Carol Linda Dille

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedMarch 8, 2021
Docket18-42994
StatusUnknown

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Bluebook
Carol Linda Dille, (Mo. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

In re: ) ) CAROL LINDA DILLE, ) Case No. 18-42994 ) Debtor. ) __________________________________________

ORDER

Before this Court is the Amended Second Application for Payment of Fees (the “Fee Application”) filed by counsel for Carol Dille (the “Debtor”). In his application, Joseph Jepson IV (“Counsel”) seeks an order a) approving the full flat fee of $6,175 and treating the funds in trust as earned fees; b) approving additional attorney fees in the amount of $20,069 for services provided to Debtor and directing the Chapter 13 trustee to pay those fees from funds held on hand; and c) allowing the remaining balance as an administrative claim under 11 U.S.C. §503(b) to be paid from Debtor’s Chapter 7 estate. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(A) over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1334(b), 157(a) and (b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Counsel’s request is granted in part and denied in part. I. Procedural Background The Debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition on November 20, 2018. Counsel and Debtor entered into a pre-petition flat fee contract for a fee of $6,175 plus expenses which specifically excluded services unrelated to this bankruptcy case, adversary proceedings, appeals, conversions, and post-confirmation services. Counsel also signed the Rights and Responsibilities Agreement Between Chapter 13 Debtors and Their Attorneys (“RRA”) which lays out what services are required to be provided by a debtor’s attorney. On January 9, 2019, this Court granted Counsel’s application for $2,978 of the flat fee and the remaining amount of $3,197 was to remain in the trust account. In March 2019, Debtor was indicted by a federal grand jury for alleged social security and bankruptcy fraud and a criminal proceeding followed. In May 2019, the Internal Revenue Service filed a motion to dismiss for Debtor’s failure to file tax returns in 2014-2017 regarding fraudulently obtained social security income obtained by using her ex-husband’s social security number. In September 2019, the United States Trustee (the “UST”) filed a motion to

dismiss and in December 2019 filed an objection to confirmation, both of which were subsequently resolved. On March 18, 2020, the UST filed a motion to convert to Chapter 7 under §1307(c). All of the UST’s motions and objections were mainly premised on Debtor’s failure to disclose fraudulently obtained social security income and certain real estate. Thereafter, Counsel moved to withdraw as Debtor’s counsel due to the amount of post-petition fees he was owed. The Court denied the motion and granted the motion to convert. On September 17, 2020, Counsel filed a second fee application and the UST objected. The Court directed Counsel to amend the fee application to include additional detail on the services provided. On November 18, 2020, Counsel filed the Amended Second Fee Application

seeking entry of an order a) approving the full flat fee of $6,175 and treating the funds in trust as earned fees; b) approving additional attorney fees in the amount of $20,069 for services provided to Debtor and directing the Chapter 13 trustee to pay those fees from funds held on hand; and c) allowing the remaining balance as an administrative claim under 11 U.S.C. §503(b) to be paid from Debtor’s Chapter 7 estate. The UST objected arguing that most of the fees sought above the agreed flat fee amount were for services included in the scope of the terms of the RRA, the fee agreement or both, and that only $2,465.00 of additional fees should be allowed. The UST further contends that any additional allowed fees should not be an administrative expense but rather recovered directly from Debtor and not the bankruptcy estate in Chapter 7. II. Discussion The Bankruptcy Code provides a framework for evaluating the appropriateness of professional fees. Section §329(b) authorizes the court to examine the reasonableness of a debtor’s attorney’s fees and, if such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of the services rendered, the court may order the return of any payment made. The decision to reduce fees

under §329 is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. In re Miller Automotive Group, Inc., 521 B.R. 323, 326 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2014), citing In re Sullivan’s Jewelry, Inc., 226 B.R. 624, 627 (8th Cir. BAP 1998). Section 330(a) provides that in determining the amount of reasonable compensation, the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including the time spent, the rates charged, and the complexity of the tasks addressed. 11 U.S.C. §330(a)(3). It provides further that the court shall not allow compensation for services that were not “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate….” 11 U.S.C. §330(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I). However, an exception is provided in §330(a)(4)(B) for Chapter 13 cases:

“In a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor’s attorney for representing the interests of the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy case based on a consideration of the benefit and necessity of such services to the debtor and the other factors set forth in this section.” (Emphasis added). Additionally, this district has a form Rights and Responsibilities Agreement Between Chapter 13 Debtors and Their Attorneys which lays out the respective rights and responsibilities of both Chapter 13 debtors and their attorneys. The attorney seeking compensation bears the burden of proving entitlement to all fees and expenses requested. In re Kula, 213 B.R. 729, 736 (8th Cir. BAP 1997). This burden is not to be taken lightly given that every dollar expended on legal fees results is a dollar less that is available for distribution to the creditors. In re Ulrich, 517 B.R. 77, 80 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (citations omitted). Counsel asserts that he is entitled to $20,069 in addition to the flat fee amount because his fee agreement provides for additional fees for the claimed services. He claims that Debtor’s

representation significantly expanded due to the criminal investigation into an asserted overpayment of social security benefits to Debtor, Debtor’s changes in financial circumstances, her failure to disclose material facts and information, failure to make plan payments and failure to follow advice of counsel. Debtor had not disclosed an indictment for fraud by the Social Security Administration and bankruptcy fraud arising from a previous case which expanded the scope and difficulty of representing Debtor on issues in the case. Counsel discovered a delinquent mortgage claim, dealt with Internal Revenue Service claims and a motion to dismiss, and a mortgage payment default, amended plan, objection to confirmation and motion to convert. Counsel submits that the services provided far exceeded the scope of the flat fee, were

reasonable and necessary, and benefited the Debtor and the estate by preventing foreclosure of the real estate. The UST contends that Counsel knew the potential for complex issues as evidenced by the amount of his flat fee agreement and due diligence would have made him aware of many of the issues.

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Related

Davis v. Hibbits (In Re Sullivan's Jewelry, Inc.)
226 B.R. 624 (Eighth Circuit, 1998)
Chamberlain v. Kula (In Re Kula)
213 B.R. 729 (Eighth Circuit, 1997)
In re Ulrich
517 B.R. 77 (E.D. Michigan, 2014)
In re Miller Automotive Group, Inc.
521 B.R. 323 (W.D. Missouri, 2014)

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Carol Linda Dille, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carol-linda-dille-mowb-2021.