Carol Thomas v. Sfha

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 22, 2019
• Docket: 18-15444
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 22 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CAROL THOMAS, No. 18-15444

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-03819-CRB

v. MEMORANDUM* SAN FRANCISCO HOUSING AUTHORITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2019**

Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Carol Thomas appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment

and dismissal order in her action alleging race and disability discrimination under

the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo. Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2018)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations); Avenue 6E Invs.,

LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment). We

affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Thomas’s disability claim under 42

U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) because this claim is time-barred. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 3613(a)(1)(A) and (B) (FHA claims are subject to two-year statute of limitations

and are tolled while administrative proceedings are pending).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Thomas’s racial

discrimination claim because Thomas failed to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether defendant’s failure to upgrade her to a larger unit or relocate her

during renovation was discriminatory. See Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051

(9th Cir. 1999) (elements of disparate treatment claim); Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of

Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996) (elements of disparate

impact claim).

We reject as without merit Thomas’s contentions that the district court

should have held trial where no triable disputes of material fact existed.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

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