Carolyn R. Dawson and Charley Hunter v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
This text of Carolyn R. Dawson and Charley Hunter v. Liberty Mutual Insurance (Carolyn R. Dawson and Charley Hunter v. Liberty Mutual Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion issued January 28, 2020
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-19-00418-CV ——————————— CHARLEY HUNTER, Appellant V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE, Appellee
On Appeal from the 268th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 19-DCV-258885
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Charley Hunter attempts to appeal from the trial court’s no-
answer default judgment signed on June 7, 2019. However, Hunter never filed a
notice of appeal. Instead, his alleged common-law wife, Carolyn Dawson, signed
and filed a notice of appeal on Hunter’s behalf. But Dawson is not an attorney (and does not hold herself out to be). Like Hunter, Dawson is a pro se litigant in the
proceedings below.
Under Texas law, if a person is not a member of the state bar or otherwise
granted special permission, that person may not practice law on behalf of another
person—even if the two persons are related or married. See TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 81.102(a) (“[A] person may not practice law in this state unless the person
is a member of the state bar.”); Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Am. Home
Assur. Co., 261 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. 2008) (“To practice law in Texas, one must
either be licensed by the Court or have special permission.”); Pham v. Harris Cty.
Rentals, L.L.C., 455 S.W.3d 702, 710 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
pet.) (holding that property owner who appeared pro se and was not attorney could
not represent wife in action brought by equipment rental subcontractor against
owner and owner’s wife to foreclose mechanic’s lien); Magaha v. Holmes, 886
S.W.2d 447, 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (holding that plaintiff’s mother could not act as his attorney because she
was not licensed to practice law).
This prohibition includes filing a notice of appeal on behalf of another
person. See Premier Assocs., Inc. v. Louetta Shopping Ctr. Houston, L.P., No. 01-
12-00369-CV, 2012 WL 4243802, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 20,
2012, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (“[A] person proceeding pro se cannot file a
2 notice of appeal on behalf of another person.”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 9.1(b) (“A
party not represented by counsel must sign any document that the party files . . .
.”).
Because Dawson is not a member of the state bar and has not otherwise
received special permission to practice law on Hunter’s behalf, she lacked the
authority to sign and file Hunter’s notice of appeal. Accordingly, no timely notice
of appeal has been filed on Hunter’s behalf. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1 (setting
deadlines for filing notice of appeal). Without a timely filed notice of appeal, we
lack jurisdiction over Hunter’s appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(a) (“An appeal is
perfected when a written notice of appeal is filed with the trial court clerk.”).
On November 14, 2019, we gave notice that Hunter’s appeal was subject to
dismissal for want of jurisdiction. No meritorious response was filed showing
grounds for continuing Hunter’s appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss Hunter’s appeal
for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Goodman, and Countiss.
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