Carlos Jesus Colina-Meira v. Todd Lyons, et al.

Opinion

CARLOS JESUS COLINA-MEIRA, No. 1:25-cv-1716 CSK P Petitioner, ORDER v.

TODD LYONS, et al., Respondents. Petitioner, an asylum seeker from Venezuela who entered the United States on or around September 29, 2022, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 Petitioner is represented by pro bono counsel. Petitioner was initially detained by immigration officials and released on parole on October 3, 2022. On October 7, 2025, petitioner reported to U.S. Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in Los Angeles and was re-detained. This habeas action concerns petitioner’s re-detention. For the following reasons, this Court grants the petition and orders petitioner released immediately. On December 2, 2025, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.) 1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (ECF No. 11.) On December 3, 2025, petitioner filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 3.) On December 4, 2025, the Honorable Dena M. Coggins denied petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order without prejudice where petitioner was detained on October 7, 2025, but did not explain in his motion why he did not seek injunctive relief sooner. (ECF No. 4.) On December 5, 2025, this Court directed respondents to file a response to the petition within fourteen days and ordered that petitioner may file a reply within fourteen days after being served with the response. (ECF No. 6.) On December 9, 2025, this action was reassigned to this Court after the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. (ECF No. 11.) On December 19, 2025, respondents timely filed a response to the petition. (ECF No. 12.) On December 23, 2025, petitioner timely filed a reply to the response. (ECF No. 13.) In response to the Court’s order (ECF No. 14), on December 29, 2025, respondents filed a supplemental response with additional documents. (ECF No. 15.) On December 30, 2025, petitioner filed a sur-reply. (ECF No. 16.) Briefing is now complete. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela who claims to have entered the United States on or around September 29, 2022 near El Paso, Texas. (ECF No. 12 at 14, 31.) Petitioner entered or was present without inspection and he did not possess or present a valid immigrant visa or other valid entry document. (Id. at 9, 31.) On October 3, 2022, petitioner was paroled into the United States pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(d)(5) due to detention capacity. (Id. at 11, 15, 31.) According to the declaration of the ICE Officer submitted by respondents, on September 6, 2023, petitioner filed an affirmative asylum application (form I- 589), which was subsequently transferred to the Immigration Court, docketed, and a Notice to Appear was filed. (Id. at 31.) On October 7, 2025, petitioner reported to the Los Angeles ICE Field Office where he was detained. (Id. at 31, 17-19.) On October 7, 2025, a Notice to Appear was issued charging petitioner with INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(1), not being in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa or other valid entry document at the time of application of admission, and INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than designated by the Attorney General. (Id. at 6, 32.) On October 25, 2025, an I-830 was filed, reflecting petitioner’s transfer to California City ICE Processing Center. (Id. at 21, 32.) Petitioner was scheduled for a video hearing before an Immigration Judge in Adelanto, California for December 16, 2025. (Id. at 23, 32.) A video hearing before an Immigration Judge in Adelanto has been scheduled for February 6, 2026. (Id. at 32, 28.) The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The petition, filed on a habeas corpus petition form, raises two claims for relief. In claim one, petitioner argues that he is being detained in violation of his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Petitioner contends that after he entered the United States in 2022, he was released on parole. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner contends that following his re-detention on October 7, 2025, he was not afforded a pre-deprivation hearing prior to being detained in violation of his right to due process. (Id.) Petitioner contends that his prior release meant that the government found petitioner not to be a danger or a flight risk. (Id.) In claim two, petitioner argues that the July 8, 2025 DHS guidance classifies petitioner as being bond ineligible under INA 235 and thus subject to mandatory detention. (Id.) Petitioner contends that he is bond eligible under the pre-July 8, 2025 DHS guidance contained under INA 236. (Id.) Petitioner’s claims are more thoroughly briefed in petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 3.) In response, respondents argue that petitioner is detained as an applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is not entitled to a bond hearing. (ECF No. 12 at 2-3.) Respondents further argue that there is insufficient evidence that petitioner would be classified under Section 236 of the Act. (Id. at 3.) A. Statutory Claim (Claim Two) 1. Statutory Background 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention during removal proceedings for applicants “seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “provides the general process for arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under Section 1226(a), the Government has broad discretion whether to release or detain the individual. See id. Section 1226(a) provides several layers of review for an initial custody determination and it confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. In July 2025, DHS issued a memorandum changing its policy regarding application of Sections 1225 and 1226: [A] U.S. Customs and Border Protection Memorandum was issued titled “Detention of Applicants for Admission.” See https://www.cbp.gov/document/foia-record/detention-applicants- admission. The Memorandum indicated that DHS, in coordination with the DOJ, “revisited its legal position” on the INA and determined that § 1225, rather than § 1226, is the applicable immigration authority for an “applicant for admission” including an alien present in the U.S. “who has not been admitted ... whether or not at a designated port of arrival.” Id. It stated that “it is the position of DHS that applicants for admission are subject to mandatory detention under INA § 235(b) and may not be released from DHS custody except by INA § 212(d)(5) parole.” Id. The Memorandum further provides that for custody purposes, “these aliens are now treated in the same manner that ‘arriving aliens’ have historically been treated. The only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release on recognizance, bond, or condition parole under INA § 236(a) are aliens admitted to the United States and chargeable with deportability under INA § 237, with the exception of those subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c).” Id. Pacham v. Archambeault, 2025 WL 3653984, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2025). Until DHS changed its policy in July 2025, the Government consistently applied Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196. 2. Analysis Petitioner contends that he is not “seeking admission” and should be subject to Section 1226(a) consistent with DHS’s former practice and, thus, he is entitled to a bond hearing. Respondents argue that section 1225(b)(2) is the correct authority for petitioner’s detention which does not entitle him to a hearing. This Court agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide, including the Eastern District of California, in rejecting respondents’ interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226. See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1, 21-22 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (concluding, after a thorough analysis, that “the government's [interpretation of § 1225] belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2025) (collecting more than thirty cases rejecting the government's assertion that § 1225 empowers the DHS to arrest and hold a noncitizen present without legal status who has spent years in the U.S.); Cardona-Lozano v Noem, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (“Repeatedly, [district courts across the country] have found that DHS and the [Board of Immigration Appeals’] construction of the INA is incorrect and that petitioners who have long resided in the United States but are being held under § 1225 are entitled to relief.”) (collecting cases); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (holding that § 1226 applies to a petitioner who “DHS has consistently treated” as subject to discretionary detention and “who has been residing in the United States for two years” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at *3 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting cases); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (collecting cases) (“Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful.”). “These courts examined the text, structure, agency application, and legislative history of 1225(b)(2) and concluded that it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a category that does not include noncitizens like [Petitioner], living in the interior of the country.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). By contrast, “[t]he government’s proposed reading of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Guerro Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases). This Court incorporates and adopts the thorough and persuasive reasoning of the district court in Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *3-9. As the district court found in Lepe, this Court rejects the government’s contention that petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2) (ECF No. 12 at 2-3), and finds that petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations because petitioner has resided in this country for 3 years since October 3, 2022, when petitioner was released into the United States on parole, until petitioner was arrested and detained on October 7, 2025 after he reported to ICE. Petitioner’s re-detention on October 7, 2025 was not upon petitioner’s arrival to the United States. B. Due Process Claim (Claim One) Petitioner argues that his detention violates his right to due process. Respondents argue that petitioner does not have a procedural due process right to a bond hearing because § 1225(b) does not provide for a bond hearing. The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. The Court analyzes petitioner’s due process claim “in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “The Due Process clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, 2025 WL 3567862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). The Supreme Court has found that a protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from physical restraint. Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147-49 (1997). Even when a statute allows the government to arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute. See id. (finding due process requires pre-deprivation hearing before revocation of preparole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (same, in parole context). To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts have resolved the issue by comparing the specific conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide range of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring, his “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a parolee possesses a protected interest in her “continued liberty.” Id. at 481-84. Here, petitioner was initially detained upon his arrival, then paroled into the United States on October 3, 2022 and released. As this district court recently explained, this Court agrees that noncitizens paroled into the United States have a liberty interest in their continued release: Many district courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that non-citizens paroled into the United States pursuant to § 1182(d)(5) have a liberty interest in their continued release, entitling them to certain due process protections, the extent of which are determined by applying the test provided in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See e.g. Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *5, 9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (determining that the petitioner was entitled to a post-deprivation bond hearing after he was initially released pursuant to § 1182(d)(5)(A) and later re-detained); Salazar v. Casey, No. 25-cv-02784-JLS-VET, 2025 WL 3063629, at *4, 6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (ordering the petitioner released from custody subject to the conditions of her preexisting parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A), and requiring notice and a hearing prior to her re-detention); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *9– 10, 14 (enjoining re-detention of the petitioner during the pendency of his removal proceedings without leave of the court, when the petitioner was previously released on humanitarian parole pursuant to § 1182(d)(5)(A)); Rodriguez Cabrera v. Mattos, No. 2:25-cv- 01551-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3072687, at *9–11, 14 (D. Nev. Nov. 3, 2025) (ordering the petitioner's immediate release following re- detention when he was initially released pursuant to § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The court agrees with the conclusions reached in the cited cases and finds that petitioner is likely to demonstrate that he has a liberty interest in his continued release. The court proceeds to consider whether due process requires written notice and a pre- detention hearing before a neutral adjudicator. Chavarria v. Chestnut, 2025 WL 3533606, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); see also Castellon v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2373425, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2025) (case-by-case analysis required as to the decision to revoke parole); Y-Z-H-L v Bostock, 2025 WL 1898025, at *10-12 (D. Or. July 9, 2025). This Court concludes that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his release. See Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606, at *3; Castellon, 2025 WL 2373425, at *5; Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] is inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Y- Z-H-L, 2025 WL 1898025, at *10-12; Ortega v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have been released have a strong liberty interest); F.M.V. v. Wofford, 2025 WL 3083934, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). Next, the Court turns to what procedures are necessary to ensure that the deprivation of that protected liberty interest meets the demands of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)], to due process challenges to removal proceedings.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1206; see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). In applying the Mathews test to a procedural due process claim for detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206-07 (citations omitted). Under Mathews, the court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. First, petitioner has a private interest in remaining free from detention. “Freedom from imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint -- lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”)); Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 981 (“[T]he government’s discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”). For three years petitioner was free from custody before his re-detention. Respondents make no claim that petitioner failed to comply with the ICE monitoring requirements or violated any condition of release. Next, the Court turns to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation to petitioner, and finds this factor weighs in petitioner’s favor. “[T]he risk of erroneous deprivation is high when, as here, parole is revoked without written notice or reason.” Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606, at *3; see also A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (“The risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.”). Civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Respondents do not contend that petitioner is or was a flight risk or a danger to the community. “Where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody ... hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high’ because neither the government nor [petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)). Finally, with regard to the third Mathews factor, this Court recognizes that the government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws, but respondents’ interest in detaining petitioner without notice and without a hearing is “low.” See Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. March 3, 2025). Detention hearings in immigration courts are routine, and impose a “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. Even if respondents believed they had a proper reason to detain petitioner, such decision on their part would warrant written notice and a pre-detention hearing rather than automatic detention. “That the Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain petitioner does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with due process.” E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025). In addition, here, the government’s interest is even lower because petitioner was previously released after immigration officials determined he was not a flight risk or danger to the community, there is no evidence that he has a criminal record, and he has complied with all conditions of release.2 See Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025). Overall, balancing these factors, this Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor of finding petitioner is entitled to notice and a bond hearing, and petitioner should have been provided such notice and a hearing before he was re-detained. “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for 2 Respondents do not contend that petitioner violated any conditions of his release. (See ECF Nos. 12, 15.) hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In criminal cases, parolees released on parole, which does not provide “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions,” are also entitled to due process, including a predeprivation hearing before their parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-86. “Numerous district courts have held that these principles extend to the context of immigration detention.” F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (collecting cases). Respondents identify no reason why written notice was not provided as required by their own regulations or why a pre-deprivation hearing could not be held, and provided no evidence of “urgent concerns,” thus, “a pre-deprivation hearing is required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to relief as to his due process claim. VI. CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted; and 2. Respondents are ordered to release petitioner immediately. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless they provide petitioner with written notice before a pre-deprivation bond hearing and demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical custody is legally justified. 3. Within seven days of the date of this order, the parties shall file a joint status report addressing petitioner’s status. Dated: December 31, 2025 A aA Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Meir1716.157/2 1]