Carlstrom v. United States

177 F. Supp. 245, 147 Ct. Cl. 297, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 121
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 7, 1959
Docket542-57
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 177 F. Supp. 245 (Carlstrom v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carlstrom v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 245, 147 Ct. Cl. 297, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 121 (cc 1959).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This case was referred by the court, pursuant to Rule 45(a), 28 U.S.C.A., to S. R. Gamer, a trial commissioner of the court, with directions to make findings of fact and recommendations for conclusions of law. The commissioner has done so in a report filed May 28, 1959. When more than the specified time elapsed after the filing of this report and neither party gave notice in writing of an intention to except to it, defendant filed a motion for judgment based on the commissioner’s report. Since the court agrees with the recommendations and findings of the commissioner, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby adopts the same as the basis of its judgment in this case. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover and judgment will be entered for plaintiff in the sum of $20,147.40, plus interest as part of just compensation at the rate of four percent per annum on each monthly installment of $387.45 as it became due until date of payment, said installments commencing on August 1, 1953, and ending November 1, 1957.

It is so ordered.

Opinion of Commissioner

This case grows out of the occupancy by a branch post office of premises in a shopping center owned by plaintiff. When the post office first occupied the premises, the entire area, consisting of a residential community and a commercial shopping development in the center thereof, was owned by defendant. It had been constructed in 1942 and operated by the Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA) as a housing project for warworkers. The development, called Linda Vista, is located within the city limits of San Diego, California, but approximately six miles north of the center of the city. It is part of a table of land called Kearny Mesa. Going north, the mesa is separated from the city by a canyon called Mission Valley. Another canyon, called Tecolote Canyon, also separates the mesa from the west. The mesa is, however, approachable from the city through the east without any natural barriers, and similarly connects with the area to the north without any appreciable drop in the land. However, as a result of the geographical characteristics of the mesa and its distance from the main portion of the city, the Linda Vista development, as well as other subsequent developments on the mesa, evolved somewhat like a separate city.

Pursuant to an interdepartmental arrangement between the Post Office Department and FPHA, no rent was paid by the Department for the use of the premises by the post office. However, in 1952, defendant offered the shopping center for sale and, pursuant to a bid made by plaintiff which was accepted, plaintiff took title to the center on August 1, 1953, subject to such leases as had theretofore been entered into by defendant with the various tenants. The Post Office Department had no such lease. Accordingly, it was, as of August 1, 1953, for the first time obliged to consider the problem of paying rent for the premises, and its representatives had several conferences with plaintiff with respect thereto.

The premises consisted of 2,583 square feet of space with 28 feet of frontage in a frame construction building 350 feet long and 116 feet deep. As of August 1, 1953, three tenants occupied the entire building, consisting of the post office in the center, a branch of the Bank of America adjoining on one side occupying 3,248 square feet of space, and the principal tenant, a department store, occupying 34,945 square feet of space on the other side. The building was the' largest of the six buildings comprising the shopping center, and had a spacious improved parking area immediately adjoining.

Plaintiff felt that a monthly rental of' $516.60, computed on a basis of 20 cents, per square foot, was reasonable. How *247 •ever, the Post Office Department’s representatives considered this to be excessive. They offered $219.56 a month, ■computed on a basis of $1 a square foot per year, or 8% cents per square foot per month. With this wide discrepancy between them, agreement was never reached, despite further negotiations and discussions. In the meantime no rent in any amount was "paid. Even prior to August 1, when plaintiff assumed ownership, the Department’s representatives attempted to find other suitable space in the area at a price they considered to be reasonable, an endeavor that met with many obstacles. They continued in this effort throughout the period of their occupancy of plaintiff’s premises, but it was not until November 30, 1957, that the Department finally vacated plaintiff’s premises. It had thus occupied the premises for four years and four months, or a total of 52 months, without paying any rent.

The parties are in agreement that defendant’s possession of plaintiff’s property for 52 months resulted in a temporary taking of the use of the property and gives rise to a valid claim for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. See Riverside Military Academy, Inc. v. United States, 122 Ct.Cl. 756, 784. The parties also agree that such compensation is to be measured by the reasonable rental value of the premises, plus interest as a part of just compensation. Barcroft Lake Shores, Inc. v. United States, 135 Ct.Cl. 623, 626. They further agree that the highest and best use of the premises was as a retail store or for a retail service use, which was similar to the use to which the other space in the shopping center was devoted. However, the parties disagree as to what a reasonable rental value was for such type of use for the period of occupancy.

The most nearly comparable locations in the shopping center, which consisted of six buildings, were naturally, the two ■other adjoining stores in the same building in which the post office was located. The lease of the branch of the Bank of America was entered, into in 1947 at a rate of $350 per month, which came to 10.8 cents per square foot. Over the years its rent was twice increased. By the time the lease expired in June 1955, it was paying $450 per month or 13.9 cents per square foot and it had paid such rental for the past three years. There was a 12% percent increase in its rent in 1950, when the rate was increased to $400 per month, and another 11.2 percent increase in 1952, which produced the $450 rate. After its lease terminated in 1955, it paid plaintiff $1,-500 per month, or 46.2 cents per square foot, but this was only for a short period of time and until it was able to move to its new building nearby, then under construction. There is little question but that this was an excessive rental imposed on the bank by plaintiff when the bank was hardly in a position to resist, and no weight should therefore be afforded it.

Since the last rental paid under the lease in 1955 was agreed to in 1948, and without being able to foretell the dynamic growth of the San Diego area and the general postwar increase in land values therein, including the mesa generally and the Linda Vista area thereon, (finding 9) it appears that the 13.9 cents per square foot rate it was paying was .and had been somewhat too low.

After the bank moved in March 1956, the premises remained vacant for almost six months. Thereafter, they became occupied by a furniture store under a lease whereby rent was paid on a basis of a percentage of gross sales, with a $250 per month minimum. The highest rate paid during the period herein involved was $611.42, or 18.8 cents per square foot for March 1957. The average for the four months in 1956 that it occupied the premises was 13.4 cents per square foot.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States
640 F.2d 328 (Court of Claims, 1980)
Miller v. United States
620 F.2d 812 (Court of Claims, 1980)
Tektronix, Inc. v. United States
552 F.2d 343 (Court of Claims, 1977)
Pitcairn v. United States
547 F.2d 1106 (Court of Claims, 1976)
King v. United States
504 F.2d 1138 (Court of Claims, 1974)
American Chemical Society v. The United States
438 F.2d 597 (Court of Claims, 1971)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
177 F. Supp. 245, 147 Ct. Cl. 297, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlstrom-v-united-states-cc-1959.