Carlos E. Mendez v. Board of Review

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: A-1950-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1950-24

CARLOS E. MENDEZ,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and CREAM O LAND DAIRY, INC.,

Respondents. __________________________

Argued May 5, 2026 – Decided May 15, 2026

Before Judges Rose and Torregrossa-O'Connor.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 330683.

Carlos E. Mendez, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf.

Courtney Babb, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Board of Review (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gina M. Labrecque, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Claimant Carlos E. Mendez appeals from a January 3, 2025 final decision

of the Board of Review, disqualifying him from unemployment benefits under

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he left his job without good cause attributable to

the work. We affirm.

I.

We summarize the pertinent facts and events from the record before the

Board. From August 25, 2017 to February 28, 2023, Mendez was employed as

a truck driver for Cream O Land Dairy, Inc. On February 26, 2023, Mendez

filed a claim for unemployment benefits. On March 23, 2023, the Deputy

Director of the Division of Unemployment Insurance disqualified Mendez from

receiving unemployment benefits because he left his work voluntarily without

good cause attributable to the work. On March 30, 2023, Mendez appealed the

Deputy's decision to the Appeal Tribunal.

On January 31, 2024, the Tribunal conducted a telephonic hearing, during

which Mendez was represented by counsel and testified on his own behalf,

without the assistance of a Spanish-speaking interpreter. The employer

presented the testimony of: human resources manager, Daviani Cordero;

A-1950-24 2 operations manager, Emanuel Caravano; union representative, Jeremiah Rice;

and vice president of operations, Scott Stoner.

Mendez testified Caravano terminated him on February 28, 2023 after

Mendez questioned a large amount of tax deducted from his paycheck for

vacation time. When Mendez requested Caravano correct the issue, Caravano

"got mad," told Mendez he "ha[d] to resign," and attempted to have him sign a

resignation letter. Mendez refused to sign the letter. That day, Mendez called

Rice advising Caravano terminated him. Rice then contacted Stoner and

arranged for Mendez to work on March 1, 2023.

After working his route on March 1, Mendez spoke with Rice in the

parking lot and requested a personal day for March 2. When Mendez returned

to work on March 3, 2023, he was unable to access the building and was told to

speak with Caravano. Instead, Mendez contacted Rice. At the hearing, Mendez

described a 2022 incident when he was terminated and later reinstated, which

gave him hope he could keep his job this time.

Caravano testified, "Mendez asked to get paid out [for] his vacations

because he needed the money." The employer complied. Thereafter, Mendez

complained to Caravano that taxes were deducted from his paycheck.

Explaining he "c[ould not] do anything about taxes that were taken out of [his]

A-1950-24 3 check," Caravano told Mendez to speak with the payroll department. Mendez

replied, "I'm giving you my two weeks' notice. I'm resigning and don't ask me

to come back like you gave me my job back the last time." Caravano verbally

accepted Mendez's resignation. Caravano testified, under the union contract,

employees must resign via a formal writing or they are "not paid out anything

that's owed to [them]." Although Mendez did not sign a resignation letter, he

received all wages owed.

Rice testified Mendez asked for a vacation payout, which the company

provided but included in Mendez' regular paycheck, placing him in a higher tax

bracket. According to Rice, Mendez made "multiple attempts . . . before this

incident transpired to get restitution," and Mendez said he would "resign from

his position, but he didn't want to sign any type of resignation [letter] until he

was aware if he was gonna get compensation." Rice stated Mendez believed if

he continued working, he would face retaliation. Rice informed Mendez his

"best course of action [wa]s to take the voluntary resignation."

Although Rice was not present when Mendez told Caravano he quit,

Mendez acknowledged he spoke with Caravano "with an intent to resign from

the company, but . . . wanted to make sure that he was going to receive full

compensation." Rice testified he spoke with the union attorney who advised

A-1950-24 4 that Mendez "had the right[] to rescind his resignation." When Rice asked

Mendez if he would like to get his job back, Mendez responded, "No." Rice

stated Mendez "was adamant" because he feared retaliation. Rice asserted he

was not authorized to approve Mendez's off day and Mendez knew why he was

taxed at a higher rate.

Text messages between Rice and Mendez were read into the record. On

an undisclosed date, Rice wrote: "There is no policy. They wrongfully

terminated you. Complaining isn't a violation." At some point, Mendez replied:

"They told the unemployment that I resigned. Why they said [sic] that if

[Caravano] the boss fired me in front of everyone." Rice replied, "Resigned gets

you paid from them. It didn't go to unemployment. According to unemployment

you were fired."

Rice explained he "was trying to create an impropriety against the

company to show that [Mendez did]n't resign[], he was terminated." That is why

Rice told Mendez "to work and make it appear as if [he wasn't] resigning." Rice

asserted Mendez "knew what he did, he kn[e]w he resigned from th[e] position."

Mendez "didn't want to take the job back because" he feared "retaliation." But

after the union attorney informed them Mendez's refusal to return to work would

be considered job abandonment, Rice and Mendez "went along with the

A-1950-24 5 resignation." Rice clarified he wanted to create the impression Mendez was

terminated to ensure his compensation under the voluntary resignation provision

of the union contract and so he qualified for unemployment benefits.

On redirect examination, Mendez denied he: told Rice he quit; did not

want his job back; and participated in a scheme to create an impression he was

terminated so he could collect unemployment benefits. Mendez maintained he

was fired because he upset Caravano by questioning his withheld taxes.

On February 2, 2024, the Tribunal affirmed the Deputy's determination.

The Tribunal credited Caravano's testimony that he "advised [Mendez] to seek

the right tax resource" because Caravano "had no control over the tax deduction

and therefore would have no cause to fire [Mendez] over it." Additionally, the

Tribunal found Rice confirmed the text messages between Mendez and him were

"part of a pretentious plot of a discharge for the receipt of unemployment

benefits." Thus, the Tribunal concluded Mendez "resigned over the unresolved

tax deduction and not for good cause," voluntarily left his work, and was

disqualified for benefits.

Mendez administratively appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board.

In its January 3, 2025 final decision, the Board affirmed the Tribunal's

determination, but supplemented the Tribunal's factfinding. The Board found

A-1950-24 6 Rice's testimony "most persuasive and most credible as he testified that he was

'dragged into' the unemployment proceedings after colluding with [Mendez] to

deceive the employer" so that Mendez could "receive the maximum

compensation pursuant to the union contract" and "collect unemployment

benefits." The Board also found Mendez resigned because he feared retaliation

for inquiring about the reduction of his vacation pay and disagreed with the

Tribunal's decision Mendez left "solely due to the unresolved tax deduction."

The Board determined Mendez did not leave employment "in a huff" as

did the claimant in Savastano v. Board of Review, 99 N.J. Super. 397 (1968).

The Board concluded Mendez "was given ample opportunity to rescind his

resignation" and "was adamant in his decision to leave the employer." The

Board concluded Mendez's return to work on March 1, was part of "a ploy to get

paid according to the union contract and to receive unemployment benefits."

Self-represented on appeal, Mendez maintains he was terminated by

Caravano and, as such, he did not voluntarily leave his employment. He further

argues the Board's credibility findings are misplaced. For the first time on

appeal, Mendez contends he should have been afforded the assistance of a

Spanish interpreter at the hearing before the Tribunal.

A-1950-24 7 II.

Well-established principles guide our review. The scope of our review of

an administrative agency's final determination is strictly limited. Brady v. Bd.

of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997); see also Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor

Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018). An agency's decision may not be

disturbed on appeal unless it is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or

inconsistent with applicable law. Brady, 152 N.J. at 210. "If the Board's factual

findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to

accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)); see

also McClain v. Bd. of Rev., 237 N.J. 445, 456 (2019). "[I]n reviewing the

factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is

not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original

determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could

reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Brady, 152 N.J. at 210 (quoting

Charatan v. Bd. of Rev., 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).

To avoid disqualification, a claimant has the burden of establishing he or

she left work for "good cause attributable to work." Brady, 152 N.J. at 218; see

also N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) (providing an employee who "left work voluntarily

without good cause attributable to such work" is disqualified from

A-1950-24 8 unemployment-compensation benefits). "Good cause attributable to such work"

is defined in N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) as "a reason related directly to the

individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no

choice but to leave the employment." An employee has left work "voluntarily"

within the meaning of the statute "only if 'the decision whether to go or to stay

lay at the time with the worker alone.'" Lord v. Bd. of Rev., 425 N.J. Super.

187, 191 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. Bd. of Rev., 13 N.J.

431, 435 (1953)). Accordingly, an employee who leaves a job without a

sufficient work-related reason is disqualified from receiving benefits. See Self,

91 N.J. at 457; see also Cottman v. Bd. of Rev., 454 N.J. Super. 166, 169-70,

(App. Div. 2018) ("With few exceptions, leaving work for personal reasons

unrelated to the work, no matter how reasonable, disqualifies an employee from

receiving unemployment benefits.").

In Savastano, cited by the Board in the present matter, the claimant argued

with a coworker, left work early, returned the next day, and found out he was

replaced. 99 N.J. Super. at 399. We noted:

Employees frequently leave work temporarily for some fleeting physical or mental irritation, or "in a huff" occasioned by one or more of the frustrations attending commercial life, without intending to quit. Although such an individual may be said to have left work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the

A-1950-24 9 work, thus engaging in conduct which might justify a discharge by the employer, nevertheless such a party may not be said to have "left work" in the meaning of having severed his employment relationship with an intent not to return.

[Id. at 400.]

We held whether an employee quit or was fired "depends upon the facts

of each particular case" and "is to be determined by the Board upon an analysis

of the evidence and specific findings of fact supportive of its conclusion." Id.

at 400-01. We remanded to the Board to determine "the critical questions[,]"

including: "what, if anything, did [claimant] say when he left"; "was he prepared

to resume work when he returned the following day"; "did the employer sever

the employment relationship by the hiring of a permanent replacement"; and

"did claimant quit or was he discharged?" Id. at 400.

In the present matter, the Board considered and rejected Mendez's

argument that he left his employment "in a huff" as did the claimant in

Savastano. The Board found Mendez was "adamant in his decision to leave the

employer," and "sought union counsel after he resigned and chose not to rescind

his resignation." Mendez's return to work on March 1 was not to resume his

employment rather it was part of "a ploy to get paid according to the union

contract and to receive unemployment benefits." We defer to the Board's

A-1950-24 10 findings, Brady, 152 N.J. at 210, and conclude the record sufficiently

demonstrated Mendez voluntarily resigned on February 28, 2023 because he was

dissatisfied with the taxes withheld from his paycheck and feared retaliation for

inquiring about his pay.

We also reject Mendez's contention that the Tribunal failed to

"demonstrate[] a sufficient basis to find . . . Rice [more] competent or credible"

than he. Based on its review of the record, the Board found Rice's testimony

"most credible" because, as a union representative, he "did not testify in order

to corroborate the testimony of the other employer witnesses[,] but to provide

his firsthand account of his interactions and communications with [Mendez]

despite potential adverse repercussions from the employer." We defer to the

agency's credibility findings, see Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 444 N.J. Super. 576, 584

(App. Div. 2016), and there is sufficient evidence in the record that supports the

Board's conclusion, Brady, 152 N.J. at 210.

For the first time on appeal, Mendez argues the Tribunal failed to provide

a Spanish interpreter at the hearing. "Normally, we do not consider issues not

raised below at an administrative hearing." In re Stream Encroachment Permit,

402 N.J. Super. 587, 602 (App. Div. 2008); see also Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins.

A-1950-24 11 Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,

cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2026).

We have nonetheless considered Mendez's contentions and conclude they

are belied by the record. The transcript of the hearing reflects Mendez was

represented by counsel, who advised the Tribunal Mendez's first language is

Spanish, but Mendez "refused" an interpreter for testimonial purposes. Based

on our review of the transcript, we do not discern a language barrier or

confusion. Mendez fully answered questions, asked questions, offered

testimony when no questions were pending, and never stated during the hearing

he did not understand the proceedings.1

We therefore conclude the record supports the Board's conclusion Mendez

left "voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" under N.J.S.A.

43:21-5(a). Because the Board's decision "is supported by sufficient credible

evidence on the record as a whole," R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D), we discern no reason to

disturb it.

Affirmed.

1 We recognize Mendez requested, and was afforded, an interpreter during his self-represented argument before us. However, that accommodation does not alter our conclusion Mendez understood and fully participated in the proceedings before the Tribunal for the reasons noted above. A-1950-24 12