Carlton Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 25, 2024
DocketAT-1221-21-0217-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Carlton Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Carlton Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carlton Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CARLTON EUGENE HOOKER, JR., DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-1221-21-0217-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: April 25, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Carlton Eugene Hooker, Jr. , Clearwater, Florida, pro se.

Luis E. Ortiz-Cruz , Esquire, Orlando, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The appellant filed an appeal alleging that the agency committed a prohibited personnel practice (PPP) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(4) when it allegedly obstructed his right to compete for a Police Officer position in April 2017. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 3, 5. With his appeal, he submitted, among other documents, a letter from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) closing its investigation into the appellant’s PPP complaint. Id. at 12. Unsure of the jurisdictional basis for the appeal, the administrative judge issued an order stating that the appellant appeared to be claiming that the agency retaliated against him because of his whistleblowing or other protected activity, and the administrative judge explained the jurisdictional standards for an individual right of action (IRA) appeal. IAF, Tab 3. The appellant submitted two responses confirming that he did not intend to file an IRA appeal but was instead challenging a PPP under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(4). IAF, Tab 5, Tab 6 at 3. Accordingly, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that PPP claims are not within the Board’s jurisdiction unless raised in connection with an otherwise appealable action or when the appellant claims retaliation for whistleblowing or other protected 3

activity in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or (9), in which case an appellant may file an IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision at 3. The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

The appellant has not established jurisdiction over an IRA appeal. In his petition for review, the appellant again asserts that he is not alleging reprisal for whistleblowing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10. However, he also asserts that he engaged in protected activity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), (9) when he filed a grievance with the agency on October 13, 2017, a complaint with the agency’s Office of Inspector General on January 26, 2020, a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeal with the Office of Personnel Management in March 2020, and a discrimination complaint with the agency on June 29, 2020. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. To establish jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, an appellant must show by preponderant evidence that he exhausted his remedies before OSC and make nonfrivolous allegations of the following: (1) he made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Requena v. Department of Homeland Security , 2022 MSPB 39. A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion of fact that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). The appellant has not proved by preponderant evidence that he exhausted a whistleblower retaliation claim with OSC. E.g., IAF, Tab 1 at 12. The letter from OSC references a PPP claim but not a whistleblower retaliation claim. Id. The appellant also has not nonfrivolously alleged that his alleged whistleblowing or other protected activity was a contributing factor to the personnel action at 4

issue, alleged obstruction of the right to compete for the Police Officer position. The appellant complained that the agency obstructed his right to compete for the position in April 2017. Id. at 5, 12. However, all of the protected activity alleged in the petition for review occurred after April 2017 and thus could not have been a contributing factor in that matter. See Davis v. Department of Defense, 106 M.S.P.R. 560, ¶ 12 (2007) (“Because the personnel actions complained about by the appellant predate his protected disclosures, there is no way that the disclosures could have in any way contributed to the personnel actions complained about by the appellant.”), aff’d, 278 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For these reasons, we find that the appellant has not established jurisdiction over an IRA appeal.

The Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s PPP claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(4). PPP claims are not an independent source of Board jurisdiction and “are cognizable by the Board only when they motivate an otherwise appealable personnel action.” Brodt v.

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Davis v. Merit Systems Protection Board
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Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
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Rommie Requena v. Department of Homeland Security
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Bluebook (online)
Carlton Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlton-hooker-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.