media postings of defendant and K.R. celebrating holidays and taking vacations together "fail[ed] to show that the couple ha[d] undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage." The court found that "plaintiff fail[ed] to provide any other evidence showing cohabitation, such as, the couple living together, intertwined finances, sharing living expenses and household chores."

Plaintiff provided the court with a certification from her private investigator detailing the number of times K.R.'s car was parked outside defendant's home, which the court found to be "insufficient to present even a question of fact concerning cohabitation." The court concluded that defendant

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and K.R. "appear[ed] to maintain separate homes, no evidence of intertwined finances [was] adduced, nor [was] there any evidence of the couple holding themselves out in a relationship tantamount to marriage." It characterized the relationship as a "committed dating relationship" with overnights at each other's residences at times, which did not "rise to the level of cohabitation."

The court focused its analysis of the fee issue on plaintiff's argument that defendant violated the terms of the Agreement. The court acknowledged that plaintiff attempted to resolve the issues before filing a motion, but ultimately concluded that because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of cohabitation, "no genuine issue to mediate" existed, and plaintiff was therefore not owed counsel fees.

II. Standard of Review.

A trial judge has "broad discretion" in reviewing an application to modify alimony. Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464, 470 (App. Div. 2004) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). The decision of a family court to modify alimony is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2006). "Whether an alimony obligation should be modified based upon a claim of changed circumstances rests within the Family

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Part judge's sound discretion." Id. at 21 (citing Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504 (1990)).

Cohabitation by a dependent ex-spouse constitutes a changed circumstance that could justify a modification of the supporting ex-spouse's alimony obligation. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 154–55 (1983). In Landau v. Landau, 461 N.J. Super. 107 (App. Div. 2019), we recently held that "the changed circumstances standard of Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980), continues to apply to a motion to suspend or terminate alimony based on cohabitation following the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)." Landau, 461 N.J. Super. at 108. Those amendments defined cohabitation as "involv[ing] a mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage or civil union but does not necessarily maintain a single common household." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n). Under the statute, "[a] court may not find an absence of cohabitation solely on grounds that the couple does not live together on a full-time basis." Ibid.

Instead, courts "shall consider" the following factors "[w]hen assessing whether cohabitation is occurring[:]"

(1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or liabilities;

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(2) Sharing or joint responsibility for living expenses;

(3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle;

(4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a mutually supportive intimate personal relationship;

(5) Sharing household chores;

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CAROLYN SMITH-BARRETT VS. MICHAEL SNYDER (FM-10-0329-06, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), (N.J. Ct. App. 2020).

CAROLYN SMITH-BARRETT VS. MICHAEL SNYDER (FM-10-0329-06, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CAROLYN SMITH-BARRETT VS. MICHAEL SNYDER (FM-10-0329-06, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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