Carlson Lumber Co. v. Zervas
This text of 15 Mass. App. Div. 182 (Carlson Lumber Co. v. Zervas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Contract on a promissory note alleging an unpaid balance due of $1,507.00. The defendant’s answer sets forth a general denial, payment, novation, estoppel, a special denial of the corporate existence of the alleged plaintiff demanding proof thereof, and a special denial of the defendant’s signature on the note and demanding proof thereof at the trial. The case has never proceeded to the point of trial on its merits and no evidence has been introduced.
The following interrogatories were propounded by the Plaintiff to the Defendant:
(1) Please identify yourself by stating your full name, age, residence, occupation, business address, giving city or town, street and number. Manuel A. Zervas; over 21; Riverside Drive, Dedham, Massachusetts; real estate; 4.72 Stuart Street, Boston, Mass.
The plaintiff filed a motion to require the defendant to further answer and the Court on April 11,1950, ordered the defendant to further answer interrogatories numbered 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The defendant seasonably claimed a report on the allowance by the Court of the plaintiff’s motion and without waiving his request for a report further answered the plaintiff’s interrogatories numbered 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9,10,11 and 12 as follows: (2) Not so far as I can now recall. (3) See answer to interrogatory No. 2. (4) I do not have the original note for comparison and have no way of knowing whether the photostat is a true facsimile of the note itself. Counsel has advised me that under the laws of this State relating to answering* interrogatories I am not required to travel to the office of counsel for the alleged plaintiff and the interrogatory not having-included sufficient information to guide me in determining* the relationship of the photostat to the original note, I do not feel that I can answer yes or no to this interrogatory and be bound, by such answer. (7) See answer to interrogatory No. 4. (8) Not so far as I know. (9) So far as this alleged plaintiff is concerned I claim a credit for the entire amount. (10) I do not consider that I am at all indebted to this alleged plaintiff. (11) Not to my knowledge. (12) Not so far as I can recall.
[185]*185Thereafter on April 28, 1950, the plaintiff filed a motion to default the defendant for failure to file proper answers to the plaintiff’s interrogatories numbered 4 and 10, in accordance with the order of the Court.
Over the defendant’s objections the Court on May 2,1950, allowed the plaintiff’s motion “as a matter of law” on the ground that interrogatories numbered 4 and 10 had not been answered and defaulted the defendant. The defendant duly requested a report on the allowance by the Court of the plaintiff’s motion.
The report recites that it contains all the evidence material to the question reported. The defendant claims to be aggrieved by the order of the Court directing the defendant to answer the plaintiff’s interrogatories and because of having a default entered against him for not having filed proper answers to interrogatories numbered 4 and 10.
It is exclusively within the discretion of the Court whether orders granting additional time should be given the interrogated party to file answers or further answers to interrogatories. Amherst and Belchertown Railroad Co. v. Watson, 8 Gray 529, 530, 531; Stern v. Filene, 14 Allen 9, 11; Harding v. Noyes, 125 Mass. 572, 573; Harding v. Morrill, 136 Mass. 291; Wetherbee v. Winchester, 128 Mass. 293, 295; Spinney v. Boston Elevated Railway, 188 Mass. 30, 36.
But if the interrogated party answers he should have an opportunity to have the sufficiency of his answers passed upon before being defaulted or non-suited and he should be given the chance to make his answers sufficient before such an entry should be made. Fels v. Raymond, 139 Mass. 98, 100, 101; Hooton v. G. L. Redmond & Co., Inc., 237 Mass. 508, 512.
But the record states that the decision of the trial judge was made as a “matter of law on the ground that interrogatories numbered 4 and 10 had not been answered.” The fact that the Court found that the interrogatories num[186]
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15 Mass. App. Div. 182, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlson-lumber-co-v-zervas-massdistctapp-1950.