Carlos Gonzalez v. FXI, Inc., et al.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 27, 2026
• Docket: 8:25-cv-00721
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No. 8:25-cv-00721-SRM-ADS 11 CARLOS GONZALEZ,

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

14 MOTION TO REMAND [14] FXI, INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff Carlos Perez Gonzalez’s (“Plaintiff Gonzalez”) Motion 20 to Remand (“Motion”) this case to Orange County Superior Court, arguing that the $75,000 21 jurisdictional amount in controversy is not satisfied under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Dkt. 14. 22 Defendant FXI, Inc. (“Defendant FXI”) opposes the Motion (“Opposition”). Dkt. 19. 23 Plaintiff Gonzalez filed a reply in support of his Motion (“Reply”). Dkt. 20. The Court has 24 reviewed the parties’ arguments, relevant legal authority, and record in this case. For the 25 reasons discussed below, Plaintiff Gonzalez’s Motion to Remand is DENIED. 26 27 28 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Gonzalez, a citizen of California, was employed by Defendant FXI, a 3 citizen of Delaware and Pennsylvania, beginning in April 2014 in roles including packer, 4 machine packer, and forklift operator. See Dkt. 1-1 at 10.1 On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff 5 Gonzalez alleges he was injured while operating a band saw due to equipment failure. See 6 id. at 10–11. He returned to work and completed a shift on June 12, 2024. See id. at 11. 7 The following day, Plaintiff Gonzalez was informed he was terminated for safety 8 violations. See id. 9 On March 5, 2025, Plaintiff Gonzalez filed this action in Orange County Superior 10 Court against FXI, asserting claims of discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination 11 under California law. Dkt. 1-1 at 7. He seeks relief including lost wages, punitive damages, 12 emotional distress, and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 20. 13 On April 9, 2025, Defendant FXI removed the case to federal court under diversity 14 jurisdiction, arguing the amount in controversy is over $75,000 based on (1) back pay of 15 $75,724.80 calculated using Plaintiff Gonzalez’s hourly rate of $19.72 for 95 weeks based 16 on a trial date of April 2026, (2) front pay for one year of $41,806.40, (3) emotional and 17 punitive damages that could range in the millions of dollars based on prior verdicts, and 18 (4) attorneys’ fees of $60,000 or more based on 100 hours at $600 per hour. Dkt. 1 at 1, 3, 19 6–8. 20 On May 9, 2025, Plaintiff Gonzalez filed the present Motion to Remand challenging 21 the amount controversy, arguing that (1) Defendant FXI’s estimates of compensatory 22 damages are conclusory and speculative, and do not account for mitigation of lost wages, 23 and (2) punitive damages, emotional damages, and future attorneys’ fees are never properly 24 in controversy for jurisdictional purposes. See Dkt. 14. 25 26 27

28 1 Citations refer to CM/ECF pagination. 1 On June 12, 2025, Defendant FXI filed its Opposition arguing that the amount in 2 controversy is at least $177,531.20 based on its previous estimates of lost wages and 3 attorneys’ fees alone. Dkt. 19 at 2. 4 Plaintiff Gonzalez filed his reply in support of his Motion on June 19, 2025, 5 contending his back pay is “more like $58,000,” calculated by mitigating Defendant FXI’s 6 $75,724.80 estimate by $18,216 for wages he received from a subsequent employer from 7 September 2024 to June 2025. Dkt. 20 at 2–3. He also reasserts that only attorneys’ fees 8 already accrued are properly counted towards the amount in controversy, which his counsel 9 declares are $9,000 as of June 2025 based on 15 hours of work at an hourly rate of $600. 10 See Dkt. 20-2 at 1. 11 III. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they can only hear the types of cases 13 for which they are constitutionally and statutorily authorized. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 14 U.S. 251, 256 (2013). A defendant may properly remove a case to federal court when the 15 federal district court has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Original subject 16 matter jurisdiction may be satisfied through either diversity of citizenship or the presence 17 of federal law claims. See § 1441(b)–(c). Relevant here, diversity jurisdiction is established 18 by (1) complete diversity of citizenship and (2) an amount in controversy exceeding “the 19 sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 20 To remove a case to federal court, the “defendant bears the burden of establishing . 21 . . the jurisdictional threshold,” see Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 22 (9th Cir. 2018), but it needs “only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy 23 exceeds the jurisdictional threshold; the [removal] notice need not contain evidentiary 24 submissions.” See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 81 25 (2014)(clarifying requirements under §1446(a)). Following removal, a plaintiff may 26 challenge the amount in controversy if it did not assert one in the complaint. Id. at 88. Then, 27 “both sides submit proof and the [district] court decides, by a preponderance of the 28 1 evidence,” if the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied. Id. at 88 n.1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2 1446(c)(2)(B)). 3 In other words, a defendant need only provide “plausible allegations,” without 4 evidence, that the amount in controversy is met for the case to be removed, but if that 5 amount is challenged, the district court decides if it is satisfied by a preponderance of the 6 evidence. See Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 81; see also Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 7 936 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2019). The burden lies with the removing defendant to establish 8 a challenged amount in controversy, and if the evidence is equal, the scales tip in favor of 9 remanding to state court. See Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 10 2015). In this process, courts consider “summary-judgment-type evidence.” Kroske v. U.S. 11 Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g 12 en banc (Feb. 13, 2006). This includes allegations in the complaint and notice of removal, 13 the parties’ briefs, submitted evidence, and available discovery. See, e.g., id.; Harris v. KM 14 Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d 694, 702 (9th Cir. 2020); Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416. 15 The amount in controversy is defined as the total “amount at stake,” see Gonzales v. 16 CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016), i.e., the amount 17 recoverable under the operative complaint at the time of removal, assuming the plaintiff 18 prevails, see Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416–17. It includes all relief a plaintiff could recover if 19 the action succeeds, regardless of the likelihood of success. See Fritsch v. Swift Transp. 20 Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793–94 (9th Cir. 2018) (past and future attorneys’ 21 fees); Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416–17 (damages “compensatory, punitive, or otherwise” 22 including non-economic damages). 23 If the court finds the amount does not exceed the threshold “at any time before final 24 judgment,” it must remand the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). However, the amount is 25 measured as of the time of removal, meaning subsequently adding or dismissing claims 26 from the complaint does not affect the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes. 27 See, Chavez, 888 F.3d at 417. 28 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 The parties dispute whether the statutory $75,000 threshold to establish diversity 3 jurisdiction has been met. Whereas Defendant FXI estimates the amount exceeds 4 $177,531.20, see Dkt. 19 at 2, Plaintiff Gonzalez argues it is no more than $67,000. See 5 Dkt. 20 at 1–2. The parties primarily argue the proper temporal and categorical calculation 6 of the amount in controversy as a matter of law. Plaintiff Gonzalez omits specific dollar 7 amounts from the relief requested in the Complaint. Dkt. 1-1. Therefore, the Court must 8 decide, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the threshold is satisfied. See, Dart 9 Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 81; see also Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199. 10 A. Back Pay and Past Attorney’s Fees 11 In his Reply, Plaintiff Gonzalez concedes that estimates for his back pay and past 12 attorneys’ fees are approximately $58,000 and $9,000. See Dkt. 20 at 2–3. This alone would 13 bring the amount in controversy to approximately $67,000. See id. This estimate mitigates 14 back pay by $18,216 for Plaintiff Gonzalez’s subsequent employment, which Defendant 15 FXI disputes as a matter of law, see Dkt. 19 at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff Gonzalez’s $67,000 16 figure is an underestimate because it fails to account for all future attorneys’ fees, punitive 17 damages, front pay, and relief for emotional distress. See Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416–17; see 18 also Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 794. However, a plaintiff cannot disprove the amount in 19 controversy by merely reducing damages originally claimed in a complaint to below the 20 threshold, or else “the defendant's supposed statutory right of removal would be subject to 21 the plaintiff's caprice.” See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 22 294 (1938). Accordingly, diversity jurisdiction cannot be defeated by simply omitting 23 numerical damages, as Plaintiff Gonzalez has done here for front pay, punitive damages, 24 future attorneys’ fees, and emotional damages. Rather, the Court must decide, by a 25 preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 26 §1446(a); see also Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 81. 27 Plaintiff Gonzalez’s $67,000 estimate, which only includes back pay and past 28 attorneys’ fees, falls $8,000 short of the $75,000 threshold. When calculating the amount 1 in controversy, the Court considers all relief Plaintiff Gonzalez may recover, assuming he 2 is successful in all asserted claims. See Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 793–94; see also Chavez, 888 3 F.3d at 417. Here, Plaintiff Gonzalez’s recoverable relief includes attorneys’ fees, relief for 4 emotional distress, and punitive damages. Thus, assuming Plaintiff Gonzalez’s estimate is 5 correct, the Court must deny this motion if any of the remaining relief at stake exceeds 6 $8,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 7 B. Future Attorney’s Fees 8 Turning to the issue of future attorneys’ fees, Defendant FXI contends at least 9 $60,000 of past and future attorneys’ fees are at stake based upon Plaintiff Gonzalez’s 10 counsels’ hourly rates of $600–$750, see Dkt. 19 at 7. Plaintiff Gonzalez, on the other 11 hand, argues attorneys’ fees should be limited to the $9,000 already incurred for 15 hours 12 of work by Mr. Troy Candiotti as of June 19, 2025, under his declared $600 hourly rate. 13 See Dkt. 20 at 1–2. 14 First, as a matter of law, courts “must include future attorneys’ fees recoverable by 15 statute or contract when assessing whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is met.” 16 See Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 794. Here, Plaintiff Gonzalez’s Complaint seeks to recover 17 attorneys’ fees, including under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), which 18 statutorily permits recovery of attorneys’ fees. See Dkt. 1-1 at 12, 14, 20; see also Hoglund 19 v. Sierra Nevada Mem'l-Miners Hosp., 102 Cal. App. 5th 56, 81 (2024) (“[A] prevailing 20 plaintiff in a [FEHA] lawsuit is usually entitled by statute to receive an award of attorney 21 fees”) (interpreting Cal. Gov't Code § 12965). 22 Relying on Chen, Plaintiff Gonzalez contends that “attorney fees anticipated but 23 unaccrued at the time of removal are not properly in controversy for jurisdictional 24 purposes.” See Dkt. 14 at 6 (citing Chen v. United Talent Agency, LLC, No. CV 17-1848 25 PA (EX), 2017 WL 946642, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017)). However, the Ninth Circuit 26 has since held that “there is no question that future attorneys’ fees are at stake in the 27 litigation.” See Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 794) (cleaned up); see also Arias, 936 F.3d at 922. 28 1 Therefore, under Fritsch, Plaintiff Gonzalez’s statutory attorneys’ fees, past and future, are 2 properly in controversy. See Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 794. 3 Second, the Court gauges the value of future attorneys’ fees at stake here. In this 4 process, a party’s “[c]onclusory allegations . . . are insufficient,” see Matheson v. 5 Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003), but “reasonable 6 assumptions” may be properly relied upon. See Arias, 936 F.3d at 922. “An assumption 7 may be reasonable if it is founded on the allegations of the complaint.” Id. at 925. For 8 instance, in Matheson, the plaintiff sought relief for the delay of an insurance payment for 9 a loss of property valued at less than $16,000. See Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090. The 10 defendant’s allegations were conclusory because the complaint only sought damages “in 11 excess of” $30,000 and there was no other evidence to suggest the $75,000 threshold was 12 satisfied. See id. at 1091. 13 Here, some of Defendant FXI’s allegations are conclusory. For example, it claims 14 “attorneys’ fees will likely exceed $75,000” based upon “Plaintiff’s allegations” and 15 Mr. Candiotti’s hourly rate. See Dkt. 1 at 8. These allegations, alone, are insufficient and 16 conclusory because, as in Matheson, they fail to reasonably tie the assumptions to specific 17 allegations in the complaint. See Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1091. To conclude the amount is 18 satisfied based upon an attorney’s billable rate and assumptions as to the expected billable 19 hours, alone, would be to “render[] meaningless” the amount in controversy requirement. 20 See Hernandez v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 11-245 JP/CG, 2011 WL 13284598, at 21 *3. 22 Nonetheless, the Court finds that Defendant FXI’s allegations that the amount in 23 controversy greatly exceeds $75,000 are ultimately based on reasonable assumptions. As 24 noted above, Plaintiff Gonzalez concedes there is $67,000 at stake, excluding future 25 attorneys’ fees. See Dkt. 20 at 1–2. Mr. Candiotti’s declaration indicates his hourly rate is 26 $600, and that Plaintiff Gonzalez has incurred approximately $9,000 in fees for 15 hours 27 of work as of June 19, 2025. See Dkt. 20-2 at 1. Therefore, if Mr. Candiotti spends at least 28 an additional 13.4 hours working on this case, Plaintiff Gonzalez would accrue over $8,000 1 ||in attorneys’ fees at counsel’s rate of $600 per hour. The Court finds this likely because 2 || Plaintiff Gonzalez has already accrued $9,000 at the early stages of litigation, and an excess 3 || of $17,000 in total attorneys’ fees for this case is not unreasonable. See Reese, 729 F. Supp. 4 980 at 985 n. 4 (noting $30,000 in attorneys’ fees is a “reasonable and conservative 5 || estimate” for a similar employment case with comparable wages at stake for a workplace 6 || in the Central District of California). Therefore, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 7 a preponderance of the evidence based on Plaintiff Gonzalez’s $67,000 estimate and 8 || future attorneys’ fees, alone. 9 CONCLUSION 10 The Court need not address punitive damages, emotional distress, or the total lost 11 |} wages in dispute because it finds the amount in controversy is met through minimum back 12 ||pay and attorneys’ fees, alone. Therefore, the Court holds that diversity jurisdiction is 13 proper. Accordingly, Plaintiff Gonzalez’s Motion to Remand is DENIED. Dkt. 14. 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 || Dated: March 27, 2026 18 HON. SERENA R. MURILLO 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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