Carlos Hernandez v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: June 25, 2025
• Docket: 3D2025-0104
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed June 25, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-0104 Lower Tribunal No. 94-CF-30011-A-P ________________

Carlos Hernandez, Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Mark H. Jones, Judge.

Carlos Hernandez, in proper person.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Daniel Colmenares, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

EMAS, J. Carlos Hernandez appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to

correct illegal sentence, which was ostensibly filed pursuant to Florida Rule

of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). In his brief, Hernandez “now acknowledges

that his claim that his sentence is illegal under Fla. Rules of Criminal

Procedure 3.800(a) is not a valid claim.” On this point, Hernandez is quite

correct. Hernandez nevertheless presses the issue on appeal, attempting to

advance his claim under the banner of “manifest injustice.” However, and

as we have observed before:

The mere incantation of the words “manifest injustice” does not make it so. . . . There is little doubt that every defendant believes they will suffer a “manifest injustice” if their postconviction claim is deemed foreclosed by the passage of time. However, a defendant does not have an unlimited right to continue to litigate (and relitigate) the validity of their conviction, and such a limited right must be balanced against the State's competing and substantial interest in the finality of judgments in criminal cases.

Beiro v. State, 289 So. 3d 511, 511-12 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (internal citations

omitted). We find no merit in Hernandez’s claim, as the issue he raises

(whether Hernandez’s possession and use of a six-inch knife during a

robbery constituted armed robbery with a deadly weapon, as charged in the

Information) is a factual question which the jury, by its 1995 verdict,

answered in the affirmative. Any claim of error regarding this factual

determination could have and should have been raised on direct appeal.

2 This court affirmed Hernandez’s judgment on February 19, 1997, see

Hernandez v. State, 687 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) and the mandate

issued March 7, 1997. Any contention that trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective counsel in regard to this claim should have been

raised in a postconviction motion filed no later than March 7, 1999. See Fla.

R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). Hernandez’s motion, properly characterized, was a

successive, 1 time-barred and procedurally-barred motion for postconviction

relief under rule 3.850, and the trial court correctly denied it as such.

Affirmed.

1 See Hernandez v. State, 3D15-1277 (appeal from denial of rule 3.850 motion).