Carlson v. City of Thief River Falls

201 N.W. 942, 162 Minn. 27, 1925 Minn. LEXIS 1429
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedJanuary 30, 1925
DocketNo. 24,321.
StatusPublished

This text of 201 N.W. 942 (Carlson v. City of Thief River Falls) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carlson v. City of Thief River Falls, 201 N.W. 942, 162 Minn. 27, 1925 Minn. LEXIS 1429 (Mich. 1925).

Opinion

Stone, J.

Action by the contractor for the retained balance of the contract price of a filter plant building and motor house erected for defendant. After a directed verdict for plaintiff, defendant moved for a new trial and this appeal is from the order denying that motion.

*28 The facts are simple and except as hereinafter noted not much in controversy. The building is situated on the bank of the Red Lake river and the grade line slopes from front to rear, the rear wall being some 80 feet from the water. The structure consists in the main of the filter, clear water and settling basins, over which is a one story superstructure. The clear water basin occupies the front and lower portion of the building. It rests upon a reinforced concrete slab placed flat upon the bottom of the excavation. To the rear and toward the river is the settling basin, about 35 feet long and 45 wide. It is 11 feet high inside and projects 13 feet 10 inches beyond the rear wall of the one story superstructure. The bottom is another reinforced concrete slab. The top and walls of the settling basin are also of reinforced concrete.

There were the usual contract, plans and specifications. Plaintiff did not guarantee the completed structure. He was obligated only to perform the labor and furnish the material necessary to complete the work pursuant to the plans and specifications. The engineer, it was agreed, was to supervise the work and “inspect the materials to be furnished and the work to be done under these specifications, and see that the same corresponds therewith”. His decision as to the meaning of the plans or specifications “or any inconsistencies between them or as to the respective rights” of the parties was made binding. All materials were subject to his approval.

Notwithstanding the engineering supervision, the specifications imposed upon plaintiff responsibility for the entire work until its completion and acceptance, and provided that any imperfect or unfaithful work discovered at any time before final acceptance should be corrected on the requirement of the engineer. In that connection the specifications further provided:

“All loss or damage arising out of the nature of the work done under this agreement, or any unforeseen or unusual obstruction or difficulties which may be encountered in the prosecution of the same, or from any action of the elements, is to be sustained by the contractor.” '

*29 The contractor shall give his personal attention to the faithful performance of the work.”

One of the plan sheets shows a detailed cross section of the building. It indicates the dimensions and details, among other things, of the bottom slab and rear wall of the settling basin. The- slab, 12 inches thick, was to be carried beyond the rear wall 4 inches so as to make a projecting shoulder 12 inches thick and 4 inches wide outside the outer face of the rear wall. Under the rear wall and this projection of the bottom slab, the plan indicates by dotted lines the possible need of running the wall itself downward to an extent then undetermined. There is appended, on the plan, a “note” showing that it was not then foreseen by the engineer, that he had not determined, how far this possible additional foundation wall would have to be carried. No'soundings had been taken at this point by either contractor or engineer. The note reads: “In case of soft material under wall at south end, remove and construct wall on 1:8:6 concrete footing.”

There is little doubt as to the meaning. If it were otherwise, the opinion of the engineer would be helpful, if not in fact controlling. His testimony is this:

“The dotted lines indicate that the degree or amount of soft material is uncertain and that the soft material shall be removed and a one-three-six mixture of concrete, which means one of cement, three of sand and six of rock shall be placed underneath and well constructed. Such note is necessary where we are not on continuous supervision; where we are not there every day a contractor under a contract and having full charge of the completion of the work is required to obtain a proper foundation under such conditions where we are not continually on the work.”

The building was never formally accepted by defendant, but the contract price of almost $20,000 has been paid except for $1,000 retained, which is sought to be recovered by this action. The defense is a defect of construction claimed to have resulted from a breach of the contract, the alleged failure of plaintiff to comply with the “note”, quoted just above. Although he did remove some *30 soft material at the point indicated, it is now said that plaintiff did not remove enough of it and did not carry the wall down far enough to give it a bottom of the requisite solidity. Shortly after the building was finished, the rear wall of the settling basin settled, causing serious cracks in the side walls between the clear water and settling-basin, the existence and serious character of these cracks not being-denied. The learned trial judge was correct in admonishing counsel that too much was said below, both in the pleadings and at the trial, concerning negligence. This is not a negligence case. It is one to recover upon a contract and the defense is a breach of the contract. The obligation imposed by the “note” was absolute and a failure to perform it would not be excusable, even though there was no negligence. Due care does not excuse a breach of contract which nevertheless remains a violation of legal duty and attended with resulting liability. So in this case, the first inquiry is whether plaintiff performed the obligation in question. It was, “in case soft material” under the wall at the point indicated to remove the same and construct the wall on the specified footing.

As a matter of fact, plaintiff encountered soft material where it was anticipated and removed some of it. It appears to have been “filled” ground. Whether he removed sufficient to comply with the note, and whether he constructed the wall as required are questions of fact. The note obviously required the removal of enough material and the carrying of the wall to a sufficient depth so that the footing would rest upon firm bottom — one that would carry the load. Not only was the excavation required, but the construction of the specified footing was also necessary. Here it is well to digress long enough to say that the additional excavation and concrete required by the note constituted extra work, to be paid for in addition to the contract price. It was so considered by the engineer.

Even though plaintiff did not comply with the requirement of additional excavation and concrete work, he is not liable as for breach of contract if he made a good faith effort to comply and his work at the point in question was approved at the time by defendant through the agency of its engineer or any other authorized representative. And that is where we are constrained to disagree *31 with the learned trial judge. The evidence made a jury question as to whether the engineer in fact approved of the work. True, all that plaintiff had to do was to comply with the contract, plans and specifications as reasonably interpreted and applied by the engineer. Friederick v. County of Redwood, 153 Minn. 451, 190 N. W. 801.

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Related

Wisconsin Red Pressed-Brick Co. v. Hood
56 N.W. 165 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1893)
Wisconsin Red Pressed-Brick Co. v. Hood
62 N.W. 550 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1895)
Wisconsin Red Pressed Brick Co. v. Hood
69 N.W. 1091 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1897)
Friederick v. County of Redwood
190 N.W. 801 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1922)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
201 N.W. 942, 162 Minn. 27, 1925 Minn. LEXIS 1429, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlson-v-city-of-thief-river-falls-minn-1925.