Carlos Villalta v. City and County of San Francisco

Ninth Circuit

Carlos Villalta v. City and County of San Francisco

448 F. App'x 697

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 23, 2011

Docket10-16006

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 448 F. App'x 697 (Carlos Villalta v. City and County of San Francisco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Carlos Villalta v. City and County of San Francisco, 448 F. App'x 697 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Gilberto Guerra, Daniel Perez, Anthony Padilla, and Carlos Villalta appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the City and County of San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (“MTA”) on their Title VII disparate treatment claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, Anthoine v. N. Cent. Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 747 (9th Cir.2010), we affirm.

Guerra failed to establish a prima facie case of workplace discrimination or retaliation because restricting his access to a computer database and to a photocopier did not “materially affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.2008) (discussing the third element of disparate impact claims) (internal alterations omitted); see Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir.2000) (applying similar standard to retaliation).

*699 Even assuming Perez made out a prima facie case of discrimination, his work-related misconduct constituted a “legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason” for his dismissal. Cornwell v. Electro, Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Perez adduced no evidence that the employer’s reason was pretextual.

Padilla and Villalta each made out prima facie cases of disparate treatment by showing that each was passed over for a promotion for which he was qualified in favor of a Caucasian employee. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994). But MTA brought forward admissible evidence that it promoted individuals who were rated as more highly qualified than either Padilla or Villalta during the interview process. And unlike the plaintiffs, neither had disciplinary records. Neither Padilla nor Villalta has brought forth evidence creating a triable issue of fact as to whether MTA’s explanation was “unworthy of credence.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir.2005) (applying the standard enunciated by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003)).

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s summary judgment in favor of MTA is AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM *

Gilberto Guerra, Daniel Perez, Anthony Padilla, and Carlos Villalta appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the City and County of San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (“MTA”) on their Title VII disparate treatment claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, Anthoine v. N. Cent. Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 747 (9th Cir.2010), we affirm.

Guerra failed to establish a prima facie case of workplace discrimination or retaliation because restricting his access to a computer database and to a photocopier did not “materially affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.2008) (discussing the third element of disparate impact claims) (internal alterations omitted); see Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir.2000) (applying similar standard to retaliation).

*699 Even assuming Perez made out a prima facie case of discrimination, his work-related misconduct constituted a “legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason” for his dismissal. Cornwell v. Electro, Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Perez adduced no evidence that the employer’s reason was pretextual.

Padilla and Villalta each made out prima facie cases of disparate treatment by showing that each was passed over for a promotion for which he was qualified in favor of a Caucasian employee. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994). But MTA brought forward admissible evidence that it promoted individuals who were rated as more highly qualified than either Padilla or Villalta during the interview process. And unlike the plaintiffs, neither had disciplinary records. Neither Padilla nor Villalta has brought forth evidence creating a triable issue of fact as to whether MTA’s explanation was “unworthy of credence.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir.2005) (applying the standard enunciated by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003)).

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s summary judgment in favor of MTA is AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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