Carolina Action v. Pickard

420 F. Supp. 310, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13170
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedSeptember 20, 1976
DocketC-C-76-236
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 420 F. Supp. 310 (Carolina Action v. Pickard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carolina Action v. Pickard, 420 F. Supp. 310, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13170 (W.D.N.C. 1976).

Opinion

ORDER

McMILLAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff is an organization with political purposes (Defendants’ Exhibit E) which include litigation and political action contesting changes in electric power rates, alleged short-comings of the State in financing participation in Federal benefits programs and other matters. Plaintiff is a state-wide organization and places heavy reliance upon its Charlotte activities.

Plaintiff applied to the defendants for a license to solicit contributions and memberships and support. The application was denied under Section 2-30 of the Code of the City of Charlotte, which requires the local Charlotte Solicitation Commission to deny a license if the cost of collection exceeds 25% of the total amount to be raised. The text of the ordinance, the text of the local law under which the ordinance exists, and the *311 text of the North Carolina General Statutes, 160A-178, are all appended as exhibits to this order.

Plaintiff offered evidence which would support a finding that the individual defendants, the Commissioners, actually based their decision upon a disapproval of the purposes of the plaintiff rather than upon a violation of the 25% rule. The defendants offered evidence in support of the view that the decision was based purely upon the technical requirement that the expenses of solicitation not exceed 25% of the total amount to be raised. The evidence will support a finding in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendants on this issue.

Plaintiff offered evidence that the contributions and other activities sought to be carried on in Charlotte are a substantial element of their operation; that if they are barred from solicitation in Charlotte they will be unable to operate in Charlotte; and that if the Charlotte operation fails, the state-wide operation may likewise fail. They have demonstrated that the actions of the defendants have caused and threaten to cause harm which is great, immediate and irreparable and which seriously threatens the existence of this organization and activities.

There is a threshold question whether the statute under which the local defendants proceed even contemplates any restriction on the kind of activities which the plaintiff seeks to conduct. If a constitutional interpretation is to be presumed, it would be easy to say that the statute does not authorize what the defendants are doing in this case. The defendants, by their actions and by way of contention stated in argument, say that the statute and the ordinance do apply; and it is therefore obvious that, as applied, the ordinance and statute are inhibiting the activities of plaintiff.

Beyond serious question, the ordinance as applied does restrict rights, protected by the First Amendment, to complain about the activities of bodies regulating the public utilities, of bodies charged with welfare programs and related Federal-State activities, and similar sensitive public issues, and also affects the capacity of poorly funded people to organize together for the purpose of raising these and similar questions.

The ordinance is overbroad; the 25% limitation, as this Court views it, is unrelated to and does not protect against fraud or violence on the part of solicitors; such protection, in fact, is not its stated purpose.

The ordinance is vague; and when a vague and overbroad ordinance is made the basis of an infringement on rights of speech and expression, it comes under the severest kind of constitutional scrutiny. It may be that the ordinance can be applied or even has been applied in this case without conscious intention to inhibit First Amendment rights. However, if so, it does not thereby lose its unconstitutional character; a restraint on protected freedoms in the form of a 25% expense requirement can be just as fatal as a restraint upon the overt theory that this kind of activity ought not to be allowed in Charlotte. Moreover, as the Supreme Court said in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1942), at page 111, 63 S.Ct. at 874:

“It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Payne were not distributed free of charge”.

I therefore conclude, without in any manner questioning the public spirit or motives of the Commissioners themselves, that as applied in this case the ordinance is unconstitutional and must not be used to inhibit the solicitation of money and support from the citizens of the City.

This decision and these findings are for the purpose only of preliminary injunctive relief pending the decision on the merits.

It is, therefore, ORDERED:

1. That, pending final decision on the merits, defendants are restrained from enforcing the 25% restriction of the ordinance against plaintiff;

2. That the parties advise by October 1 whether further evidence will be required prior to a final decision.

*312 APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A

DIVISION 2. CHARITY SOLICITATIONS COMMISSION *

Sec. 2-24. Definitions.

(a) The words “solicit” and “solicitation” shall mean the request directly or indirectly of money, credit, property, financial assistance or other thing of value on the plea or representation that such money, credit, property, financial assistance or other thing of value will be used for a charitable, patriotic, educational or philanthropic purpose, in any office or business building, by house to house canvass or in any other public or private place by telephone, personal interview, mail, or otherwise. The said words shall also mean and include the sale or offer to sell any article, tag, ticket, emblem, publication, advertisement, subscription or other thing, whether of value or not, on the plea or representation that such money, credit, property, financial assistance or other thing of value will be used for a charitable, patriotic, educational or philanthropic purpose.

(b) The word “promoter” shall mean any person who promotes, manages, supervises, organizes or attempts to promote, manage, supervise or organize a campaign of solicitation.

(c) The word “permit” shall mean a certificate signed by the city clerk issued to any person showing that he has complied with the provisions of this division.

(d) The word “commission” shall mean the charity solicitations commission hereinafter provided for. (Code 1946, Ch. 15, § 1)

Sec. 2-25. Created; appointment of members; terms of office; meetings, quorum and regulations.

There is hereby created for the administration of this division a charity solicitations commission, which shall be composed of three (3) members appointed by the mayor, all of whom shall be citizens of Charlotte, one of whom shall be designated by the mayor’ as chairman and another as vice chairman. The mayor shall appoint the members of this commission for terms of three (3) years each to succeed in regular order the members whose terms originally expired on May 31, 1942, May 31, 1943, and May 31, 1944. When a vacancy occurs the mayor shall appoint a citizen of the city to serve for the unexpired term of the member whose position has become vacant.

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Related

Carolina Action v. Pickard
465 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. North Carolina, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
420 F. Supp. 310, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carolina-action-v-pickard-ncwd-1976.