Carlos Garcia Marroquin v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: November 21, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03013
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARLOS GARCIA MARROQUIN, Case No.: 25-cv-3013-RSH-AHG

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17

18 On November 6, 2025, petitioner Carlos Garcia Marroquin filed a petition for writ 19 of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner, a citizen 20 of Peru, is detained by U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Otay 21 Mesa Detention Center in San Diego, California. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7. Respondents have filed a 22 return. ECF No. 5. As set forth below, the Court grants the Petition. 23 I. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 25 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 26 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the 27 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 28 1 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 2 III. ANALYSIS 3 A. Jurisdiction 4 Respondents contend that Petitioner’s claim is jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C. 5 § 1252(g) and (b)(9). ECF No. 5 at 7–10. 6 Section 1252(g) provides that, except as otherwise provided in that section, and 7 notwithstanding any other provision of law including 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “no court shall 8 have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the 9 decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or 10 execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 11 Additionally, Section 1252(b)(9) states: 12 Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation 13 and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the 14 United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial 15 review of a final order under this section. 16 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Respondents argue that this habeas petition arises from DHS’s 17 decision to commence removal proceedings, and Petitioner’s challenge is thus barred by 18 both Section 1252(g) and (b)(9). ECF No. 5 at 8–10. 19 The Supreme Court has interpreted the “arising from” jurisdiction-limiting provision 20 in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) provisions narrowly, restricting it “only to three discrete actions that 21 the Attorney General may take”: the “‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, 22 adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti–Discrimination 23 Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The 24 Supreme Court noted that “[t]here are of course many other decisions or actions that may 25 be part of the deportation process . . . .” Id. 26 In a later decision involving a habeas petition, the Supreme Court likewise narrowly 27 interpreted the similar “arising from” language in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Jennings v. 28 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018). Referring back to its opinion in American-Arab Anti- 1 Discrimination Committee, the Supreme Court explained that it did not construe Section 2 1252(g) “to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed 3 actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three 4 specific actions themselves.” Id. (citation omitted). Consistent with this narrow 5 interpretation, the Supreme Court held that Section 1252(b)(9) did not bar the detainee in 6 Jennings from using habeas to challenge the legality of his detention. Id. at 294–95 (“[I]t 7 is enough to note that respondents are not asking for review of an order of removal; they 8 are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal; and 9 they are not even challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be 10 determined. Under these circumstances, § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional 11 bar.”). See also Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating 12 that § 1252(b)(9) “does not affect petitions for habeas corpus”). 13 Here, Petitioner challenges the legality of his detention rather than challenging an 14 order of removal or Respondents’ decision to charge him with being a removable 15 noncitizen. Based on the foregoing precedent, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim 16 is not barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) or (b)(9). 17 Respondents also argue in a footnote that “the Court should ensure Petitioner 18 properly exhausts administrative remedies.” ECF No. 5 at 10 n.2. This Court, following 19 other courts in this district, finds that exhaustion would be futile here because the Board of 20 Immigration Appeals would be obligated to apply administrative precedent to conclude 21 that detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See Hoyos Amado v. U.S. Dep’t 22 of Justice, No. 25-cv-2687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL 3079052, at *3 (Nov. 4, 2025) (collecting 23 cases). 24 B. Merits 25 Petitioner appears to argue—and Respondents construe him as arguing—that he is 26 entitled to a bond determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides that, except for 27 noncitizens with certain criminal convictions as set forth in subsection (c), the Attorney 28 General may release an alien on bond or conditional parole pending a decision on whether 1 the alien is to be removed from the United States. 2 Respondents maintain that Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing, because he is 3 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). ECF No. 5 at 11–15. That 4 statute provides that subject to certain exceptions, “in the case of an alien who is an 5 applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien 6 seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall 7 be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 8 An “applicant for admission” for purposes of this section includes an “alien present in the 9 United States who has not been admitted . . . .” Id. § 1225(a)(1). 10 Respondents argue that Petitioner is an alien present in the United States who has 11 not been admitted, and therefore that under the plain language of the statute, he is an 12 “applicant for admission” subject to the mandatory detention provision of Section 13 1225(b)(2)(A). ECF No. 5 at 1. Respondents do not dispute Petitioner’s assertion that at 14 the time of his arrest in connection with his current detention, he had already been present 15 in the United States for over two decades after having crossed the U.S.-Mexico border in 16 2004. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 13. Thus, at the time of Petitioner’s arrest, he was not an applicant 17 for admission in an everyday sense, but Respondents argue he was nonetheless an applicant 18 for admission under the statutory definition. ECF No. 5 at 11. 19 The plain language of the mandatory detention provision on which Respondents rely 20 requires, however, that the “applicant for admission” also be “seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C. 21 § 1225. The record does not reflect that Petitioner was in the process of “seeking 22 admission” at the time he was arrested. ECF No. 1 ¶ 44. Respondents appear to answer that 23 all applicants for admission are, by definition, also “seeking admission.” ECF No. 5 at 13– 24 14. Respondents do not cite any cases that expressly so hold. 25 Respondents’ interpretation of “seeking admission” as used in the mandatory 26 detention provision of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) would seemingly render that phrase mere 27 surplusage, such that the language could be deleted while retaining the same statutory 28 meaning: “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining 1 immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a 2 doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) 3 (emphasis added). Respondents argue elsewhere that “[o]ne of the most basic interpretative 4 canons instructs that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its 5 provisions.” ECF No. 5 at 13 (citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)). 6 Respondents’ approach to the mandatory detention provision at issue appears to run 7 contrary to this interpretive canon. 8 Respondents’ interpretation also appears to collapse the general distinction between 9 Section 1225(b) and Section 1226(a) explained by the Supreme Court in Jennings. In that 10 case, the Supreme Court observed that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the government 11 to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). 12 It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending 13 the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” 583 U.S. at 289. The Court 14 thereby contrasted “aliens seeking admission into the country” (to whom Section 1225(b) 15 applies) with “aliens already in the country” (to whom Section 1226 applies). Id. The 16 Supreme Court described Section 1226(a) as the “default rule” for “the process of arresting 17 and detaining” aliens who are already “inside the United States.” Id. at 288. See also id. at 18 303 (“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States. Section 1226(a) creates 19 a default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to 20 issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings.”). 21 Here, it would be more accurate to describe Petitioner as “already in the country” or 22 “already present in the United States” rather than as “seeking admission into the country”— 23 Petitioner had been in the United States for decades at the time he was arrested. Concluding 24 that Petitioner is subject to Section 1226(a) is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 25 discussion in Jennings. 26 Section 1226(a) itself provides an exception (“[e]xcept as provided in subsection 27 (c)”) to its rule that the Attorney General may set bond or release an alien on conditional 28 parole. Section 1226(c), in turn, provides for the mandatory detention of noncitizens who 1 have committed certain crimes. Relevant here, Section 1226(c) states that “[t]he Attorney 2 General shall take into custody any alien who … is inadmissible under paragraph (6)(A) 3 . . . of section 1182(a) of this title, and is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, 4 admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential 5 elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer 6 offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person. . . .” 7 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) (emphasis added). 8 Petitioner appears to satisfy the first of these two statutory conditions for mandatory 9 detention: He is “[a]n alien present in the United States without having been admitted or 10 paroled,” which is a ground for inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6). However, 11 Petitioner does not satisfy the second of these two statutory conditions—there is no 12 suggestion that he has been arrested for or committed an enumerated crime. The point is 13 not that Respondents are relying on the mandatory detention provision contained in Section 14 1226(c)—they are not. But Respondents’ interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) would 15 seemingly render the foregoing language from Section 1226(c) a nullity. That is, under 16 Respondents’ interpretation, all aliens “present in the United States without being admitted 17 or paroled” are applicants for admission who are seeking admission, and are subject to 18 mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). There would be no reason for Congress 19 to further specify that some subset of those noncitizens, who have committed certain 20 enumerated crimes, are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1226(c)(1)(E). 21 The overwhelming majority of courts to address the issue have agreed that Section 22 1226(a), rather than the mandatory detention provision of Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies 23 to a noncitizen in Petitioner’s position who has resided in the United States for years. See, 24 e.g., Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-13073, 2025 WL 2952796, at *8 & n.4 25 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and 26 not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this country, 27 irrespective of the length of time, having been apprehended and arrested within the border 28 of the United States. The reading of the statutes supports this finding, as does every other 1 || Court that has had to address the distinction between Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and Section 2 || 1226(a).”) (collecting cases); Cerritos Echevarria v. Bondi, No. CV-25-3252-PHX-DWL 3 || (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025) (“In recent months, many district 4 ||courts across the country have grappled with the same issue, and it appears that all but one 5 ||of them has rejected Respondents’ position and concluded that an alien in Petitioner’s 6 || situation (7.e., an alien who entered the United States without inspection, never formally 7 ||applied for admission, and has been living in the United States for years or decades) is 8 entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).”’) (collecting cases). This Court rules likewise. 9 The Court concludes that Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 10 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and that detention, bond, and release in Petitioner’s case are 11 ||instead governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 12 CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are directed to 14 || arrange a bond hearing for petitioner Carlos Garcia Marroquin before an immigration court 15 || pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of this order as described above. The 16 ||Court declines to order Petitioner’s immediate release, to issue an injunction or further 17 judicial declarations. The Court VACATES the hearing date set for December 4, 2025 and 18 || any remaining dates set in this case. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: November 21, 2025 21 Fo ht G Howe Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28