Carlos Landeros v. Merrick Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 29, 2024
• Docket: 19-72855
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 29 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS A. LANDEROS, No. 19-72855 Agency No. Petitioner, A034-266-469 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of an Immigration Judge

Submitted March 26, 2024**

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Carlos A. Landeros, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for

review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order affirming an asylum officer’s

negative reasonable fear determination. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. We review for substantial evidence an IJ’s negative reasonable fear

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). determination, and we review de novo due process challenges to reasonable fear

proceedings. Orozco-Lopez v. Garland, 11 F.4th 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2021). We

deny the petition for review.

Because Landeros does not challenge the IJ’s determinations that he failed to

show a reasonable possibility of persecution on account of a protected ground or a

reasonable possibility of torture if returned to Mexico, we do not address

them. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).

We decline to reach Landero’s claim of harm that was raised for the first

time in his reply brief. See Bazuaye v. INS, 79 F.3d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1996) (court

need not reach issues raised for the first time in the reply brief).

Landeros’ contentions that the asylum officer violated due process by

denying him access to an attorney, interviewing him under duress, and

demonstrating prejudice against him, are not supported by the record.

We reject Landeros’ contention that the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”) provides the right to apply for asylum for individuals in reinstated

removal proceedings. See Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1162 & n.7 (9th

Cir. 2015) (the two available forms of CAT protection are withholding of removal

and deferral of removal); Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1081 (9th Cir.

2016) (“Although the availability of asylum is an important component of our

immigration law, it is not unreasonable to conclude Congress intended to bar this

2 19-72855 form of relief to persons in reinstated removal proceedings while preserving relief

for individuals able to meet the higher standards for withholding of removal and

CAT relief.”).

To the extent Landeros raises a Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim, it

is foreclosed by Usubakunov v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1299, 1303 (9th Cir. 2021)

(“[N]oncitizens have the right to counsel in removal proceedings, albeit not the

right to counsel paid for by the government.”).

Landero’s motions to take notice (Docket Entry Nos. 34, 38, and 40) are

denied.

The stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 19-72855