Carolyn Ransby v. Eric Moore, as administrator of the Estate of Margaret G. Moore

• Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: June 13, 2025
• Docket: CL-2025-0039
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: June 13, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025 _________________________

CL-2025-0039 _________________________

Carolyn Ransby

v.

Eric Moore, as administrator of the Estate of Margaret G. Moore, deceased

Appeal from Choctaw Circuit Court (CV-22-900043)

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

This appeal arises from a judgment entered by the Choctaw Circuit

Court ("the trial court") declaring a contract for the sale of land to be void

for violating Ala. Code 1975, § 8-9-2(5), a part of the Statute of Frauds,

Ala. Code 1975, § 8-9-2. We conclude that the trial court erred in CL-2025-0039

determining that the description of the land was not specific enough to

satisfy the Statute of Frauds. We reverse the judgment and remand the

case with instructions to the trial court.

Background

In 1979, Velma Coody executed a deed conveying a parcel of real

property ("the property") to Margaret G. Moore; the description of the

property was set forth as follows:

" TOWNSHIP 10 NORTH, RANGE 3 WEST

" SECTION 7 Begin at the Northwest corner of the NE 1/4 of NW 1/4 of said Section 7; thence go South along the West boundary of said quarter-quarter section for a distance of 191 feet and to Mill Creek; thence go along Mill Creek with its meanders in a Southeasterly direction for a distance of 200 feet to the point of beginning of the tract herein conveyed; thence go North 2° 15' East for a distance of 60 feet; thence go South 88° 15' East for a distance of 350 feet; thence go South 2° 15' West for a distance of 225 feet and to Mill Creek; thence go in a Northwesterly direction along said Mill Creek with its meanders to the point of beginning, being 1.2 acres, more or less."

The property described was located at 22 Mustang Drive in Gilbertown.

Margaret subsequently installed a mobile home on the property, and she

used the property and the mobile home as her residence.

On April 30, 2004, Margaret executed a written agreement with

Carolyn Ransby. The 2004 agreement provides, in pertinent part:

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" Agreement.

"Account # 00037313750, 1997 Fleetwood (28 x 66) FL FLV79A/B1300-1HE21 I leave my house, 2 ½ acre land, well located on 22 Mustang Drive,

" Agree, when paid off IN FULL transfer DEED in Carolyn Ransby name,

" INSURANCE IN Carolyn Ransby, if flood, fire, theft all money goes to Carolyn Ransby, once payment of $1,515.34 the home belong to Carolyn Ransby, Ms. Margaret G. Moore has no more right, if Ms. Margaret [G.] Moore should die before home is paid for, family member cannot brake [sic] this agreement if Carolyn Ransby should die before home is paid for my children shall have the right to keep the home .... All rights to home belong to Carolyn Ransby, I agreet [sic] to all right."

At the time of the execution of the 2004 agreement, which was signed by

two witnesses and notarized, Ransby paid Margaret $1,515.34.

Margaret continued to reside on the property after the execution of

the 2004 agreement. On February 23, 2015, Margaret signed a notarized

document in which she stated that she was leaving the property to Eric

Moore, her grandson; however, Margaret apparently did not execute a

formal last will and testament.

Margaret died on March 31, 2019. On April 11, 2019, Ransby filed

the 2004 agreement in the Choctaw Probate Court. On June 11, 2020,

Ransby executed a quitclaim deed of the property to herself; the quitclaim

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deed contained the legal description of the property as set forth in the

1979 deed and was recorded in the Choctaw Probate Court. At some

point, Ransby assumed possession of the property. Subsequently, the

Choctaw Probate Court appointed Eric to be the administrator of

Margaret's estate.

On August 15, 2022, Eric filed a complaint against Ransby. In the

complaint, Eric alleged that Ransby " has no title nor color of title

enabling her to execute a deed to herself purporting to 'clear up' any title

issue" and that "[Ransby] has committed fraud against the Estate of

Margaret G. Moore by recording a deed to the property owned by the

Estate of Margaret G. Moore and unilaterally taking possession of said

property." Eric requested that the quitclaim deed be stricken and that

the trial court enter a judgment declaring that title to the property was

vested in the estate. On October 5, 2022, Ransby filed an answer

generally denying the allegations in the complaint.

On June 27, 2024, the trial court conducted a bench trial. Eric

testified that he had lived on the property until approximately 2010. He

recalled that, in 2004, Ransby had given Margaret money to pay off the

balance of a loan on a mobile home. Eric reviewed the 2004 agreement

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and testified that the agreement memorialized the transaction between

Margaret and Ransby. Eric testified that the 2004 agreement did not

contain a legal description of the property, and, he said, Margaret had

not owned 2.5 acres of land located at 22 Mustang Drive as referenced in

the 2004 agreement. Eric testified that, at one time, he had believed that

the property consisted of 2.25 acres of land, but, he said, he had later

determined from the legal description that the property was comprised

of only 1.2 acres. Eric said that, after Margaret died, Ransby had

continued the electric service to the mobile home located on the property

and had continued cutting the grass at 22 Mustang Drive. Eric testified

that he also believed that someone had removed the porch from the

mobile home. Eric said that Ransby had not filed a claim to the property

against Margaret's estate and that the quitclaim deed that she had

recorded had hindered his ability to sell the property.

Ransby testified that, in 2004, she was residing in Miami, Florida,

but she was planning on moving to Gilbertown. According to Ransby,

Margaret approached her about purchasing the property and a mobile

home that was located on the property. Ransby testified that, at that

time, the mobile home was in "Grade D" condition. Eventually, Ransby

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said, she and Margaret had agreed that Ransby would purchase the

property for $1,515.34. On April 30, 2004, Margaret and Ransby went to

a local bank, drew up the 2004 agreement, and had bank employees

witness and notarize the document. Ransby testified that she had paid

Margaret $1,515.34 in cash on the same date.

Ransby did not take immediate possession of the property. Within

a month of the 2004 agreement, Ransby moved into a mobile home

located at 43 Mustang Drive, near the property, where she has since

resided. Ransby testified that she told Margaret she could live on the

property until she died because Margaret was poor and had no help.

Ransby said that Margaret had lived on the property until her death.

After Margaret died, no one moved onto the property. Ransby testified

that a storm had blown the roof off the porch of the mobile home located

on the property. Ransby testified that she had intended to fix the porch

but that she had not done so. A restraining order was entered by the trial

court to prevent the parties from changing the condition of the mobile

home. Ransby had nevertheless cut the grass to maintain community

standards, and she maintained that she owned the property pursuant to

the 2004 agreement.

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On August 21, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment. In the

judgment, the trial court determined that the 2004 agreement

" is not a contract specific enough to satisfy the statute of frauds, as the real estate allegedly conveyed in the said contract is not particularly described. ' "A contract for the sale of land, to satisfy the statute of frauds, must describe the land with such certainty that it can be identified without resort to oral evidence.[" '] Nix v. Wick, 66 So. 3d 209, 213 (Ala. 2010) [(quoting Goodwyn v. Jones, 288 Ala. 71, 75, 257 So. 2d 320, 323 (1971))]."

" The Court further finds that the 'Quitclaim Deed' from Carolyn Ransby to Carolyn Ransby, recorded at deed book 378 at page 520, is null and void as Carolyn Ransby had no legal right to attempt to convey the property subject to that deed to herself."

The trial court declared that Margaret's estate owned the property.

On September 11, 2024, Ransby filed a postjudgment motion,

arguing that the property was sufficiently described in the 2004

agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and that the 2004 agreement

had been fully executed. The postjudgment motion was denied by

operation of law on December 10, 2024. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.

Ransby timely appealed on January 17, 2025.

Analysis

In the proceedings below, Eric sought to set aside the quitclaim

deed on the theory that Ransby had not acquired any interest in the

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property through the 2004 agreement, which, he contended, was

unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The trial court determined

that the 2004 agreement did not satisfy the Statute and Frauds, and,

accordingly, that Ransby had no interest in the property that she could

have conveyed to herself through the quitclaim deed. We, therefore,

review the case to determine whether the 2004 agreement complied with

the Statute of Frauds and gave Ransby an interest in the property.

Section 8-9-2 provides, in pertinent part:

"In the following cases, every agreement is void unless such agreement or some note or memorandum thereof expressing the consideration is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith or some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized in writing:

"....

"(5) Every contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of any interest therein, except leases for a term not longer than one year, unless the purchase money, or a portion thereof is paid and the purchaser is put in possession of the land by the seller."

In Nix v. Wick, 66 So. 3d 209, 213 (Ala. 2010), our supreme court

recognized " 'that a contract for sale of land, to satisfy the statute of

frauds, must describe the land with such certainty that it can be

identified without resort to oral evidence.' Goodwyn v. Jones, 288 Ala. 71,

8 CL-2025-0039

75, 257 So. 2d 320, 323 (1971)." However, as a caveat to that rule, "a

general description may be made specific and certain by parol evidence

and concurrent facts and circumstances sufficient to that end." Goodwyn

v. Jones, 288 Ala. 71, 75, 257 So. 2d 320, 323 (1971). According to that

caveat, the Statute of Frauds is satisfied if the writing furnishes the key

or means of identifying the property at issue with certainty even though

the description in the writing itself is not certain. Id. Whether a property

description is legally sufficient under that standard is a question of law

for the trial court. See Oconee Land & Timber, LLC v. Buchanan, 300

Ga. App. 853, 856, 686 S.E.2d 452, 454 (2009). We review questions of

law de novo. See Vestlake Communities Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v.

Moon, 86 So. 3d 359, 365 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

Margaret promised in the 2004 agreement to convey to Ransby 2.5

acres of land located at 22 Mustang Drive. Under Goodwyn, that general

description was sufficient to allow for additional evidence as to the

specific description of the property conveyed. The trial court received

evidence, without objection, indicating that, at the time of the execution

of the 2004 agreement, Margaret owned only one parcel of real property

located at 22 Mustang Drive in Gilbertown. Accordingly, there could not

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have been any confusion as to the parcel of property referred to in the

2004 agreement. See Apex Fin. Corp. v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex.

App. 2004) ("We have held that a street address or a commonly-known

name for property may be a sufficient property description if there is no

confusion."). The trial court also received evidence, without objection, of

the legal description of the property that Margaret owned at 22 Mustang

Drive, which was contained in the 1979 deed. From that evidence, the

trial court could have determined with specificity the metes and bounds

of the property conveyed; thus, the general description of the property in

the 2004 agreement satisfied the Statute of Frauds, and the 2004

agreement was enforceable.

The legal description showed that Margaret owned only 1.2 acres of

land at 22 Mustang Drive, not 2.5 acres as set forth in the 2004

agreement. That discrepancy did not render the property description

insufficient for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds. "The contract's

property description need not be mathematically certain, but only

'reasonably certain' so as to enable a person familiar with the area to

identify the property to be conveyed to the exclusion of other property."

Anderson Energy Corp. v. Dominion Oklahoma Texas Expl. & Prod., Inc.,

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469 S.W.3d 280, 295 (Tex. App. 2015) (quoting Gates v. Asher, 154 Tex.

538, 542, 280 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. 1955)). In Nix, supra, the parties

agreed to a transaction involving "at least 5 acres" of land adjacent to a

street address, but multiple different areas could have satisfied that

description, so the Jefferson Circuit Court determined that the

agreement at issue violated the Statute of Frauds. In this case, only one

parcel of property was located at 22 Mustang Drive, and it did not exceed

2.5 acres, so the 2004 agreement could not have been referring to any

other property.

The trial court erred in concluding that the 2004 agreement

violated the Statute of Frauds. That error led the trial court to conclude

that Ransby had not acquired any interest in the property that she could

convey to herself through the quitclaim deed.1 However, upon payment

of the purchase price, Ransby acquired equitable title to the property and

Margaret retained the legal title to the property in trust for Ransby. See

Bay Minette Land Co. v. Stapleton, 224 Ala. 175, 139 So. 342 (1932). The

1The parties did not litigate in the trial court whether a party may

be both the sole grantor and the sole grantee of real property in a quitclaim deed, so we express no opinion as to that point. 11 CL-2025-0039

trial court did not consider that interest when determining the validity

of the quitclaim deed or in deciding the ownership of the property.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial

court, and we remand the case with instructions that the trial court enter

a judgment finding that the 2004 agreement did not violate the Statute

of Frauds and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.