IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STEPHEN W. CARMAN, § § Defendant Below, § No. 417, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. K1007024813 § Appellee. §
Submitted: May 7, 2026 Decided: July 14, 2026
Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the opening and answering briefs and the record below,
it appears to the Court:
(1) In 2010, Stephen W. Carman pleaded guilty to nine counts of dealing
in child pornography in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1109(4). For each count, the
Superior Court sentenced Carman to twenty-five years of imprisonment, suspended
after two years for lower levels of supervision.1 As such, Carman was sentenced to
1 The term of imprisonment was the statutory minimum-mandatory sentence and consistent with the sentence recommended by the parties in the plea agreement. See 11 Del. C. § 1109 (providing that dealing in child pornography is a class B felony, “unless the prohibited sex act [depicted] is ‘partial nudity’”); id. § 4205(b)(2) (providing that the sentence for a class B felony is “not less than 2 years up to 25 years to be served at Level V”). The original sentence order provided that Carman’s incarceration would be followed by six months at Level IV halfway house, followed by two years at Level III probation. In March 2024, at Carman’s request, the court modified the Level IV supervision to Level III with GPS monitoring. serve a total of eighteen years before suspension. The sentencing order required
Carman to be evaluated for and participate in a sex offender treatment program, as
deemed appropriate by Probation and Parole, among other special conditions.
(2) Carman was released from prison in August 2024. Shortly after
Carman’s release, a probation officer filed a progress report requesting that the court
add special conditions prohibiting Carman from having contact with minors,
accessing the internet, and possessing or controlling a device with the ability to
access the internet. The request was based on Carman’s history of sexual offenses
against minor victims, Carman’s mental health evaluation, and the recommendation
upon Carman’s discharge from the Transitions sex offender program that he
completed while he was incarcerated. The court modified the sentence order
accordingly.
(3) In November 2024, a probation officer filed a progress report stating
that Carman was compliant with probation and participating in the community-based
sex offender treatment program. The program had advised that Carman met the
criteria for participation in the Probation and Parole Computer Monitoring Program,
which would allow limited internet access on an approved device and recommended
that Carman be permitted such access while participating in the monitoring program.
The court modified the special conditions in accordance with the recommendation.
2 (4) In July 2025, Probation Officer Vorous filed reports and administrative
warrants (collectively, the “reports”) alleging that Carman was in violation of
probation and conditional release. The alleged violations included that Carman had
been discharged, without successful completion, from sex offender treatment on
June 27, 2025, and had spent approximately an hour and a half at an “ice cream
shop/[mini golf] establishment” that “caters to children” and is a ”popular and
frequent location where children gather,” during the establishment’s “peak hours.”
The reports requested that the court revoke Carman’s conditional release and
sentence him to a term of incarceration that would be suspended upon successful
completion of a treatment program to be determined in the Department of
Correction’s discretion.
(5) Carman contested the violation, and the Superior Court convened an
evidentiary hearing on September 3, 2025, to consider the alleged violations. At the
beginning of the hearing, defense counsel objected to the admissibility of a discharge
summary from the sex offender treatment program because its author, Carman’s
treatment provider, was not available to testify. Defense counsel also argued that
Officer Vorous should not be permitted to testify regarding matters that were in the
discharge summary but of which he had no personal knowledge. The State agreed
not to submit the discharge summary but argued that Officer Vorous should be
permitted to testify as to his knowledge that Carman had not successfully completed,
3 and had been discharged from, the treatment program. Reasoning that hearsay
testimony is permitted in VOP hearings, the court determined that Officer Vorous
would be permitted to testify to the extent he had been made aware of Carman’s
engagement with, and discharge from, treatment.
(6) During his testimony, Officer Vorous recounted a series of
“concerning” and “alarming” behaviors that resulted in Carman’s discharge from the
community treatment program. These included that Carman hid photographs of his
minor grandchildren after treatment personnel instructed him not to have them;
collected contact information and other details about another sex offender’s victim
and sent the information for delivery to the offender in prison; and collected
information about a person whom Carman said he had sexually abused in the past.
Officer Vorous testified that he and the treatment provider had attempted to work
with Carman regarding their concerns in order to keep him in treatment in the
community, but Carman’s visit to the ice cream shop was the “straw that broke the
camel’s back.” Officer Vorous explained that he was conducting a routine review
of Carman’s GPS data when he observed that Carman had visited Tre Sorelle Dolce,
an “ice cream shop with Putt-Putt, lots of games, [and] activities for children,” from
6:36 p.m. until 8:08 p.m. on June 25, 2025. Officer Vorous spoke with Carman’s
treatment provider about it and “she was very upset” because, after years of
treatment “in prison and out,” Carman should have recognized that he should not go
4 to an ice cream shop designed for and frequented by children and should instead
speak with his treatment provider about it.
(7) Carman’s son testified that he invited Carman to meet him at the ice
cream shop so that they could reconnect after Carman’s years in prison. He stated
that he did not see any customers or employees there whom he believed to be minors.
He also testified that Carman did not speak to anyone else while they were there,
except an older woman who used to work with Carman.
(8) In closing, defense counsel argued that there was no evidence that any
children were present at the ice cream shop and that Carman’s mere presence at the
shop did not constitute a VOP and should not have resulted in his discharge from
treatment. The State argued that Carman’s visit to the ice cream shop was the
culmination of a series of concerning behaviors that resulted in Carman’s discharge
from treatment, and the treatment discharge constituted a VOP.
(9) The Superior Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Carman had violated probation. As to sentencing, the court revoked Carman’s
conditional release and previously earned good time credits, requiring that Carman
serve the time remaining on his sentence through July 20, 2028, but did not sentence
him to serve any additional time for the VOP.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STEPHEN W. CARMAN, § § Defendant Below, § No. 417, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. K1007024813 § Appellee. §
Submitted: May 7, 2026 Decided: July 14, 2026
Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the opening and answering briefs and the record below,
it appears to the Court:
(1) In 2010, Stephen W. Carman pleaded guilty to nine counts of dealing
in child pornography in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1109(4). For each count, the
Superior Court sentenced Carman to twenty-five years of imprisonment, suspended
after two years for lower levels of supervision.1 As such, Carman was sentenced to
1 The term of imprisonment was the statutory minimum-mandatory sentence and consistent with the sentence recommended by the parties in the plea agreement. See 11 Del. C. § 1109 (providing that dealing in child pornography is a class B felony, “unless the prohibited sex act [depicted] is ‘partial nudity’”); id. § 4205(b)(2) (providing that the sentence for a class B felony is “not less than 2 years up to 25 years to be served at Level V”). The original sentence order provided that Carman’s incarceration would be followed by six months at Level IV halfway house, followed by two years at Level III probation. In March 2024, at Carman’s request, the court modified the Level IV supervision to Level III with GPS monitoring. serve a total of eighteen years before suspension. The sentencing order required
Carman to be evaluated for and participate in a sex offender treatment program, as
deemed appropriate by Probation and Parole, among other special conditions.
(2) Carman was released from prison in August 2024. Shortly after
Carman’s release, a probation officer filed a progress report requesting that the court
add special conditions prohibiting Carman from having contact with minors,
accessing the internet, and possessing or controlling a device with the ability to
access the internet. The request was based on Carman’s history of sexual offenses
against minor victims, Carman’s mental health evaluation, and the recommendation
upon Carman’s discharge from the Transitions sex offender program that he
completed while he was incarcerated. The court modified the sentence order
accordingly.
(3) In November 2024, a probation officer filed a progress report stating
that Carman was compliant with probation and participating in the community-based
sex offender treatment program. The program had advised that Carman met the
criteria for participation in the Probation and Parole Computer Monitoring Program,
which would allow limited internet access on an approved device and recommended
that Carman be permitted such access while participating in the monitoring program.
The court modified the special conditions in accordance with the recommendation.
2 (4) In July 2025, Probation Officer Vorous filed reports and administrative
warrants (collectively, the “reports”) alleging that Carman was in violation of
probation and conditional release. The alleged violations included that Carman had
been discharged, without successful completion, from sex offender treatment on
June 27, 2025, and had spent approximately an hour and a half at an “ice cream
shop/[mini golf] establishment” that “caters to children” and is a ”popular and
frequent location where children gather,” during the establishment’s “peak hours.”
The reports requested that the court revoke Carman’s conditional release and
sentence him to a term of incarceration that would be suspended upon successful
completion of a treatment program to be determined in the Department of
Correction’s discretion.
(5) Carman contested the violation, and the Superior Court convened an
evidentiary hearing on September 3, 2025, to consider the alleged violations. At the
beginning of the hearing, defense counsel objected to the admissibility of a discharge
summary from the sex offender treatment program because its author, Carman’s
treatment provider, was not available to testify. Defense counsel also argued that
Officer Vorous should not be permitted to testify regarding matters that were in the
discharge summary but of which he had no personal knowledge. The State agreed
not to submit the discharge summary but argued that Officer Vorous should be
permitted to testify as to his knowledge that Carman had not successfully completed,
3 and had been discharged from, the treatment program. Reasoning that hearsay
testimony is permitted in VOP hearings, the court determined that Officer Vorous
would be permitted to testify to the extent he had been made aware of Carman’s
engagement with, and discharge from, treatment.
(6) During his testimony, Officer Vorous recounted a series of
“concerning” and “alarming” behaviors that resulted in Carman’s discharge from the
community treatment program. These included that Carman hid photographs of his
minor grandchildren after treatment personnel instructed him not to have them;
collected contact information and other details about another sex offender’s victim
and sent the information for delivery to the offender in prison; and collected
information about a person whom Carman said he had sexually abused in the past.
Officer Vorous testified that he and the treatment provider had attempted to work
with Carman regarding their concerns in order to keep him in treatment in the
community, but Carman’s visit to the ice cream shop was the “straw that broke the
camel’s back.” Officer Vorous explained that he was conducting a routine review
of Carman’s GPS data when he observed that Carman had visited Tre Sorelle Dolce,
an “ice cream shop with Putt-Putt, lots of games, [and] activities for children,” from
6:36 p.m. until 8:08 p.m. on June 25, 2025. Officer Vorous spoke with Carman’s
treatment provider about it and “she was very upset” because, after years of
treatment “in prison and out,” Carman should have recognized that he should not go
4 to an ice cream shop designed for and frequented by children and should instead
speak with his treatment provider about it.
(7) Carman’s son testified that he invited Carman to meet him at the ice
cream shop so that they could reconnect after Carman’s years in prison. He stated
that he did not see any customers or employees there whom he believed to be minors.
He also testified that Carman did not speak to anyone else while they were there,
except an older woman who used to work with Carman.
(8) In closing, defense counsel argued that there was no evidence that any
children were present at the ice cream shop and that Carman’s mere presence at the
shop did not constitute a VOP and should not have resulted in his discharge from
treatment. The State argued that Carman’s visit to the ice cream shop was the
culmination of a series of concerning behaviors that resulted in Carman’s discharge
from treatment, and the treatment discharge constituted a VOP.
(9) The Superior Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Carman had violated probation. As to sentencing, the court revoked Carman’s
conditional release and previously earned good time credits, requiring that Carman
serve the time remaining on his sentence through July 20, 2028, but did not sentence
him to serve any additional time for the VOP.
(10) On appeal, Carman argues that Officer Vorous’s testimony was
inadmissible hearsay and that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he
5 violated his probation. These arguments are unavailing. In a VOP proceeding, the
State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred.2
“Hearsay evidence is admissible in VOP hearings,” but if the defendant denies
violating probation, there must be “some competent evidence” sufficient to
“reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as good
as required by the conditions of the probation.”3 “Although the State does not need
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, probation cannot be revoked solely
upon the basis of testimony from a witness who has no first-hand knowledge of the
events constituting the violations.”4
(11) The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Officer
Vorous’s testimony and revoking Carman’s probation.5 The conditions of Carman’s
probation and conditional release required him to participate in sex offender
treatment while in the community. Officer Vorous testified that Carman was
discharged from treatment without successful completion and recounted the various
events that resulted in the discharge. The officer had first-hand knowledge of many
of those events. For example, he had ongoing discussions with the treatment
2 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006); see also Coleman v. State, 289 A.3d 630, 2023 WL 28708, at *3 (Del. Jan. 3, 2023) (TABLE) (“The same standards apply to a violation of conditional release.”). 3 Jenkins v. State, 8 A.3d 1147, 1152 (Del. 2010). 4 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 5 See Jenkins v. State, 862 A.2d 386, 2004 WL 2743556, at *1 (Del. Nov. 23, 2004) (TABLE) (“Our review regarding the admissibility and the sufficiency of the evidence [presented at a VOP hearing] is for abuse of discretion.”).
6 provider about the course of Carman’s treatment and the concerns about his
progress; they worked together in an attempt to keep Carman in treatment in the
community. Officer Vorous reviewed Carman’s phone data through the monitoring
program and observed Carman’s involvement in conveying information to another
offender about that offender’s victim. And Officer Vorous’s discovery from the
GPS data that Carman had gone to the ice cream shop culminated in the treatment
provider’s decision to discharge Carman from treatment.6
(12) Carman also argues on appeal that his counsel was ineffective in
various respects. We will not consider these claims for the first time on appeal.7
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow Justice
6 Officer Vorous also testified regarding an incident in which Carman gave another individual who was on GPS supervision and had cut off his GPS device a ride to Wilmington. On appeal, Carman argues that the State withheld data from the other passenger’s GPS device, which purportedly would have shown that Carman was not involved in removing the other passenger’s GPS device. Carman has not shown that any exculpatory information was withheld; the court heard information suggesting that the passenger’s device was removed before his ride with Carman. In any event, that incident appears to have had little bearing on the court’s determination that Carman violated probation by being discharged from sex offender treatment before completion. 7 Holland v. State, 337 A.3d 1268, 2024 WL 5265274, at *2 (Del. Dec. 31, 2024) (TABLE).