Carmella Ashlee Christensen v. Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION CARMELLA ASHLEE ) CHRISTENSEN ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV424-273 ) COMMISSIONER OF ) SOCIAL SECURITY, ) ) Defendant. ) ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Doc. 20. The Commissioner does not oppose the request. Doc. 22. For the reasons explained, the motion is GRANTED. Doc. 20. I. BACKGROUND The Court, on the Commissioner’s motion, reversed and remanded plaintiff’s social security appeal to the agency for further consideration, and judgment was entered in plaintiff’s favor. Doc. 12 (Motion); doc. 13 (Order); doc. 14 (Judgment). On remand, Plaintiff’s claim was granted, and the Social Security Administration awarded Plaintiff total past-due benefits of $112,591.00. Doc. 21 at 2; see also doc. 21-2. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $2,562.50 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Doc.

21 at 2. Counsel represents that, if his request is granted, he will refund the previously awarded attorney fee of $1,023.40. Id. at 3. II. ANALYSIS

Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), counsel may seek a reasonable contingency fee “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due

benefits to which the claimant is entitled.” Bergen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting § 406(b)(1)(A)). “Assuming that the requested fee is within the 25 percent limit, the court must then

determine whether ‘the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.’ ” Jackson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 601 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002)).

Courts may reduce the requested fee if the representation has been substandard, if the attorney has been responsible for delay, or if the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time the attorney spent

on the case. Id. The fee is payable “out of, and not in addition to, the amount of the past-due benefits.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 795 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff was awarded past-due benefits of $112,591.00. Doc. 21-2 at 1. Counsel seeks an award of $2,562.50, which is far less than the 25

percent contemplated by Plaintiff’s fee agreement with counsel. Id.; see also doc. 21-1 (Fee Agreement). Counsel expended 2.8 hours, and his

staff expended 4.3 hours, successfully prosecuting Plaintiff’s case. See docs. 21-3, 21-4, 21-5. Counsel explains this results in an effective hourly attorney rate of $800. Doc. 21 at 2. The Court finds the requested fee

amount reasonable. See, e.g., Adams v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 2415645, at *3 (S.D. Ga. June 2, 2017) (finding an award with an effective hourly rate of $850 to be “generous and reasonable” and collecting cases).

The Court notes, as does counsel, that the Court has already awarded EAJA fees in the amount of $1,023.40. See doc. 19; see also doc. 21 at 3. As counsel acknowledges, an attorney who receives fees under

both the EAJA and § 406(b) must refund the smaller fee to his client to avoid double recovery. Doc. 21 at 3; see also Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Jackson, 601 F.3d at 1273-74; Paltan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 518 F. App’x

673, 674 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ‘Savings Provision’ of the EAJA required [claimant's counsel] to refund either the EAJA award or the § 406(b) award, whichever was smaller.”). III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees Under the Social Security Act § 206(b)(1). Doc. 20. Plaintiffs counsel is awarded $2,562.50 in attorney’s fees and is DIRECTED to refund Plaintiff the previously awarded $1,023.40. SO ORDERED, this 21st day of May, 2026. ( hivegho~h lies CHRISTOPHER L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE J UDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA