1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CAROLINA BARRIENTOS VASQUEZ, No. 1:26-cv-03190-DAD-CKD (HC) 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 WARDEN, (Doc. No. 13) 15 Respondent.
16 17 This matter is before the court on petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order. 18 (Doc. No. 13.) For the reasons explained below, petitioner’s motion will be denied. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States on or about December 21 29, 2023, where she was released into this country at the border. (Doc. No. 11 at ¶ 11.) On or 22 about January 20, 2026, petitioner was arrested by local law enforcement and was subsequently 23 transferred into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody on January 23, 2026. 24 (Id. at ¶¶ 12–13.) She has remained in custody since that date. (Id. at ¶ 17.) On March 27, 2026, 25 an immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered petitioner removed to Guatemala and denied her applications 26 for asylum and withholding of removal. (Doc. No. 15-3 at 1–4.) Petitioner reserved her right to 27 appeal the IJ’s order and the deadline for her to do so was April 27, 2026. (Id. at 4.) The parties 28 do not dispute the fact that petitioner did not appeal the IJ’s order by that deadline. 1 On June 4, 2026, petitioner, proceeding through counsel, filed a motion for temporary 2 restraining order seeking an order enjoining respondent from removing her from the United 3 States, transferring her from the California City Detention Center, or taking any other action that 4 would interfere with this court’s ability to adjudicate her pending habeas petition. (Doc. No. 13.) 5 On the same day, the court issued an order regarding petitioner’s motion for a temporary 6 restraining order in which the court set a briefing schedule and ordered that pending resolution of 7 the motion respondent not “take any action to remove petitioner from the United States or to 8 move petitioner out of the Eastern District of California.” (Doc. No. 14.) That same day, 9 respondent filed an opposition to the pending motion. (Doc. No. 15.) On June 5, 2026, the court 10 issued an order directing petitioner to file a reply brief addressing respondent’s arguments. (Doc. 11 No. 16.) On June 8, 2026, petitioner filed a reply brief. (Doc. No. 17.) 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 The standard governing the issuing of a temporary restraining order is “substantially 14 identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. 15 John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The proper legal standard for 16 preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the 17 merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 18 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, 19 Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 20 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th 21 Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 22 possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los 23 Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 24 make a showing on all four of these prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 25 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[a] preliminary injunction is 26 appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were 27 raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. at 1134–35 (citation 28 omitted). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v. 1 City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. 2 v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“A plaintiff must do more than 3 merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate 4 immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). Finally, an 5 injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 6 plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 7 The likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor. See Disney 8 Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, plaintiff bears the burden 9 of demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims or, at the very least, that 10 “serious questions going to the merits were raised.” All. for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. 11 DISCUSSION 12 In the motion for temporary restraining order, petitioner argues that her detention violates 13 due process because she has not been afforded a bond hearing since being transferred to ICE 14 custody. (Doc. No. 13 at 2.) In opposition, respondent argues that petitioner is subject to the 90- 15 day mandatory detention period pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) because there is a removal 16 order for her that became final on April 28, 2026.1 (Doc. No. 15 at 2–4.) 17 When an order of removal becomes administratively final, the government has 90 days to 18 remove the individual subject to that order from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). An order 19 of removal becomes administratively final under a number of circumstances, including, most 20 pertinent here, “[u]pon expiration of the time allotted for an appeal if the respondent does not file 21 an appeal within that time.” 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1; see also Cabrel v. LaRose, No. 3:26-cv-00526- 22 RBM-BJW, 2026 WL 891838, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2026) (noting that the 90-day mandatory 23 removal period begins if a petitioner fails to timely appeal an IJ’s removal order). During that 90- 24 day removal period, individuals subject to the final order of removal must be detained. 8 U.S.C. 25
1 Respondent also requests that the court lift its prior order prohibiting respondent from removing 26 petitioner from the United States or transferring her out of the Eastern District of California so 27 that respondent may lawfully execute her removal order. (Id. at 5.) Because petitioner has failed to rebut respondent’s showing that she is subject to a final order of removal, respondent’s request 28 in this regard will be granted. 1 § 1231(a)(2)(A); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CAROLINA BARRIENTOS VASQUEZ, No. 1:26-cv-03190-DAD-CKD (HC) 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 WARDEN, (Doc. No. 13) 15 Respondent.
16 17 This matter is before the court on petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order. 18 (Doc. No. 13.) For the reasons explained below, petitioner’s motion will be denied. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States on or about December 21 29, 2023, where she was released into this country at the border. (Doc. No. 11 at ¶ 11.) On or 22 about January 20, 2026, petitioner was arrested by local law enforcement and was subsequently 23 transferred into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody on January 23, 2026. 24 (Id. at ¶¶ 12–13.) She has remained in custody since that date. (Id. at ¶ 17.) On March 27, 2026, 25 an immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered petitioner removed to Guatemala and denied her applications 26 for asylum and withholding of removal. (Doc. No. 15-3 at 1–4.) Petitioner reserved her right to 27 appeal the IJ’s order and the deadline for her to do so was April 27, 2026. (Id. at 4.) The parties 28 do not dispute the fact that petitioner did not appeal the IJ’s order by that deadline. 1 On June 4, 2026, petitioner, proceeding through counsel, filed a motion for temporary 2 restraining order seeking an order enjoining respondent from removing her from the United 3 States, transferring her from the California City Detention Center, or taking any other action that 4 would interfere with this court’s ability to adjudicate her pending habeas petition. (Doc. No. 13.) 5 On the same day, the court issued an order regarding petitioner’s motion for a temporary 6 restraining order in which the court set a briefing schedule and ordered that pending resolution of 7 the motion respondent not “take any action to remove petitioner from the United States or to 8 move petitioner out of the Eastern District of California.” (Doc. No. 14.) That same day, 9 respondent filed an opposition to the pending motion. (Doc. No. 15.) On June 5, 2026, the court 10 issued an order directing petitioner to file a reply brief addressing respondent’s arguments. (Doc. 11 No. 16.) On June 8, 2026, petitioner filed a reply brief. (Doc. No. 17.) 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 The standard governing the issuing of a temporary restraining order is “substantially 14 identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. 15 John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The proper legal standard for 16 preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the 17 merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 18 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, 19 Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 20 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th 21 Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 22 possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los 23 Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 24 make a showing on all four of these prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 25 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[a] preliminary injunction is 26 appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were 27 raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. at 1134–35 (citation 28 omitted). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v. 1 City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. 2 v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“A plaintiff must do more than 3 merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate 4 immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). Finally, an 5 injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 6 plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 7 The likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor. See Disney 8 Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, plaintiff bears the burden 9 of demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims or, at the very least, that 10 “serious questions going to the merits were raised.” All. for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. 11 DISCUSSION 12 In the motion for temporary restraining order, petitioner argues that her detention violates 13 due process because she has not been afforded a bond hearing since being transferred to ICE 14 custody. (Doc. No. 13 at 2.) In opposition, respondent argues that petitioner is subject to the 90- 15 day mandatory detention period pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) because there is a removal 16 order for her that became final on April 28, 2026.1 (Doc. No. 15 at 2–4.) 17 When an order of removal becomes administratively final, the government has 90 days to 18 remove the individual subject to that order from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). An order 19 of removal becomes administratively final under a number of circumstances, including, most 20 pertinent here, “[u]pon expiration of the time allotted for an appeal if the respondent does not file 21 an appeal within that time.” 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1; see also Cabrel v. LaRose, No. 3:26-cv-00526- 22 RBM-BJW, 2026 WL 891838, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2026) (noting that the 90-day mandatory 23 removal period begins if a petitioner fails to timely appeal an IJ’s removal order). During that 90- 24 day removal period, individuals subject to the final order of removal must be detained. 8 U.S.C. 25
1 Respondent also requests that the court lift its prior order prohibiting respondent from removing 26 petitioner from the United States or transferring her out of the Eastern District of California so 27 that respondent may lawfully execute her removal order. (Id. at 5.) Because petitioner has failed to rebut respondent’s showing that she is subject to a final order of removal, respondent’s request 28 in this regard will be granted. 1 § 1231(a)(2)(A); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 528 (2021) (“During the removal 2 period, detention is mandatory.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231); see also Blandon v. Warden of the 3 Mesa Verde Det. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-01117-DAD-DMC (HC), 2026 WL 1506320, at *1 (E.D. 4 Cal. May 29, 2026) (“An order of removal is final upon expiration of the time allotted for an 5 appeal in the event that the respondent does not file an appeal within that time. Title 8 U.S.C. § 6 1231(a)(2) mandates detention during ‘the removal period’ which is the 90-day period beginning 7 from the date the removal order becomes final.”) (internal citation omitted). 8 Here, respondent has submitted a copy of petitioner’s final order of removal. (Doc. No. 9 15-3.) The IJ’s decision ordered petitioner removed to Guatemala and denied her applications for 10 asylum, withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, and withholding of 11 removal pursuant to § 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (Id. at 1.) The removal 12 order was entered on March 27, 2026, petitioner reserved the right to appeal the IJ’s order, and 13 any such appeal was due to be filed by April 27, 2026. (Doc. No. 15-3 at 1, 4.) As noted above, 14 it is undisputed that petitioner did not appeal the IJ’s order within the time allowed to do so. 15 Accordingly, the IJ’s order became administratively final on April 28, 2026, which means that 16 petitioner is still within the 90-day mandatory detention period and is not entitled to a bond 17 hearing at this time. Gomez v. ICE Field Off. Dir., No. 2:25-cv-02242-TL-TLF, 2026 WL 18 449536, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2026) (“To the extent petitioner did not appeal the IJ’s order 19 of removal to the BIA by the December 31, 2025, deadline and his removal order became final on 20 that date, he is within the 90-day mandatory detention window of § 1231(a)(2). Thus, due 21 process would not require a bond hearing at least until he is outside the 90-day window, in the 22 post-removal period.”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Osuna Gomez v. ICE Field 23 Off. Dir. & Facility Adm’r, No. 2:25-cv-02242-TL-TLF, 2026 WL 447409 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17, 24 2026) (citation omitted); see also Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 2004) 25 (noting that “the due process analysis attaches in the post-removal period.”). 26 Petitioner attempts to refute respondent’s arguments that § 1231(a)(2) applies here by 27 raising several arguments challenging the validity of both her removal proceedings and the 28 removal order. (Doc. No. 17.) However, even if these arguments were supported, , the court 1 could not consider them because is jurisdictionally barred from doing so. See Singh v. Gonzales, 2 499 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The REAL ID Act dramatically changed the means for 3 judicial review of an order of removal. The Act provides that a petition for review in the court of 4 appeals is ‘the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.’”) (quoting 8 5 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)); Payan v. Engleman, No. 24-cv-06297-MEMF-RAO, 2024 WL 5466084, at 6 *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2024) (“To the extent Petitioner seeks to challenge the validity of the final 7 removal order, this Court lacks jurisdiction over any such challenge.”), report and 8 recommendation adopted sub nom. Payan v. Warden, No. 2:24-cv-06297-MEMF-RAO, 2025 9 WL 597256 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2025); cf. Esquivel Pacheco v. LaRose, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 10 1175 (S.D. Cal. 2026) (noting that petitioner’s unlawful detention claims were not jurisdictionally 11 barred because they did not “challenge his order of removal or seek review of any decisions 12 leading up to that order” and were “wholly ‘independent of and collateral to’ the merits of his 13 asylum claim, the removal order issued by the Immigration Judge, and the Attorney General’s 14 discretionary decision to pursue a removal action against him.”). 15 Therefore, the court concludes that petitioner has failed to show that she is likely to 16 succeed on the merits of her claim that her detention without a bond hearing violates due 17 process.2 Because petitioner has not carried her burden of establishing that she is likely to 18 succeed on the merits of her claims, the court need not consider the other Winter factors. 19 California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Likelihood of success on the merits is ‘the 20 most important’ factor; if a movant fails to meet this ‘threshold inquiry,’ we need not consider the 21 other factors.”) (quoting Disney, 869 F.3d at 856).
22 2 While not raised in the motion, the court observes that petitioner’s first amended petition also 23 alleges that the conditions of her detention are punitive because she is receiving inadequate medical care for a pre-existing knee injury while in immigration custody. (Doc. No. 11 at ¶¶ 30– 24 31.) To the extent that petitioner intended to raise these allegations as a separate claim challenging the conditions of her confinement, the court would be unable to conclude whether 25 any such claim properly sounds in habeas because petitioner has not asserted that any relief short of release would remedy any alleged harm she has suffered. Boscan v. Becerra, No. 1:26-cv- 26 00651-KES-SAB, 2026 WL 310093, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026) (“Petitioner’s allegations that 27 continued custody poses a substantial risk of serious harm, without more, do not state a habeas claim when the asserted constitutional violation is the alleged inadequacy of medical care and 28 remedial measures short of release would address any such circumstance.”). 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons explained above, 3 1. Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED 4 without prejudice; 5 2. The court’s prior order prohibiting respondent from transferring or removing 6 petitioner (Doc. No. 14) is dissolved; and 7 3. This matter is re-referred to the assigned magistrate judge for further proceedings. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. ” | Dated: _ June 10, 2026 Da A. 2, sxe 10 DALE A. DROZD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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