Carlson Orchards, Inc. v. Linsey (In Re Linsey)

296 B.R. 582, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 937, 2003 WL 21946740
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedAugust 11, 2003
Docket19-10013
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 296 B.R. 582 (Carlson Orchards, Inc. v. Linsey (In Re Linsey)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carlson Orchards, Inc. v. Linsey (In Re Linsey), 296 B.R. 582, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 937, 2003 WL 21946740 (Mass. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

JOEL B. ROSENTHAL, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is an adversary proceeding, filed by Carlson Orchards, Inc. (“Carlson”) against David and Nina Linsey (collectively the “Debtors” or the “Defendants”). The complaint [# 1] filed by Carlson includes two counts: Count I requested that the Court find that the obligation owed by Nina Linsey to Carlson in the amount of $121,865 1 be deemed nondischargeable; Count II requested that the Court issue declaratory judgment vesting title in (1) two vehicles and (2) an interest in the amount of $40,000 in real property owned by the Linseys, in Carlson.

On March 31, 2003, the parties filed an Agreement for Judgment as to Defendant Nina M. Linsey Only [# 11], in which it was agreed that the obligation owed by Nina Linsey to Carlson is non-dischargeable. The Court entered judgment against Nina Linsey, pursuant to this agreement, on May 1, 2003. The only issue remaining before the Court is Count II, that being whether a constructive trust or equitable lien may be imposed on the vehicles and real estate improvements allegedly purchased with the funds stolen by Nina Linsey.

Facts

In accordance with Federal Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 7052, the Court finds as follows:

1. Nina Linsey began working for Carlson as a bookkeeper in January 2001 and continued working there until November 2001.

2. Nina Linsey was paid a gross salary of approximately $600 per week by Carlson. Nina Linsey was paid on an hourly basis and the amount of her paycheck varied week-to-week based on the number of hours worked.

3. Nina Linsey generally worked a 40-hour work week. Sometimes, however, *585 she worked a few hours of overtime. Nina Linsey’s hourly wage was $15/hour.

4. Nina Linsey embezzled 2 money from Carlson. This was accomplished, in part, by diverting checks payable to Carlson and depositing those checks directly into bank accounts controlled by Nina Linsey. Nina Linsey also wrote extra paychecks to herself and deposited the extra paychecks into bank accounts she controlled.

5. Carlson issued a W-2 to Nina Linsey stating that Nina Linsey received a total of $32,606.85 in earnings from Carlson during calendar year 2001. Part of this amount is comprised of extra unauthorized payroll checks written by Nina Linsey to herself.

6. Nina Linsey and David Linsey kept separate bank accounts and did not commingle their funds. All of David Linsey’s paychecks were deposited into his separate accounts.

7. On July 29, 2002 Nina Linsey pled guilty to one count of larceny by check and was ordered to pay restitution of $140,000.00 which was later reduced to approximately $121,000.00.

8. Nina Linsey used the funds she embezzled from Carlson to purchase a 1999 Plymouth Grand Caravan.

9. The Debtors listed the value of the 1999 Plymouth Grand Caravan on Schedule B in the Defendant’s chapter 13 bankruptcy as $4,700.

10. The Plymouth Grand Caravan was titled in the name of David Linsey.

11. Nina Linsey used the funds she embezzled from Carlson to purchase a 1995 Ford F150.

12. The Debtors listed the value of the 1995 Ford F150 on their Schedule B as $3,850.

13. The Ford F150 was titled in the name of David Linsey.

14. Nina Linsey and David Linsey are married and live together at 11 Meadow-brook Road, Hudson, Massachusetts (the “Property”).

15. David Linsey recorded a Declaration of Homestead on the Property on August 8, 1994. There were no objections to the Debtors’ Declaration of Homestead or to claimed exemptions in the chapter 13 bankruptcy.

16. The fair market value of the Property on February 15, 2002 per a realtor’s opinion of value was $219,900.00.

17. The current balance owed on the mortgage on the Linsey home is $139,279.73.

Discussion

Carlson requests imposition of a constructive trust in its favor in the 1999 Plymouth Grand Voyager, the 1995 Ford F-150, and an undivided 32.26% interest in the Property. The Defendant asserts that a constructive trust does not apply in a Chapter 13 case.

The issue of whether constructive trusts may be imposed or recognized by bankruptcy courts has produced disparate judicial views and remains unsettled. 3 See *586 Robert J. Keach, The Continued Unsettled State of Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 103 Com. L.J. 411 (1998). Although there may be cases, such as where a trustee has invoked his strong-arm powers, in which a competing federal interest would justify a refusal to recognize a constructive trust, this case involves only a two-party dispute. No one has objected to the Debtors’ exemptions; the equity in the house has been exempted. The issue is whether the Debtors may keep the entire equity or whether, if Carlson proves the elements of a constructive trust, they must share the equity with the defrauded creditor. Thus, the main policy justification that courts have given in their refusal to recognize constructive trusts is not applicable in this case and the Court sees no reason to refrain from imposing a constructive trust so long as Carlson can make the necessary showing.

Under the so-called “traditional approach,” adopted by the First Circuit, in order to obtain a constructive trust over the property of a debtor, a party must (1) show either sufficient wrongdoing by the debtor in acquiring the property or a fiduciary relationship between the party and the debtor, and (2) be able to trace the wrongfully held property. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir.1988). If both requirements are met, the constructive trust will be imposed, the property will be excluded from the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(d), and the property ordered turned over to the claimant. See Keach, supra, at 421. Many courts opt to strictly construe these requirements for the reason that imposition of a constructive trust in favor of one creditor can undercut the Bankruptcy Code policy of ratable distribution among similarly situated creditors. See Richard Cox v. Nancy Cox, 247 B.R. at 572. The first of the two requirements is easily met by Nina Linsey’s admitted embezzlement. The tracing requirement, however, merits additional discussion.

It is well established that mere commingling of trust property with other property of the debtor does not defeat imposition of a constructive trust. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 838 F.2d at 619. In the case of commingling, however, the claimant bears the further burden of tracing the alleged trust property “specifically and directly” back to the illegal transfers giving rise to the trust.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
296 B.R. 582, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 937, 2003 WL 21946740, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlson-orchards-inc-v-linsey-in-re-linsey-mab-2003.