Carlos Castillo-Crespo v. William Barr

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 13, 2019
Docket17-72936
StatusUnpublished

This text of Carlos Castillo-Crespo v. William Barr (Carlos Castillo-Crespo v. William Barr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carlos Castillo-Crespo v. William Barr, (9th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 13 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS ALEXANDER CASTILLO- No. 17-72936 CRESPO, Agency No. A206-676-194 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 16, 2019 San Diego, California

Before: HURWITZ, OWENS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Carlos Alexander Castillo-Crespo, a native and citizen of El Salvador,

petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),

finding that his appeal from a removal order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) was

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. withdrawn pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4.1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. We grant the petition and remand.

Waiver of the right to appeal a removal order must be “considered” and

“intelligent.” Chavez-Garcia v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 840 (1987)). The applicant must

therefore be informed that departure from the country would waive the right to

appeal. Id. at 997-98. Although Chavez-Garcia dealt with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e),

which provides for “waiver” of the right to appeal when a petitioner departs the

country before appealing the order of an IJ to the BIA, there is no material difference

between the “waiver” and “withdrawal” of an appeal through departure. When an

appeal is withdrawn, the decision of the IJ is “final to the same extent as though no

appeal had been taken.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4.

The government presented no evidence that Castillo knew departure would

1 The regulation provides:

Departure from the United States of a person who is the subject of deportation or removal proceedings, except for arriving aliens as defined in § 1001.1(q) of this chapter, subsequent to the taking of an appeal, but prior to a decision thereon, shall constitute a withdrawal of the appeal, and the initial decision in the case shall be final to the same extent as though no appeal had been taken.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.4.

2 result in the withdrawal his appeal, and the BIA made no such finding.2 Nor is there

clear and convincing evidence in the record that Castillo knew of this consequence

before his alleged departure. See Chavez-Garcia, 871 F.3d at 997 (holding that there

must be “clear and convincing evidence” of waiver) (citing United States v. Gomez,

757 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2014)).3

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

2 Castillo relied on Chavez-Garcia in a supplemental filing to the BIA, which addressed that opinion in its decision. See Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 914 (9th Cir. 2018) (“It is well-established that we may review any issue addressed on the merits by the BIA, regardless of whether the petitioner raised it before the agency.”). 3 Because we grant the petition on this ground, we do not address the other arguments in Castillo’s petition.

3 Castillo-Crespo v. Barr, No. 17-72936 FILED LEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: NOV 13 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS I respectfully dissent for two reasons.

First, Castillo-Crespo did not adequately raise and exhaust the argument that

he allegedly did not receive sufficient notice about the effect of departing the

country. He did not argue this in his merits brief to the BIA, and instead relies

solely on a submission to the BIA that simply states that Chavez-Garcia v.

Sessions, 871 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2017) “is directly relevant to his case.” See Abebe

v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“Petitioner will

therefore be deemed to have exhausted only those issues he raised and argued in

his brief before the BIA.”).

Second, even assuming that the claim is exhausted, Castillo-Crespo’s

argument fails because he received sufficient notice about the effect of his

departure. To file a notice of appeal with the BIA, Castillo-Crespo had to use

Form EOIR-26. The instructions for Form EOIR-26 states “[i]f you leave the

United States after filing an appeal with the Board, but before the Board decides

your appeal, your appeal may be withdrawn and the Immigration Judge’s decision

put into effect as if you had never filed an appeal.” This is sufficient warning of

the effects of his departure.

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Related

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez
481 U.S. 828 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Abebe v. Mukasey
554 F.3d 1203 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
United States v. Faustino Gomez
757 F.3d 885 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Gualberto Chavez-Garcia v. Jefferson Sessions
871 F.3d 991 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Moris Quiroz Parada v. Jefferson Sessions, III
902 F.3d 901 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)

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Carlos Castillo-Crespo v. William Barr, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlos-castillo-crespo-v-william-barr-ca9-2019.