Carol Jane Oakley v. Estate of Philip Andrew Oakley, and Bruce Oakley, Independent of the Estate of Philip Andrew Oakley

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 13, 2024
• Docket: 07-23-00181-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00181-CV

CAROL JANE OAKLEY, APPELLANT

V.

ESTATE OF PHILIP ANDREW OAKLEY, DECEASED; AND BRUCE OAKLEY, INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PHILIP ANDREW OAKLEY, DECEASED; APPELLEES

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Comal County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-PC-0621, Honorable Deborah Wigington, Presiding

June 13, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

Appellant, Carol Jane Oakley, proceeding pro se, appeals from two summary

judgment orders.1 Because there is no final judgment in this case and the summary

1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. judgment orders are not immediately appealable, we dismiss the appeal for want of

jurisdiction.

Background

This appeal arises from probate proceedings concerning the estate of Philip

Andrew Oakley. During probate, Carol filed a notice of interest against Philip’s estate,

claiming to be his wife.2 In response, Appellee, Bruce Oakley, independent executor of

Philip’s estate, filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that Carol’s

claim against the estate was invalid and that Philip was the sole owner of certain real

property at issue. Bruce also sued Carol pursuant to Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and

Remedies Code for allegedly asserting a fraudulent lien or claim against real property.

He sought attorney’s fees under both actions.

As a result of Carol’s claim against Philip’s estate, Appellees, Roger and Linda

Fruendt, filed a petition in intervention seeking a declaration that Carol has no interest in

a tract of land they purchased from Philip.

Both Bruce and the Fruendts moved for summary judgment on their declaratory

judgment actions. On March 1, 2023, the trial court granted the Fruendts summary

judgment, quieting title to their property and decreeing that Carol owned no interest in

said property.3 The order contained no finality language. That day, the trial court also

granted Bruce’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court’s order removed Carol’s

2 Carol alleges that Philip forged her signature on a divorce decree that purportedly dissolved their

marriage in 2005. 3 The trial court later signed a nunc pro tunc order correcting a scrivener’s error.

2 cloud on the title of the subject property and released funds from its sale to Bruce. The

order states that it “finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable,” but

also that a “[h]earing for attorney’s fees shall be scheduled for evidence to be presented

. . .” The summary judgment order does not address the attorney’s fees requested by

Bruce as part of his declaratory action, nor does it address his fraudulent lien claim

against Carol. Carol appealed both orders.

Analysis

We have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment or from an

interlocutory order made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con

Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex.

1998) (per curiam). “[W]hen there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an

order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every

pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes

of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205–06. “[C]ourts cannot find facial

finality with anything less than an unequivocal expression.” In re Lakeside Resort JV,

LLC, No. 22-1100, 2024 Tex. LEXIS 342, at *12 (Tex. May 10, 2024). Therefore, finality

language must be clear, unequivocal, and unmistakable, removing any doubt about its

effect. In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 543 (Tex. 2019).

The order granting Bruce’s motion for summary judgment does not contain

unequivocal finality language as it expressly contemplates further proceedings

concerning the attorney’s fee issue. Without unequivocal facial finality, we must turn to

the record to determine whether the summary judgment orders actually dispose of all

3 claims and parties. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205–06. As noted above, Bruce’s request

for attorney’s fees under his declaratory action and his Chapter 12 fraudulent lien claim

against Carol have not been resolved. Consequently. the trial court’s summary judgment

orders are interlocutory, and we have found no statutory authority permitting their appeal.

By letter of May 21, 2024, we notified the parties that it did not appear we have

jurisdiction over this appeal. Both parties filed a response. Carol argues that a final

judgment has been entered but fails to identify any language in the summary judgment

order that “clearly and unequivocally” disposes of all claims and parties or anything in the

record effectively doing so. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205–06. Bruce acknowledges

that a jurisdictional issue exists.

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that there is no final judgment or

appealable order presented for review. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal for want of

jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

Per Curiam