1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Carlos Laperry Smith, Case No. 2:24-cv-00756-CDS-DJA
5 Plaintiff Order Granting Defendant’s Unopposed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 6 v.
7 Jaime Sanchez, et al., [ECF No. 16]
8 Defendants
9 10 Plaintiff Carlos Laperry Smith brings a negligence action against defendants Jaime 11 Sanchez and Old Dominion Freight Line. See Compl., ECF No. 1-2. Old Dominion filed a motion 12 for partial summary judgment as to the negligent and reckless hiring, training, supervision, and 13 retention, and negligent and reckless entrustment claims. See Partial mot. summ. j. ECF No. 16. 14 Responses to the motion were due by July 4, 2025, and no response was filed, so the motion is 15 unopposed. For the following reasons, I grant Old Dominion’s unopposed motion. 16 I. Background1 17 This case arises from a car accident that occurred on April 13, 2023. See ECF No. 1-2 at 18 ¶ 5. Defendant Old Dominion was the owner of the vehicle that defendant Sanchez was 19 operating at the time of the accident. Id. at ¶ 8. As set forth in the complaint, on or about April 20 13, 2023, Smith was travelling northbound on I-15 south of US-95 when Sanchez made an unsafe 21 lane change and collided into Smith’s vehicle. Id. at ¶ 10. Sanchez allegedly failed to pay full 22 attention while driving, failed to observe the road closure in front of him, and failed to reduce his 23 speed. Id. at ¶¶ 11–12. 24 25 26 1 Unless otherwise noted, the court only cites to Smith’s complaint (ECF No. 1-2) to provide context to this action, not to indicate a finding of fact. 1 In turn, Smith filed a complaint in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, 2 Nevada, on April 4, 2024, asserting four causes of action: negligence and negligence per se 3 against Sanchez, and negligent and reckless hiring, training, supervision, and retention, and 4 negligent and reckless entrustment against Old Dominion. See generally ECF No. 1-2. Smith 5 asserts that as a direct and proximate result of Old Dominion’s negligence, he sustained severe 6 bodily injuries and suffers physical and mental pain. Id. at ¶¶ 31–34. 7 Sanchez removed this action on April 19, 2024. See Pet. Removal, ECF No. 1. Old 8 Dominion now moves for summary judgment as to both claims brought against them by Smith. 9 Mot., ECF No. 16. Old Dominion asserts that the undisputed facts show that Smith failed to 10 establish the requisite elements of his claims. Id. at 5. 11 II. Legal standard 12 Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 13 to the nonmovant, indicates “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that “the movant is 14 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect 15 the outcome of the suit” based on the governing law, and a dispute is genuine “if the evidence is 16 such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 17 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “mere disagreement or the bald assertion that a genuine 18 issue of material fact exists” is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Harper v. Wallingford, 877 19 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1989). 20 Because the plaintiffs bear the burden of proof at trial, a moving defendant need only 21 point to an absence of evidence on an element of the plaintiffs’ case. Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 22 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56 by demonstrating the absence of 23 any genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the party resisting summary judgment to 24 “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250– 25 51. “To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce evidence of a genuine 26 dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.” Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 1 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018); Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving 2 party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through 3 affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan v. NME Hosps., 4 Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). 5 District courts may grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment if the movant’s 6 papers sufficiently support the motion and do not present on their face a genuine issue of 7 material fact. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). The failure to oppose a 8 motion for summary judgment does not permit the court to enter summary judgment by default, 9 but the lack of a response is not without consequences. Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 917 10 (9th Cir. 2013). As Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) explains, “[i]f a party fails . . . to properly address another 11 party’s assertion of fact[,] . . . the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the 12 motion” and “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the 13 facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), 14 (3); Heinemann, 731 F.3d at 917. But the nonmoving party’s failure to respond does not absolve the 15 moving party from its affirmative duty to demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 16 of law. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2003). 17 III. Discussion 18 In its motion, Old Dominion argues that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 19 fact, so it is entitled to judgment in its favor. ECF No. 16 at 5. I agree. 20 A. Smith has not presented evidence that Old Dominion was negligent in its hiring, supervision, training, or retention of Sanchez so Old Dominion’s motion for 21 summary judgment as to these claims is granted. 22 Nevada courts recognize two separate torts—one for negligent hiring and another for 23 negligent training, supervision, and retention—but not one that merges them together. See 24 Vaughan v. Harrah’s Las Vegas, Inc., 238 P.3d 863 (Nev. 2008) (separately analyzing a negligent- 25 hiring claim and one for negligent training, supervision, and retention). Moreover, the court is 26 unaware of a claim asserting “reckless” training, supervision, or retention, and Smith did not 1 respond to the motion so he fails to provide any authority to support these allegations. 2 Accordingly, I decline to analyze the “reckless” claim and only analyze these claims separately as 3 negligence claims. 4 5 “The tort of negligent hiring imposes a general duty on the employer to conduct a 6 reasonable background check on a potential employee to ensure that the employee is fit for the 7 position.” Hall v. SSF., 930 P.2d 94, 98 (Nev. 1996) (quoting Burnett v. C.B.A. Sec. Serv.,
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1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Carlos Laperry Smith, Case No. 2:24-cv-00756-CDS-DJA
5 Plaintiff Order Granting Defendant’s Unopposed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 6 v.
7 Jaime Sanchez, et al., [ECF No. 16]
8 Defendants
9 10 Plaintiff Carlos Laperry Smith brings a negligence action against defendants Jaime 11 Sanchez and Old Dominion Freight Line. See Compl., ECF No. 1-2. Old Dominion filed a motion 12 for partial summary judgment as to the negligent and reckless hiring, training, supervision, and 13 retention, and negligent and reckless entrustment claims. See Partial mot. summ. j. ECF No. 16. 14 Responses to the motion were due by July 4, 2025, and no response was filed, so the motion is 15 unopposed. For the following reasons, I grant Old Dominion’s unopposed motion. 16 I. Background1 17 This case arises from a car accident that occurred on April 13, 2023. See ECF No. 1-2 at 18 ¶ 5. Defendant Old Dominion was the owner of the vehicle that defendant Sanchez was 19 operating at the time of the accident. Id. at ¶ 8. As set forth in the complaint, on or about April 20 13, 2023, Smith was travelling northbound on I-15 south of US-95 when Sanchez made an unsafe 21 lane change and collided into Smith’s vehicle. Id. at ¶ 10. Sanchez allegedly failed to pay full 22 attention while driving, failed to observe the road closure in front of him, and failed to reduce his 23 speed. Id. at ¶¶ 11–12. 24 25 26 1 Unless otherwise noted, the court only cites to Smith’s complaint (ECF No. 1-2) to provide context to this action, not to indicate a finding of fact. 1 In turn, Smith filed a complaint in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, 2 Nevada, on April 4, 2024, asserting four causes of action: negligence and negligence per se 3 against Sanchez, and negligent and reckless hiring, training, supervision, and retention, and 4 negligent and reckless entrustment against Old Dominion. See generally ECF No. 1-2. Smith 5 asserts that as a direct and proximate result of Old Dominion’s negligence, he sustained severe 6 bodily injuries and suffers physical and mental pain. Id. at ¶¶ 31–34. 7 Sanchez removed this action on April 19, 2024. See Pet. Removal, ECF No. 1. Old 8 Dominion now moves for summary judgment as to both claims brought against them by Smith. 9 Mot., ECF No. 16. Old Dominion asserts that the undisputed facts show that Smith failed to 10 establish the requisite elements of his claims. Id. at 5. 11 II. Legal standard 12 Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 13 to the nonmovant, indicates “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that “the movant is 14 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect 15 the outcome of the suit” based on the governing law, and a dispute is genuine “if the evidence is 16 such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 17 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “mere disagreement or the bald assertion that a genuine 18 issue of material fact exists” is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Harper v. Wallingford, 877 19 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1989). 20 Because the plaintiffs bear the burden of proof at trial, a moving defendant need only 21 point to an absence of evidence on an element of the plaintiffs’ case. Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 22 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56 by demonstrating the absence of 23 any genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the party resisting summary judgment to 24 “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250– 25 51. “To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce evidence of a genuine 26 dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.” Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 1 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018); Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving 2 party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through 3 affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan v. NME Hosps., 4 Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). 5 District courts may grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment if the movant’s 6 papers sufficiently support the motion and do not present on their face a genuine issue of 7 material fact. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). The failure to oppose a 8 motion for summary judgment does not permit the court to enter summary judgment by default, 9 but the lack of a response is not without consequences. Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 917 10 (9th Cir. 2013). As Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) explains, “[i]f a party fails . . . to properly address another 11 party’s assertion of fact[,] . . . the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the 12 motion” and “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the 13 facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), 14 (3); Heinemann, 731 F.3d at 917. But the nonmoving party’s failure to respond does not absolve the 15 moving party from its affirmative duty to demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 16 of law. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2003). 17 III. Discussion 18 In its motion, Old Dominion argues that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 19 fact, so it is entitled to judgment in its favor. ECF No. 16 at 5. I agree. 20 A. Smith has not presented evidence that Old Dominion was negligent in its hiring, supervision, training, or retention of Sanchez so Old Dominion’s motion for 21 summary judgment as to these claims is granted. 22 Nevada courts recognize two separate torts—one for negligent hiring and another for 23 negligent training, supervision, and retention—but not one that merges them together. See 24 Vaughan v. Harrah’s Las Vegas, Inc., 238 P.3d 863 (Nev. 2008) (separately analyzing a negligent- 25 hiring claim and one for negligent training, supervision, and retention). Moreover, the court is 26 unaware of a claim asserting “reckless” training, supervision, or retention, and Smith did not 1 respond to the motion so he fails to provide any authority to support these allegations. 2 Accordingly, I decline to analyze the “reckless” claim and only analyze these claims separately as 3 negligence claims. 4 5 “The tort of negligent hiring imposes a general duty on the employer to conduct a 6 reasonable background check on a potential employee to ensure that the employee is fit for the 7 position.” Hall v. SSF., 930 P.2d 94, 98 (Nev. 1996) (quoting Burnett v. C.B.A. Sec. Serv., 820 P.2d 750, 8 752 (Nev. 1991)). “An employer breaches this duty when it hires an employee even though the 9 employer knew, or should have known, of that employee’s dangerous propensities.” Hall, 930 10 P.2d at 98 (quoting Kelly v. Baker Protective Servs., Inc., 401 S.E.2d 585, 586 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)). 11 Smith alleges Old Dominion’s conduct “constituted a breach of its duty to exercise 12 reasonable care in hiring [Sanchez].” ECF No. 1-2 at ¶ 30. Old Dominion asserts that Smith fails 13 to provide this court with any facts indicating that it negligently hired Sanchez, and that during 14 the course of discovery, Smith failed to produce any specific evidence to support the conclusory 15 allegations in the complaint. ECF No. 16 at 5–6. Old Dominion provides evidence that Sanchez 16 had a valid Class A Commercial Driver’s License showing he was properly licensed2 to drive the 17 vehicle at issue at the time the accident occurred, so without more, there is no evidence to 18 suggest, much less prove, that Sanchez was improperly hired. Old Dominion further argues that 19 Smith fails to prove that it “failed to conduct a reasonable background check” on Sanchez. Vinci 20 v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 984 P.2d 750, 751 (Nev. 1999) (citing Hall, 930 P.2d at 98). Indeed, Smith 21 does not even mention hiring practices at all in his complaint. 22 Because Smith failed to respond to the summary judgment motion, there is no evidence 23 showing that Old Dominion was negligent when it hired Sanchez, nor that it knew or should 24 have known that Sanchez had dangerous propensities. So I grant Old Dominion’s motion on the 25 negligent hiring portion of Smith’s claim. 26 2 See Def.’s Ex. B, ECF No. 16-2 at 6. 1 2 The record is similarly devoid of facts to support Smith’s negligent training, supervision, 3 and retention claim. In Nevada, the elements of a claim for negligent training, supervision, or 4 retention are: “(1) a general duty on the employer to use reasonable care in the training, 5 supervision, and retention of employees to ensure that they are fit for their positions, (2) breach, 6 (3) injury, and (4) causation.” Lambey v. Nev. ex rel. HHS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51155, at *9 (D. 7 Nev. July 3, 2008) (citing Hall, 930 P.2d at 98, for duty and breach elements and Jespersen v. 8 Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1195 (D. Nev. 2002), for elements of injury and 9 causation). 10 Here, Smith does not provide any support in his allegations that Old Dominion 11 negligently trained, supervised, or retained Sanchez. See generally ECF No. 1-2 at 8. Rather, the 12 complaint merely alleges that as a “direct and proximate result” of Old Dominion’s negligent 13 training, supervision, control and retention of Sanchez, Smith sustained several injuries and may 14 suffer future physical and mental pain and anguish. ECF No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 31–33. 15 To survive a motion for summary judgment, Smith must offer evidence that the employer 16 violated its duty. Colquhoun v. BHC Montevista Hosp., Inc., 2010 WL 2346607, at *3 (D. Nev. June 9, 17 2010) (citing Burnett, 820 P.2d at 750). Again, because Smith did not file a response to the motion 18 for summary judgment, there is no evidence to support Smith’s negligent training, supervision, 19 and retention claim. Consequently, there are no outstanding genuine issues of material fact 20 showing Old Dominion failed to use reasonable care in the training, supervision, and retention of 21 Sanchez, so Old Dominion’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted. 22 B. Smith fails to show there are any genuine issues of fact as to the negligent entrustment claim, so the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this 23 claim is granted. 24 Smith asserts in his complaint that Old Dominion breached its duty to exercise 25 reasonable care by entrusting Sanchez to operate the vehicle that allegedly crashed into him. See 26 ECF No. 1-2 at 9 37. Moreover, Smith alleges that as a direct and proximate result of Old 2|| Dominion’s entrustment, he sustained severe bodily injuries. Id. at J 38. 3 To show negligent entrustment, Smith must show that Old Dominion “knowingly entrusted a vehicle to ‘an inexperienced or incompetent person’ causing the injured party’s 5|| damages.” See Terrel v. Central Washington Asphalt, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1310 (D. Nev. 2016) 6|| (citing Zugel by Zugel v. Miller, 688 P.2d 310, 312 (Nev. 1984)). 7 Old Dominion argues that Smith fails to establish the requisite elements of his claim, and that Smith has not provided any evidence to support his allegations that Sanchez was Q|| incompetent or unqualified to operate a tractor-trailer, so this claim fails. ECF No. 16 at 8. 1 10] agree. Smith did not respond to the summary judgment motion, and his allegations alone are 1]|| insufficient to create “a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Consequently, I grant Old Dominion’s motion for partial summary judgment as to Smith’s negligent entrustment claim. | Conclusion 15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Old Dominion’s motion for partial summary judgment [ECF No. 16] is GRANTED. Old Dominion is dismissed. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed 17|| to enter judgment in favor of Old Dominion on claims three and four. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties must confer and submit a proposed joint 19]| pretrial order that complies with Local Rules 16-3 and December 24, 2025. 20 Dated: November 25, 2025 Lf ‘
21 □□ L f _——_ Cristina Sil 22 U test States District Judge 23 24 25 26