Carlin v. Krout

120 A. 232, 142 Md. 140, 29 A.L.R. 13, 1923 Md. LEXIS 4
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJanuary 9, 1923
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 120 A. 232 (Carlin v. Krout) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carlin v. Krout, 120 A. 232, 142 Md. 140, 29 A.L.R. 13, 1923 Md. LEXIS 4 (Md. 1923).

Opinion

Urner, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

While passing over an undulating floor, known as the “ocean wave,” in a building at the appellant’s amusement park, the appellee, a woman fifty-nine years of age, suffered the injury which is the occasion of this suit. The only question presented on appeal from the judgment recovered by the appellee is whether there is legally sufficient evidence of negligence in the construction or operation of the amusement device in the use of which she was injured.

The “ocean wave” is composed of a series of five hinged platforms, having an aggregate length of forty-nine feet, which are given a vertical and longitudinal motion from beneath by crankshafts turned by an electric motor. The platforms are of wood and are evenly joined together1 by flat metal hinges. Extending upward from the sides of the platforms are solid wooden barriers., about three feet high, surmounted by pipe, hand-rails. The side walls of the connecting sections, are closely adjusted for the over-lapping movement which occurs when the device is in operation. The handrails are so placed .as to be six inches apart, as their ends overlap. There is no lateral motion in any part of the device. At the time of the accident it was in perfect condition and operation according to its. design.

The appellee was near the middle of the ocean wave when,, as she testified, in moving her left hand from one section of the handrail to. another, her arm was caught between the two rails, and when she removed her rigjht hand from the rail on the other side for the purpose of releasing her left arm, she fell to the floor, with her arm still held by the rails, and remained in that position for some minutesi until an attendant stopped the machinery. The principal injury consisted *142 of a fracture of the arm bones between tbe wrist and tbe elbow, from which a partial disability of tbe arm has resulted.

A.witness who accompanied the appellee, by walking beside the ocean wave as sbe proceeded over it, confirmed ber account of tbe accident. It was testified by this witness, and by another of the appellee’s companions, that when sbe fell ber left .arm, was resting on top of tbe rail nearest to her, but bow it was caught and held by the other rail, six inches away, does not appear- from the testimony. An employee of tbe appellant testified that be was standing beside the ocean wave, to the appellee’s left, as -she was- passing from the second to the third sections, and that a handbag suspended from ber left arm caught on tbe end of tbe third section rail and as sbe tried to recover it ber arm went down between tbe rails and sbe lost ber balance, but be jumped over tbe side as sbe started to fall, assisted her1 to a sitting position, her arm having become released, and then hastened to turn off tbe power. The witnesses for tbe appellee stated that there was no -employee of the appellant near tbe ocean wave when tbe accident occurred, and that the handbag carried by the appellee was suspended from her right arm. While tbe handbag fell outside of tbe rails to the appellee’© left, the explanation made by herself and her witnesses- is that it was carried over to that side when she attempted to -assist her left arm with her right hand.

Tbe question as to tbe legal sufficiency of tbe evidence to support a recovery must be decided upon tbe assumption that the circumstances of the accident were correctly described by the appellee’s witnesses. It is, therefore, necessary to proceed upon the theory that, in some way other than by her handbag becoming entangled, the .appellee’s arm was injured between the rails. But the acceptance of the appellee’s statement to-that effect does not require us to sustain her charge that the appellant was negligent in the construction and operation of the device which sbe was .attempting to use. *143 2ÑTo evidence was offered to prove that it was defective or imperfect in design, material, or workmanship. Its structure was simple, and whatever dangers its use involved were obvious. It was manifestly not intended to be regarded as a perfectly safe means of diversion. The special thrill it provided was partly due to the risks which those passing* over it would inevitably incur. It was one of a number of unusual forms of amusement which the resort afforded. The admission fee entitled the visitor to* use any or all of the various devices or merely to* observe their use* by other patrons. Above the entrance to the building was a large notice to the effect that persons using the amusements must do so at their own risk.

The charge of negligence in this case does not relate to* unseen defects or unexpected dangers,, but to visible conditions presenting known hazards which were voluntarily assumed. To support the charge in relation to such conditions, it was not sufficient to show that the appellee;si arm was broken on or between the handrails as she fell on the* undulating floor over which she wasi endeavoring to walk, but it was, necessary to prove that tbe appellant had failed to make reasonable provisions to, obviate or reduce the* risk of such a, misfortune. It is urged that an inference of negligence may be drawn from the fact that the ocean wave was so constructed as to permit the recurrent over-lapping] of the handrails, to the extent of six or eight inches. There* is no proof that such an arrangement of the rails* was, improper or unnecessary. It is evident that handrails were requisite*, in order that, the danger of falling might be diminished for1 the patrons*, and as* the rails must approach and recede with the movement of the sections to, which they are attached, it may be that a slight overlapping of the rails, when the connecting sections are depressed to* their lowest level, is unavoidable, if the ends of tbe rails are not to* be too* widely separated when the* sections, are raised to their highest elevation. But in so adjusting tbe hand-rails as to* provide an open interval of six inches be *144 tween them,, when the ends overlap, the appellant was taking a precaution, which he might reasonably regard as sufficient, against such an injury as the appellee sustained. It would he subjecting the appellant to an unduly strict accountability to hold that, in spite of the apparently ample separation of the rails, he should have anticipated the possibility of such an unusual accident as the one described by the testimony. The proof in the case shows that no other accident of this nature has ever occurred to any of the thousands of persons who have used (the device during the two years that have elapsed since it was installed. While this fact would not in itself he conclusive as against the theory of negligence;, it may properly he considered upon the question as to whether the part of the device which is said to have been improperly designed and constructed is fairly subject to that criticism.

An important consideration in this case is that the appellee, in attempting to use the device in question, could not fail to realize her complete dependence upon her own action for her safety. If, as she testifies, there was no one in charge of the ocean wave at that time, it was all the more apparent that she must rely, for a successful passage, upon her unaided ability to maintain her balance by availing herself of the means of support which were provided.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
120 A. 232, 142 Md. 140, 29 A.L.R. 13, 1923 Md. LEXIS 4, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlin-v-krout-md-1923.