DLD-082 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-2470 ___________
CARLOS EDUARDO MARCOS SALAS, ESTEFFANY LUJAN HERRERA, E.J.M.L, & D.A.M.L., Petitioners
v.
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL ____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency Nos. A243-146-628, A243-146-629, A243-146-630, A243-146-631) Immigration Judge: Maria I. Akalski ____________________________________
Submitted on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 February 12, 2026 Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed March 10, 2026) _________
OPINION* _________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Carlos Eduardo Marcos Salas, Estefanny Lujan Herrera, and their minor children,
E.J.M.L. and D.A.M.L., petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying
their applications for relief from removal. The Government has filed a motion for
summary disposition, arguing that the petition presents no substantial question. We
agree, and we will therefore grant the Government’s motion and summarily deny the
petition for review. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
Petitioners are natives and citizens of Peru who entered the United States in
October 2022. They were charged with removability under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as non-citizens present in the United States without valid entry
documents. They conceded the charge, and the IJ sustained removability. Petitioners
filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). The individual applications were based on the same
set of facts regarding threats that Salas received while in Peru.
At a hearing, at which Petitioners proceeded pro se, Salas testified that he worked
as a graphic designer for his family’s business in Peru. In July 2022, he found a note left
at his business stating, “communicate with us to speak about the matters of the security.”
Administrative Record (A.R.) at 159. Next, in August 2022, three men approached Salas
near his business, and one punched him in the chin; he required stitches as a result. The
men threatened that “it was going to be wors[e] if [he]didn’t comply” and “[o]bey the
instructions.” A.R. at 161-62. Salas testified that “[t]he country was going through an
aggressive wave of extortion,” and he believed the men were attempting to extort money
2 from him because of his business. A.R. at 162-64, 172. That same month, Salas was
driving with Herrera and their children when two men on a motorcycle deliberately hit
the side of his car and brandished firearms. The men did not say anything. Salas
reported the incident to the police, who told him to file a report and that they would
contact him.
Salas also testified that he received phone calls “for two weeks” in August 2022;
he answered twice. The first time, the caller asked if he received the note, and, the
second time, the caller stated, “Hold on onto (sic) the consequences.” A.R. at 186-87.
Both times, Salas quickly hung up. He stopped working after these threats, and left for
the United States a month later. He testified that neither he nor his family have been
threatened since. Finally, Herrera testified that, within two months of their arrival in the
United States, someone sent her brother in Peru a floral arrangement for Salas’ funeral,
which included a threatening note with Salas’ name on it.
The IJ denied all applications for relief, finding that Petitioners failed to establish a
prima facie case for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the CAT. The BIA
dismissed the appeal, and this timely counseled petition for review
followed. The Government moves to summarily deny the petition.1
To make out a prima facie case for asylum, a petitioner must show that he was
persecuted, or has a well-founded fear of persecution, “on account of” a statutorily
1 We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We may take summary action if the petition for review fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
3 protected ground, including “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). An applicant “who establishes
that he or she was previously persecuted on account of a statutorily enumerated ground
triggers a rebuttable presumption that the applicant has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.” Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2007).
Petitioners argue that the Government did not meet its burden to rebut the presumption of
future persecution, and that the IJ and BIA erred in “in shifting this burden to” them.
These arguments misunderstand the Agency’s rulings.
The IJ determined that Petitioners did not meet their burden to show that they
suffered past persecution, or had a reasonable fear of future persecution, on account of a
protected ground. Petitioners did not list any particular protected ground in their
applications for relief, and the IJ “endeavored to identify a cognizable Particular Social
Group [PSG],” but was “unable to do so.”2 A.R. at 107. The IJ concluded that, in any
event, Petitioners had not shown a nexus between past or future persecution and any
protected ground. See Thayalan v. Att'y Gen., 997 F.3d 132, 138 (3d Cir. 2021)
(recognizing that “[p]ersecution is on account of a protected ground only if that ground
‘was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant’” (quoting 8
2 Petitioners now assert that Salas was a member of the PSG “Peruvians who oppose extortionists.” Petitioner’s Br. at 11. But as the Government argues, they did not press this argument on appeal to the BIA, and therefore we are precluded from considering it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring petitioners to exhaust all available remedies for each issue raised); see also Aguilar v. Att’y Gen., 107 F.4th 164, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2024) (recognizing that this Court must enforce the exhaustion rule where the Government properly invokes it).
4 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). Specifically, the IJ found that the written and verbal
communications Salas received were “extremely vague,” and that, even accepting his
testimony that they were threats for money, the “unknown criminals’” were motivated by
financial gain, targeting Salas for money and not “on account of” any protected ground.
A.R. at 108-09. The IJ also concluded that, to the extent that Petitioners fear “general
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DLD-082 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-2470 ___________
CARLOS EDUARDO MARCOS SALAS, ESTEFFANY LUJAN HERRERA, E.J.M.L, & D.A.M.L., Petitioners
v.
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL ____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency Nos. A243-146-628, A243-146-629, A243-146-630, A243-146-631) Immigration Judge: Maria I. Akalski ____________________________________
Submitted on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 February 12, 2026 Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed March 10, 2026) _________
OPINION* _________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Carlos Eduardo Marcos Salas, Estefanny Lujan Herrera, and their minor children,
E.J.M.L. and D.A.M.L., petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying
their applications for relief from removal. The Government has filed a motion for
summary disposition, arguing that the petition presents no substantial question. We
agree, and we will therefore grant the Government’s motion and summarily deny the
petition for review. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
Petitioners are natives and citizens of Peru who entered the United States in
October 2022. They were charged with removability under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as non-citizens present in the United States without valid entry
documents. They conceded the charge, and the IJ sustained removability. Petitioners
filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). The individual applications were based on the same
set of facts regarding threats that Salas received while in Peru.
At a hearing, at which Petitioners proceeded pro se, Salas testified that he worked
as a graphic designer for his family’s business in Peru. In July 2022, he found a note left
at his business stating, “communicate with us to speak about the matters of the security.”
Administrative Record (A.R.) at 159. Next, in August 2022, three men approached Salas
near his business, and one punched him in the chin; he required stitches as a result. The
men threatened that “it was going to be wors[e] if [he]didn’t comply” and “[o]bey the
instructions.” A.R. at 161-62. Salas testified that “[t]he country was going through an
aggressive wave of extortion,” and he believed the men were attempting to extort money
2 from him because of his business. A.R. at 162-64, 172. That same month, Salas was
driving with Herrera and their children when two men on a motorcycle deliberately hit
the side of his car and brandished firearms. The men did not say anything. Salas
reported the incident to the police, who told him to file a report and that they would
contact him.
Salas also testified that he received phone calls “for two weeks” in August 2022;
he answered twice. The first time, the caller asked if he received the note, and, the
second time, the caller stated, “Hold on onto (sic) the consequences.” A.R. at 186-87.
Both times, Salas quickly hung up. He stopped working after these threats, and left for
the United States a month later. He testified that neither he nor his family have been
threatened since. Finally, Herrera testified that, within two months of their arrival in the
United States, someone sent her brother in Peru a floral arrangement for Salas’ funeral,
which included a threatening note with Salas’ name on it.
The IJ denied all applications for relief, finding that Petitioners failed to establish a
prima facie case for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the CAT. The BIA
dismissed the appeal, and this timely counseled petition for review
followed. The Government moves to summarily deny the petition.1
To make out a prima facie case for asylum, a petitioner must show that he was
persecuted, or has a well-founded fear of persecution, “on account of” a statutorily
1 We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We may take summary action if the petition for review fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
3 protected ground, including “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). An applicant “who establishes
that he or she was previously persecuted on account of a statutorily enumerated ground
triggers a rebuttable presumption that the applicant has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.” Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2007).
Petitioners argue that the Government did not meet its burden to rebut the presumption of
future persecution, and that the IJ and BIA erred in “in shifting this burden to” them.
These arguments misunderstand the Agency’s rulings.
The IJ determined that Petitioners did not meet their burden to show that they
suffered past persecution, or had a reasonable fear of future persecution, on account of a
protected ground. Petitioners did not list any particular protected ground in their
applications for relief, and the IJ “endeavored to identify a cognizable Particular Social
Group [PSG],” but was “unable to do so.”2 A.R. at 107. The IJ concluded that, in any
event, Petitioners had not shown a nexus between past or future persecution and any
protected ground. See Thayalan v. Att'y Gen., 997 F.3d 132, 138 (3d Cir. 2021)
(recognizing that “[p]ersecution is on account of a protected ground only if that ground
‘was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant’” (quoting 8
2 Petitioners now assert that Salas was a member of the PSG “Peruvians who oppose extortionists.” Petitioner’s Br. at 11. But as the Government argues, they did not press this argument on appeal to the BIA, and therefore we are precluded from considering it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring petitioners to exhaust all available remedies for each issue raised); see also Aguilar v. Att’y Gen., 107 F.4th 164, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2024) (recognizing that this Court must enforce the exhaustion rule where the Government properly invokes it).
4 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). Specifically, the IJ found that the written and verbal
communications Salas received were “extremely vague,” and that, even accepting his
testimony that they were threats for money, the “unknown criminals’” were motivated by
financial gain, targeting Salas for money and not “on account of” any protected ground.
A.R. at 108-09. The IJ also concluded that, to the extent that Petitioners fear “general
crime, extortion, or gang violence” in Peru, such harm would not be on account of a
protected ground. A.R. at 109.
On appeal, the BIA found no clear error with these determinations. Thus, because
the Agency did not find past persecution, the rebuttable presumption of future
persecution was not triggered, and, therefore, the burden never shifted to the
Government.3
Next, Petitioners challenge the denial of CAT relief. See Petitioners’ Br. at 19-22.
However, they failed to make this argument on appeal, and the BIA explicitly found it
waived. The argument is therefore unexhausted, and we cannot consider it because the
Government raises the exhaustion issue. See Mot. for Summ. Disposition at 10; Aguilar,
107 F.4th at 168-69.
Finally, Petitioners argue that the Agency violated their due process rights by
concluding that “private criminal activity by non-governmental actors” could not be the
basis for an asylum claim. See Petitioner’s Br. at 23-24. Importantly, Petitioners’
3 We note that the IJ also concluded that Petitioners had not met their “burden” to show that they could “safely and reasonably relocate elsewhere in Peru.” A.R. at 110. We need not address this “alternative holding” of the IJ because, as discussed above, the BIA affirmed on the nexus ground. A.R. at 6. 5 argument misapprehends the IJ’s decision. Although the IJ noted that “generally harsh
conditions shared by many other p[e]rsons,” such as “general crime, extortion, or gangs,”
do not amount to persecution, it did not rely on that proposition in denying relief. A.R. at
109. Instead, as noted above, the IJ concluded that relief was not warranted because there
was no nexus between the feared harms and a protected status. A.R. at 109-10.
Based on the foregoing, the petition for review fails to present a substantial
question. We will therefore grant the Government’s motion for summary disposition and
will deny the petition for review.4 See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
4 Petitioners’ motion to withdraw their motion for a stay of removal is granted. The temporary administrative stay of removal entered on November 28, 2025, is vacated. 6