1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No. CV 22-1371-SPG (KS) 11 CARLOS HERNANDEZ,
12 Petitioner, ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED 13 v. STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14 M. GAMBOA, Warden, et al.,
15 Respondents.
17 18 19 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition for Writ of Habeas 20 Corpus (“Petition”), all of the records herein, the Report and Recommendation of United 21 States Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 21 (“Report”)), and Petitioner’s Objections to the 22 Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 30 (“Objections”)). Pursuant 23 to § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Court has conducted a de novo review of 24 those portions of the Report to which objections have been stated. For the following 25 reasons, Petitioner’s objections to the Report do not warrant a change to the Magistrate 26 Judge’s findings or recommendations. The Court therefore accepts the Report. 27 Petitioner raised a single claim for habeas corpus relief—namely, whether the trial 28 court violated his constitutional rights when it denied his motion for a new trial on grounds 1 that the jurors “considered extraneous and erroneous law.” (ECF No. 21 (“R. & R.”) at 3). 2 As discussed in the Report, Petitioner appealed his conviction asserting as a basis post-trial 3 comments made by one of the jurors (“Juror No. 6”) in Plaintiff’s trial, which Plaintiff 4 claims indicates the jurors considered extraneous information during deliberations. 5 Specifically, the juror stated during a post-trial interview that, “during deliberations there 6 ‘was a lot of discussion about whether the [rape] victim was a willing participant,” but that 7 the jurors “kept coming back to the fact that the victim was only fifteen, and that intercourse 8 with a minor ‘constituted rape.’” (Id. at 6). Because Petitioner was charged and tried for 9 rape by force, Petitioner argues the victim’s age was not relevant to the determination of 10 consent, and the jurors’ consideration of the victim’s age was thus improper. The 11 California Courts of Appeal ultimately rejected Petitioner’s claim of juror misconduct 12 because California and Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit impeaching the verdict based 13 only on the jury’s internal deliberations. (Id. at 6–11). The California Courts of Appeal 14 found that Juror No. 6’s description of the deliberations “is the sort of evidence that opens 15 the jury’s deliberations to scrutiny,” rather than evidence of impermissible extraneous 16 influence, rendering Juror No. 6’s declaration inadmissible. (Id. at 11). 17 In determining Petitioner’s habeas petition, the Report concluded that the California 18 appellate court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 19 federal law because the state court found there was no evidence that extraneous evidence 20 permeated the jury’s deliberations—nor did Petitioner identify any—and therefore the 21 court was not allowed to impeach the jury’s verdict under the California and Federal Rules 22 of Evidence. (Id. at 15). Petitioner raises three objections to the Report. 23 First, Petitioner objects to the conclusion of the Report by stating that Petitioner 24 suffered a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” because he “was deprived of the safeguards 25 affording to him of an impartial jury and the prosecution’s burden to rebut the presumption 26 of prejudice arising from the jurors’ consideration of extrinsic evidence.” (Objs. at 8). 27 Petitioner’s objection, however, does not further identify or explain the “extrinsic 28 evidence” considered by the jury. Both the California and Federal Rules of Evidence 1 “prohibit the use of juror testimony to attack a verdict when that testimony relates to 2 intrinsic matters, specifically, the internal mental processes by which the verdict was 3 reached.” Martin v. Ornoski, No. C 06-1589 PJH (PR), 2009 WL 537075, at *11 (N.D. 4 Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (citing Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (“[L]ong- 5 recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from 6 intrusive inquiry.”)). The jurors’ misinterpretation of the law on its own is not akin to an 7 extraneous influence without other circumstances demonstrating that, for example, a juror 8 brought in evidence or experience from outside of the presentation of evidence. See United 9 States v. Pimental, 654 F.2d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 1981) (evidence that jurors had “made up 10 their minds about the guilt of the defendants” before being instructed on the law was 11 inadmissible to impeach the verdict); United States v. Stacey, 475 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th 12 Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (jurors’ misunderstanding of an element of the offense was 13 evidence of mental processes and therefore inadmissible to impeach the verdict). 14 Petitioner, however, has not shown any evidence of extraneous influence on the jury. The 15 Court therefore overrules Petitioner’s first objection. 16 Second, Petitioner objects that he suffered “cumulative prejudice” because the jury 17 foreman “persuaded” Juror No. 6 to vote for a guilty verdict. This objection similarly 18 points to evidence of internal deliberations inadmissible to impeach the jury’s verdict. See 19 Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1237 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that “the state courts 20 correctly concluded” evidence that jurors “felt pressured to vote for second-degree murder 21 and were treated disrespectfully by other jurors” was “inadmissible as the subjective 22 ‘mental processes’” of the jurors); see also United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 764 (9th 23 Cir. 1978) (evidence that a juror had voted “guilty with reservation” was inadmissible to 24 impeach the verdict). For the same reasons as outlined above, the Court overrules 25 Petitioner’s second objection. 26 Third, Petitioner objects that the evidence of his guilt was “far from overwhelming” 27 and states that he is “actually innocent.” (Objs. at 8–9). But Petitioner did not raise actual 28 innocence as a basis for habeas corpus relief, and as discussed, the Report concluded that 1 the California Courts of Appeal did not unreasonable apply federal law when it held that 2 the evidence of the jurors’ deliberations was inadmissible to impeach the verdict. See (ECF 3 No. 1). Petitioner’s objection regarding evidence of his guilt or his “innocen[ce]” therefore 4 does not relate to any finding within the Report. Nonetheless, Petitioner objects to the 5 “Recommendations that the Petitioner did not refute or present defense evidence contesting 6 the acts of the offenses and consent was not a proffered defense, he merely testified he did 7 not commit the crimes at all, denying any type of sexual relationship with the victim.” 8 (Objs. at 9). This quote, however, is actually from the state court—not the Magistrate 9 Judge—and, in any event, is not responsive to the conclusion of the Report. This objection 10 is thus overruled. 11 Finally, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Objs. at 10).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No. CV 22-1371-SPG (KS) 11 CARLOS HERNANDEZ,
12 Petitioner, ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED 13 v. STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14 M. GAMBOA, Warden, et al.,
15 Respondents.
17 18 19 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition for Writ of Habeas 20 Corpus (“Petition”), all of the records herein, the Report and Recommendation of United 21 States Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 21 (“Report”)), and Petitioner’s Objections to the 22 Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 30 (“Objections”)). Pursuant 23 to § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Court has conducted a de novo review of 24 those portions of the Report to which objections have been stated. For the following 25 reasons, Petitioner’s objections to the Report do not warrant a change to the Magistrate 26 Judge’s findings or recommendations. The Court therefore accepts the Report. 27 Petitioner raised a single claim for habeas corpus relief—namely, whether the trial 28 court violated his constitutional rights when it denied his motion for a new trial on grounds 1 that the jurors “considered extraneous and erroneous law.” (ECF No. 21 (“R. & R.”) at 3). 2 As discussed in the Report, Petitioner appealed his conviction asserting as a basis post-trial 3 comments made by one of the jurors (“Juror No. 6”) in Plaintiff’s trial, which Plaintiff 4 claims indicates the jurors considered extraneous information during deliberations. 5 Specifically, the juror stated during a post-trial interview that, “during deliberations there 6 ‘was a lot of discussion about whether the [rape] victim was a willing participant,” but that 7 the jurors “kept coming back to the fact that the victim was only fifteen, and that intercourse 8 with a minor ‘constituted rape.’” (Id. at 6). Because Petitioner was charged and tried for 9 rape by force, Petitioner argues the victim’s age was not relevant to the determination of 10 consent, and the jurors’ consideration of the victim’s age was thus improper. The 11 California Courts of Appeal ultimately rejected Petitioner’s claim of juror misconduct 12 because California and Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit impeaching the verdict based 13 only on the jury’s internal deliberations. (Id. at 6–11). The California Courts of Appeal 14 found that Juror No. 6’s description of the deliberations “is the sort of evidence that opens 15 the jury’s deliberations to scrutiny,” rather than evidence of impermissible extraneous 16 influence, rendering Juror No. 6’s declaration inadmissible. (Id. at 11). 17 In determining Petitioner’s habeas petition, the Report concluded that the California 18 appellate court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 19 federal law because the state court found there was no evidence that extraneous evidence 20 permeated the jury’s deliberations—nor did Petitioner identify any—and therefore the 21 court was not allowed to impeach the jury’s verdict under the California and Federal Rules 22 of Evidence. (Id. at 15). Petitioner raises three objections to the Report. 23 First, Petitioner objects to the conclusion of the Report by stating that Petitioner 24 suffered a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” because he “was deprived of the safeguards 25 affording to him of an impartial jury and the prosecution’s burden to rebut the presumption 26 of prejudice arising from the jurors’ consideration of extrinsic evidence.” (Objs. at 8). 27 Petitioner’s objection, however, does not further identify or explain the “extrinsic 28 evidence” considered by the jury. Both the California and Federal Rules of Evidence 1 “prohibit the use of juror testimony to attack a verdict when that testimony relates to 2 intrinsic matters, specifically, the internal mental processes by which the verdict was 3 reached.” Martin v. Ornoski, No. C 06-1589 PJH (PR), 2009 WL 537075, at *11 (N.D. 4 Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (citing Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (“[L]ong- 5 recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from 6 intrusive inquiry.”)). The jurors’ misinterpretation of the law on its own is not akin to an 7 extraneous influence without other circumstances demonstrating that, for example, a juror 8 brought in evidence or experience from outside of the presentation of evidence. See United 9 States v. Pimental, 654 F.2d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 1981) (evidence that jurors had “made up 10 their minds about the guilt of the defendants” before being instructed on the law was 11 inadmissible to impeach the verdict); United States v. Stacey, 475 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th 12 Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (jurors’ misunderstanding of an element of the offense was 13 evidence of mental processes and therefore inadmissible to impeach the verdict). 14 Petitioner, however, has not shown any evidence of extraneous influence on the jury. The 15 Court therefore overrules Petitioner’s first objection. 16 Second, Petitioner objects that he suffered “cumulative prejudice” because the jury 17 foreman “persuaded” Juror No. 6 to vote for a guilty verdict. This objection similarly 18 points to evidence of internal deliberations inadmissible to impeach the jury’s verdict. See 19 Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1237 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that “the state courts 20 correctly concluded” evidence that jurors “felt pressured to vote for second-degree murder 21 and were treated disrespectfully by other jurors” was “inadmissible as the subjective 22 ‘mental processes’” of the jurors); see also United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 764 (9th 23 Cir. 1978) (evidence that a juror had voted “guilty with reservation” was inadmissible to 24 impeach the verdict). For the same reasons as outlined above, the Court overrules 25 Petitioner’s second objection. 26 Third, Petitioner objects that the evidence of his guilt was “far from overwhelming” 27 and states that he is “actually innocent.” (Objs. at 8–9). But Petitioner did not raise actual 28 innocence as a basis for habeas corpus relief, and as discussed, the Report concluded that 1 the California Courts of Appeal did not unreasonable apply federal law when it held that 2 the evidence of the jurors’ deliberations was inadmissible to impeach the verdict. See (ECF 3 No. 1). Petitioner’s objection regarding evidence of his guilt or his “innocen[ce]” therefore 4 does not relate to any finding within the Report. Nonetheless, Petitioner objects to the 5 “Recommendations that the Petitioner did not refute or present defense evidence contesting 6 the acts of the offenses and consent was not a proffered defense, he merely testified he did 7 not commit the crimes at all, denying any type of sexual relationship with the victim.” 8 (Objs. at 9). This quote, however, is actually from the state court—not the Magistrate 9 Judge—and, in any event, is not responsive to the conclusion of the Report. This objection 10 is thus overruled. 11 Finally, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Objs. at 10). Petitioner contends 12 that a “simple inquiry” into the jurors’ purported “use [of] their own personal knowledge 13 and other incidents during the trial,” such as “a head nod from a witness [and] an alleged 14 smile from the Petitioner” would “prove the injustice done” to Petitioner. (Id.). However, 15 “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that 16 adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). “If 17 a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court,” as here, “a federal habeas 18 petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that 19 state court.” Id. at 185. An evidentiary hearing is unwarranted where “the state-court 20 record ‘precludes habeas relief’ under the limitations of § 2254(d)[.]” Id. at 183 (quoting 21 Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007)). As the Report correctly found, and as 22 discussed herein, the California appellate court’s determination that inquiry into the jury’s 23 internal deliberation was prohibited was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 24 federal law. Because habeas relief is thus precluded under § 2254(d), the Court denies 25 Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. See Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474 (in federal 26 habeas corpus proceedings, a district court may decline to hold an evidentiary hearing “if 27 the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief”). 28 1 The Court thus accepts the findings and recommendations set forth in the Report. 2 || Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 3 (1) the Petition is DENIED; and 4 (2) Judgment shall be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. 5 6 ||DATED: June 17, 2024 L-—. 7 ~ HON. SHERILYN PEACE GARNETT g UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28