Carlos Ayala v. Tapestry, Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01052
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARLOS AYALA, Case No. 24-cv-1052-BAS-BJW

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 14 TAPESTRY, INC., (ECF No. 39) 15 Defendant. 16 17 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Carlos Ayala’s motion for class certification. 18 (ECF No. 39.) 19 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges several California Labor Code violations against 20 Defendants Tapestry, Inc., Kate Spade, LLC, and Stuart Weitzman IP, LLC. (ECF No. 1- 21 2, Ex. A.) Omitting the reimbursement of business expenses claim, Defendants previously 22 moved for partial summary judgment on an affirmative defense; namely, that Plaintiff is 23 exempt from the California Labor Code as an “executive” employee. (SJ Mot. 1:8–9, ECF 24 No. 34.) The Court granted Defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25 49.) 26 Given that all other California Labor Code claims have been decided as a matter of 27 law, the only remaining claim for class certification is the reimbursement of business 28 expenses claim. Upon review, the Court DENIES the motion for class certification. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff started work for the fashion brand Coach as an “associate store manager” 3 in October 2015. (Ayala Dep. 18:12–13, 35:22–24, ECF No. 34-1, Ex. A.) In December 4 2019, he was promoted to “store manager.” (Id. 38:13–18.) In that capacity, Plaintiff was 5 the highest-ranking employee on site. (Id. 68:25–69:3.) Plaintiff left Coach in June 2023. 6 (Id. 52:4–9.) 7 Defendant Tapestry, Inc. has approximately 40 Coach stores in California, including 8 more than 15 retail stores and more than 25 outlet stores. (Crespo Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 41- 9 2.) The annual sales volume for California stores ranges from $1 million to $30 million. 10 (Id. at ¶ 4.) Since October 1, 2019, Defendant has employed 96 individuals in exempt 11 positions in Coach stores in California. (Lebe Decl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 39-3.) 12 At the time of Plaintiff’s employment, Defendant did not provide Coach store 13 managers with a work phone, (Ayala Dep. 174:9–12, ECF No. 39-3, Ex. 8), but Defendant 14 has since provided work phones for such managers, (DiMaso Decl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 41-1). 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 To obtain class certification, a plaintiff must satisfy several requirements under 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. First, a plaintiff must satisfy all four 18 requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) Numerosity: “the class is so numerous that joinder of all 19 members is impracticable,” (2) Commonality: “there are questions of law or fact common 20 to the class,” (3) Typicality: “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 21 of the claims or defenses of the class,” and (4) Adequacy: “the representative parties will 22 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Id. 23 Next, a plaintiff must satisfy at least one subdivision of Rule 23(b). Id. As relevant 24 here, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing of (1) Predominance: “the court finds that the 25 questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 26 affecting only individual members,” and (2) Superiority: “that a class action is superior to 27 other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Id. And 28 1 Rule 23(b)(3) provides four considerations to reason through predominance and 2 superiority. Id.1 3 After conducting a “rigorous analysis” of the requirements, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 4 Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011) (citation omitted), the court is afforded “broad discretion” 5 to certify the class, Zinser v. Accufix Rsch. Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir.), 6 opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). While the court does 7 not decide the merits at class certification, see Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust 8 Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465 (2013), the plaintiff must prove—not just plead—each 9 requirement, see Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 275 (2014). 10 A plaintiff seeking class certification carries the burden of proof. See Zinser, 253 11 F.3d at 1186. And the court uses a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Olean 12 Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 664–65 (9th Cir. 13 2022). 14 III. ANALYSIS 15 The only viable claim for class certification is California Labor Code § 2802(a), 16 reimbursement of business expenses. The section states, in relevant part: “An employer 17 shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by 18 the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties[.]” Cal. Lab. Code 19 § 2802(a). 20 Plaintiff seeks to certify “The Business Expense Reimbursement Class” defined as: 21 “All current and former retail employees of Defendants in the state of California who were 22 classified as exempt from May 10, 2021, through the resolution of this matter.” (Not. ¶ 23

24 1 These four considerations under Rule 23(b)(3) state: 25 (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; 26 (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; 27 (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 28 1 1(f), ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff is the only class representative. (Id. at ¶ 2; Ayala Decl. ¶ 2, 2 ECF No. 39-2.) 3 The Court first determines whether Plaintiff satisfies the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), 4 then addresses whether common questions of law or fact predominate under Rule 23(b)(3). 5 A. Satisfaction of Rule 23(a) Factors 6 The Court first considers commonality under Rule 23(a). Commonality requires at 7 least some “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). But 8 one cannot satisfy the element by simply stating common questions. See Dukes, 564 U.S. 9 at 349–50. Instead, the district court must determine “whether the evidence establishes that 10 a common question is capable of class-wide resolution.” Olean, 31 F.4th at 666–67 11 (emphasis in original); see also Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp. 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (1998) (“All 12 questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule, […] shared legal issues 13 with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled 14 with disparate legal remedies within the class.”). 15 Here, Plaintiff offers Defendants’ practice of failing to reimburse employees for 16 personal phone use. (Mot. 22:3–5, ECF No. 39.) In other words, the common question of 17 fact that Plaintiff distills is the lack of reimbursement. Although Plaintiff’s commonality 18 argument could be reinforced with other common threads, the Court finds Plaintiff has 19 provided at least one common question of fact that is capable of class-wide resolution. See, 20 e.g., Hardwick v. Hoovestol, Inc., No. cv 20-7505-DMG (MAAx), 2022 WL 4596592, at 21 *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2022) (noting that employer did not reimburse employees for 22 personal cellphone use on the job thus the indemnification subclass “has established that 23 they share a common injury and a common question that is conducive to classwide 24 adjudication”). 25 Accordingly, Plaintiff has satisfied the requirement of commonality. Given that the 26 Court ultimately denies the motion and Defendants’ opposition brief limits its arguments 27 to disputing commonality, (Opp’n 8:9, ECF No. 41), the Court assumes, for purposes of its 28 analysis, that the other Rule 23(a) elements have also been met. 1 B. Satisfaction of Rule 23(b)(3) 2 The Court next considers predominance under Rule 23(b)(3).2 Predominance means 3 that “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members 4 predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 23(b)(3). The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance analysis recognizes the existence of common 6 issues of fact or law pursuant to the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality analysis, thus, moving the 7 inquiry further, “Rule 23(b)(3) focuses on the relationship between the common and 8 individual issues.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022. Put differently, the predominance inquiry 9 asks “whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 10 representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 11 As discussed, Plaintiff identifies only one common question of fact common to class 12 members: Defendants’ failure to reimburse employees for personal phone use. (Mot. 22:3– 13 5.) But Plaintiff does not point to a uniform policy or a potential plan for common proof in 14 support. And Plaintiff does not provide “representative evidence” that “each class member 15 could have relied on […] to establish liability if he or she had brought an individual action,” 16 for example. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 454–55, 450 (2016) (relying 17 on a study performed by Dr. Mericle, an industrial relations expert, who “conducted 744 18 videotaped observations and analyzed how long various donning and doffing activities 19 took” and then “averaged the time taken in the observations to produce an estimate of 18 20 minutes a day for the cut and retrim departments and 21.25 minutes for the kill department” 21 in a wage and hour suit). Defendant has submitted eleven declarations from Coach exempt 22 employees—both general and store managers—that reflect inconsistent personal phone 23 use, and all may not be “necessary.” One manager declares, “I occasionally used my 24 personal cell phone to check my emails when I was outside the store or to text with 25 coworkers about schedule changes.” (DeRose Decl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 41-1, Ex. 2.) Another 26 manager states, “I would use my personal phone outside of the store to text my team 27 2 The Court notes that Plaintiff has only alleged satisfaction of Rule 23(b)(3) in the motion for 28 1 members individually, or check various work apps on my phone.” (Gill Decl. ¶ 23, ECF 2 No. 41-1, Ex. 5.) Someone else attests, “I would use my personal phone to communicate 3 with my District Manager or with my team members via text or email while outside of the 4 store.” (Mugleston Decl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 41-1, Ex. 8.) And still another states, “I did not 5 communicate with my team when they were not at work.” (Hawkins Decl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 6 41-1, Ex. 6.) 7 Further, there are 96 exempt Coach employees across 40 Coach stores marked by 8 varying degrees of profitability and size, giving rise to distinct demands and supervisory 9 structures. (Crespo Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4; Lebe Decl. ¶ 13); cf. Tyson, 577 U.S. at 459 (“[I]n this 10 case each employee worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was paid under the 11 same policy.”). In light of the lack of common proof and the variation across potential class 12 members, the Court finds individual factual issues will predominate. 13 Moreover, several district courts have denied class certification for personal phone 14 use under § 2802(a) on grounds of either commonality or predominance. See, e.g., Hale v. 15 Brinker Int’l, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (denying class certification 16 for reimbursement of personal phone use because the “plaintiffs have failed to allege that 17 Brinker had a uniform policy or practice requiring that” employees use personal phones to 18 make schedule change arrangements); Uschold v. Carriage Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-04424- 19 JSW, 2020 WL 1466172, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2020) (denying class certification for 20 reimbursement of personal phone use because the class “would include sales staff from 21 nearly three dozen locations in California” which gives rise to individual inquiries “on a 22 variety of factors specific to the physical set up of each office,” and “[i]ndividual Plaintiffs 23 [] espoused different reasons for using their cell phones over landlines”).3 24

25 3 See also Dugan v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., No. SA cv 16-1125-PA (FFMx), 2016 WL 9173459, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2016) (denying class certification for reimbursement of personal phone 26 use because “determination of necessity would require inquiry into […] the number of phones at the specific store, the number of phones being occupied at the time of the call, and the motivation of the 27 individual Sales Associate in making the call on his or her personal cell phone instead of a store phone”); Hardwick, 2022 WL 4596592, at *9 (denying class certification for reimbursement of personal phone use 28 1 Plaintiff cites to two cases where a court granted class certification for 2 reimbursement of business expenses. First, Plaintiff cites James v. Uber Technologies Inc., 3 but Uber is distinguishable. 338 F.R.D. 123 (N.D. Cal. 2021). Relevant to the reasoning in 4 Uber, the California Court of Appeal in Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Services, Inc., found 5 liability under § 2802 for mandatory personal phone use. 228 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1140 6 (2014) (“We hold that when employees must use their personal cell phones for work- 7 related calls, Labor Code section 2802 requires the employer to reimburse them.”). And it 8 is not possible to be an Uber driver without a phone. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 9 311 F.R.D. 547, 567 (N.D. Cal. 2015), rev’d and remanded, 904 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2018) 10 (“[P]hone expenses are plainly required for every Uber driver, as it would be impossible to 11 be an Uber driver without these items.”). Here, Plaintiff provides no evidence that 12 employees must use their personal phones to work as Coach employees. In the second case 13 Plaintiff cites to, the plaintiff could point to “a general policy that requires distributors to 14 obtain their own vehicle and insurance, as set forth in the standard [Distributer Agreement] 15 signed by all distributors.” Ludlow v. Flowers Foods, Inc., No. 18-cv-1190-JO-JLB, 2022 16 WL 2441295, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 5, 2022). Here, Plaintiff does not raise any company 17 policy for support. In light of the numerous cases denying class certification under similar 18 factual circumstances, the Court fails to see persuasive reasoning to justify granting class 19 certification. 20

21 [the provided ELD communication system] cannot be used” Plaintiff “did not provide evidence that the 22 ELD system ever malfunctions or is unusable for any reason, or that the use of personal cellphones is not completely a personal preference with respect to these tasks,” so that individual issues predominate); 23 Galvan v. First Student Mgmt., LLC, No. 18-cv-07378-JST, 2022 WL 20016825, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2022) (denying class certification for reimbursement of personal phone use even though three of five 24 declarations from class members suggested the “[d]efendants were aware that employees were incurring 25 unreimbursed business expenses” because the plaintiff “offer[ed] no way of determining when, or to what extent, class members incurred unreimbursed business expenses”); cf. Castro v. ABM Indus., Inc., 325 26 F.R.D. 332, 341 (N.D. Cal. 2018), modified, No. 17-cv-3026-YGR, 2018 WL 2197527 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) (granting class certification of a narrowed class given that the plaintiffs offered an ABM Work 27 Rule which requires employees to “[o]bey work orders of Supervisors” and “[p]erform the work assigned and follow instructions” upon penalty of “disciplinary action, up to and including termination” to show 28 1 In conclusion, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy predominance and thus cannot satisfy 2 || Rule 23(b)(3) to warrant class certification. 3 CONCLUSION 4 Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion for class certification on the 5 ||reimbursement of business expenses claim. (ECF No. 39.) This case remains open, as 6 || Plaintiff can bring the ret1mbursement of business expenses claim on an individual basis. 7 || The Court ORDERS the parties to contact the magistrate judge on or before February 8 2026, for a revised scheduling order with pretrial and trial dates. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 ~ 11 || DATED: February 6, 2026 (yatta Bahar □□ D H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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